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Abstract 
My dissertation uses the “peak oil” movement as a lens to analyze the convergence of 
apocalyptic environmental thinking and libertarian political culture in the recent United 
States.  The “peak oil” movement was a twenty-first century American social movement 
of Americans who came to believe that oil depletion and other environmental problems 
would lead to the imminent collapse of global industrial society.  Dedicated adherents 
developed a rich subculture, primarily online, and prepared themselves for the “post-
carbon” future by conserving energy, changing occupations, and even purchasing land.  
Drawing on surveys of over 1,500 participants, ethnographic research, discourse analysis 
of peak oil websites and literary analysis of subcultural fiction, my research reveals a 
group of mostly white, male, liberal Americans struggling with the perceived threat of 
economic, environmental and geopolitical decline while the country undergoes a broad 
shift in political culture: the continued rise of libertarian ideals, accelerated by the 
influence of Internet technology.  I view this apocalyptic subculture in the context of the 
environmental discourse of “limits to growth,” petroleum dependence, eco-apocalyptic 
discourses, and the influence of conservative individualism on American political culture.   
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Introduction: Peak Politics 
To most scholars who are even familiar with the term, “peak oil” is shorthand for 
energy depletion, but for a subculture of Americans in the early twenty-first century 
“peak oil” became an ideology.  Between 2004 and 2010, hundreds of thousands of 
Americans came to believe that an impending oil scarcity would lead to the imminent 
collapse of industrial society and the demise of the United States of America.1  The “peak 
oil” movement was a twenty-first century movement of Americans for whom the dire, 
apocalyptic consequences of oil scarcity were a fundamental belief that organized the 
way they thought about their lives, an “ecological identity” that often superseded other 
categories of identity.2  For many, “peakism” transformed the way they lived as well: so-
called “peakists” changed occupations, purchased land, retrofitted their homes, drove 
less, biked more, stockpiled supplies, and even left their partners as a result of their 
newfound belief system.   
One popular explanation of the peak oil theory was provided by writer/filmmaker 
“Oily Cassandra” in her 2007 YouTube video “Porn. Peak Oil. Enjoy.”  A split screen 
was intended to attract and then educate male viewers, who made up over three quarters 
of all peakists: on the right side, a sexualized Cassandra, wearing a short pink skirt and a 
revealing top, performs a mock-striptease to house music; on the left side, she soberly 
explains the concept of peak oil: 
                                                
1 This conservative figure emerges from analysis of web site membership two surveys developed for this 
dissertation.  See page 20 for more details. 
2 Although we typically think of identity as being determined by more traditional categories, such as race, 
class, gender and sexual orientation, historians of conservatism and environmentalism can attest to the 
importance of self-chosen factors, such as dedicated conservative activists or deep ecologists.  See Mitchell 
Thomashow, Ecological Identity: Becoming a Reflective Environmentalist (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); 
and Andrew Light, “What Is An Ecological Identity?” Environmental Politics 9, no. 4: 59-81. 
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Peak oil: it’s bigger than terrorism, global warming or genocide.  It’s the end of 
your way of life.  It’s not right wing or left wing doomsday theory, it’s the truth, 
and it’s right around the corner… What’s the big deal?  You’ll just drive less, 
right?  The problem is, oil isn’t just about driving.  Oil affects almost every aspect 
of our lives.  Think about it.  90% of our transportation fuel is oil.  And since 
most of our clothing, furniture and resources come from overseas, that means oil-
fueled ships may not be bringing them.  And what about food?  Our abundant 
supply of food comes from an average of 1500 miles away, which means, if you 
don’t live by a farm, no food for you.  There won’t be much food anyway, since 
oil is used to make fertilizers and pesticides fired by gas-fueled tractors.  If the 
current farming system stopped using petroleum, soon up to two-thirds of the 
world’s population may not make it.  Four billion—billion!—people may not 
survive.3 
Even if an Manhattan Project-scale endeavor of renewable energy development were to 
be implemented immediately, peakists say, it would not be sufficient, since “as Asia’s 
booming population begins to demand the same lifestyles as Americans enjoy and as 
global war starts to stabilize the oil distribution system, the demand” for petroleum will 
soar.  While most Americans have an implicit faith in the development of new 
technologies to provide energy for future generations, peakists are pessimistic about the 
potential of other fossil fuels and nonrenewable energy sources to replace petroleum.   
“It’s too late for cheery myths about how technology, wind hybrids, biofuels, 
                                                
3 “Porn. Peak Oil.  Enjoy,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAPf9V3_li0.  Accessed July 15, 2012.  As 
of this writing, it had been viewed by over 300,000 people.   
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hydroelectric dams, solar energy or hydrogen will save us and let our society continue as 
is.” 
       
Cassandra’s video is a window into this subculture’s socio-economic makeup and 
virtual orientation.  According to my surveys of peakists, they are primarily white 
(approximately 89-91%), male (73-84%) and educated—nine out of ten have at least a 
college degree, and one out of three has a Master’s or Ph.D.4  The peak oil movement has 
been called the “liberal Left Behind”5 for good reason—most American believers 
described themselves as “liberal” (29%) or “very liberal” (27%), while only 7% 
described themselves as “conservative.”  Given a wider range of political identities to 
choose from, more peakists described themselves as “anarchist” (7-9%) and “socialist” 
                                                
4 The values here reflect the differences between two surveys conducted by the author in 2011.  See notes 
66 and 67 for discussion of survey methods. 
5 Bryan Urstadt, “Imagine there’s no oil: scenes from a liberal apocalypse,” Harper’s Magazine, August 
2006. 
Figure x.1: “Oily Cassandra” explains the theory of peak oil in a YouTube video with over 
300,000 views. 
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(10-11%) than “conservative” (4-6%).  Not surprisingly, Cassandra’s video was most 
popular with men, but they are chiefly middle-aged men—in my surveys, the average 
peakist was 47.  Although believers can be found around the world—the Association for 
the Study of Peak Oil has chapters in 23 counties—the phenomenon is focused in the 
United States (70-77% of respondents), where believers have proven exceptionally 
passionate and dedicated.   
The medium of Cassandra’s evangelism is also reflective of the peak oil 
phenomenon—like her dramatic persona, the peak oil community existed almost entirely 
on the Internet.  Adherents created a rich virtual community composed of websites, blogs, 
Podcasts, YouTube channels, poems, cartoons, video games, online forums, and even 
peak oil psychotherapy.  Although their primary focus was petroleum, the scope of 
adherents’ concern is more accurately captured by the phrase “peak everything.”6  Just as 
petroleum will become scarce, costly and eventually unavailable, other natural resources 
will follow: peak water (freshwater availability); peak dirt (topsoil erosion); peak fish 
(overfishing); peak uranium; peak metal (precious metal scarcity); peak natural gas, and 
so on.  “Peak oil” is not so much an obsession with oil, but a comprehensive re-
evaluation of the relationship between humans and the natural resources we depend on.  
The potentially far-reaching implications of resource depletion have been the subject of 
dozens of scores of scholarly articles in a wide array of fields and disciplines, but the 
subculture and politics of the peak oil movement has been overlooked, partially because 
of its virtual orientation—believers generally meet on the Internet, prepare for the post-
oil future alone, and do not seek publicity. 
                                                
6 Richard Heinberg, Peak Everything: Waking Up to a Century of Decline (New Society Publishers, 2007). 
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Peakists stressed the need for collective solutions to oil depletion, reflecting the 
communitarian ideals of the American left, but most actually prepared for the post-carbon 
future alone.  After becoming “peak oil aware,” three out of four began stockpiling food, 
one out of three purchased a more energy-efficient car, one out of four moved to a 
smaller or more energy-efficient home, and one out of five changed their occupation.  
Although communal responses to the threat of peak oil have received a great deal of 
attention in the late 2000s, only one out of four respondents had participated in such 
political or collective action, and many of these respondents had attended only one 
meeting.7  In this way, this group was very different from traditional “social movements” 
that we are familiar with, membership organizations with hierarchies and explicit 
political goals.  The peak oil movement is typical of a twenty-first century “movement” 
organized through the Internet, but might also be called a “phenomenon,” “community,” 
or, borrowing Manuel de Landa’s term, a “social assemblage”—a fluid, temporally 
contingent grouping, reliant on networks (and thus decentralized), centered around 
knowledge and information across spatial boundaries.8  As such, it was similar to other 
                                                
7 In response to the question, “As a result of your knowledge of peak oil, have you done any of the 
following,” 72% had “prepared food or other supplies for yourself and your family,” 82% had “reduced 
energy usage at your current home,” 24.3 had “moved to a smaller or more energy-efficient home,” 27.3 
had “engaged in political activity related to peak oil,” and only 3% had “moved to a Transition Town.”  
The Transition Initiative, begun in the United Kingdom in 2007, has received the most attention.  
Transition is a franchise model of intentional communities based on Rob Hopkins’ book The Transition 
Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008).  For scholarship (mostly British) on Transition Towns, see Amanda Smith, “The 
Transition Town Network: A Review of Current Evolutions and Renaissance,” Social Movement 
Studies 10, no. 1 (2011): 99–105; Ian Bailey, Rob Hopkins, Geoff Wilson, “Some things old, some things 
new: The spatial representations and politics of change of the peak oil relocalisation movement,” Geoforum 
41, no. 4 (2010): 595–605; Peter North, “Eco-localisation as a progressive response to peak oil and climate 
change: A sympathetic critique,” Geoforum 41, no. 4 (2010): 585–594.  
8 Manuel de Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (New York, 
Continuum, 2006).  See also Graeme Chesters and Ian Walsh, Complexity and Social Movements: 
Multitudes at the Edge of Chaos (New York: Routledge, 2006) and Nick Srnicek, Assemblage Theory, 
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loose, decentralized groups, such as the Occupy movement.  But unlike Occupy, the peak 
oil movement was a movement without politics—a movement, in some ways, that was 
specifically anti-political.  
Even though peakists followed news and current events more closely after 
becoming “peak oil aware,” most avoided political engagement even after their 
“conversion.”  They actually became less likely to vote or attend marches, rallies, or 
protests.9  Cassandra, for example, asserted that “truth has a left-wing bias” and protested 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, but claimed in 2007 that there was no place for her 
concerns in mainstream American politics.10  Instead of trying to engage in 
environmental politics around energy depletion and climate change, she tells her viewers, 
“all you can do is slow down collapse to try and give all of us enough time to figure out 
how to best release ourselves from the age of oil to a simpler, more intimate way of 
life.”11 
Peakists’ political resignation and individualism is particularly surprising because 
this is the exact population that we might otherwise expect to become dedicated 
environmental activists—liberal or leftist, educated, politically aware, deeply concerned 
about ecological issues, and cognizant of the need for large-scale change.  Instead of 
lobbying the federal government, they assumed that “our government is unresponsive, in 
                                                                                                                                            
Complexity and Contentious Politics: The Political Ontology of Gilles Deleuze (unpublished master's 
thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2007). 
9 In response to my survey question, “Have you been more or less engaged in the following activities since 
learning about peak oil?  Please put on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for much less engaged, 3 for no change, 
and 5 for much less engaged,” American peakists averaged 2.79 for the option “attending rallies, marches 
or protests.” 
10  “Oily Cassandra,” personal communication.  February 1, 2010. 
11 “Porn. Peak Oil.  Enjoy,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAPf9V3_li0.  As of this writing, it had 
been viewed by over 300,000 people.  Accessed July 15, 2012. 
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denial, and ineffectual,” as one California man in his late thirties put it, and took 
individuals steps to prepare themselves and their families.12  Their struggle to form a 
collective response to ecological crisis reflects the decline of trust in social institutions 
and the rise of a certain type of individualism in the last half-century. 
Explorations of individualism in the U.S. have a long history that goes back to 
Alexis de Tocqueville, if not before, but such accusations have intensified over the last 
three decades.  One could point, for example, to two of the most influential scholarly 
works of the last two decades, Robert Bellah et al’s Habits of the Heart: Individualism 
and Commitment in American Life (1985) and Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The 
Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000).13  Relying on hundreds of 
interviews, Bellah and his co-authors argued that American culture had succumbed to a 
therapeutically self-centered narcissism that had stripped public life of its vibrancy and 
political possibilities.  “Utilitarian” and “expressive” individualism had infected 
contemporary conceptions of the self, the family, civic involvement, religion, the nation, 
and even “freedom,” which by the 1980s meant “being left alone by others, not having 
other people’s values, ideas, or styles of life forced upon one, being free of arbitrary 
authority in work, family, and political life.”14 
 Writing a decade and a half later, Robert Putnam marshaled an impressive array 
of evidence from membership rolls of organizations and studies of social participation to 
identify a long-term decline of “social capital” (a measure of “social connectedness”) in 
                                                
12 Respondent 9567344.  Survey respondents are identified by their randomly generated response numbers.   
13 Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of 
the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985). 
14 Bellah, 23. 
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the United States from the 1950s to 2000.15  Although his methodology was widely 
critiqued, Putnam’s basic thesis has generally been accepted and echoed by other 
sociologists.16  However, many have disagreed with his causal explanations for the 
decline in social capital, which focus on suburban sprawl, television, and the passing of 
the “greatest generation” of Americans.  This dissertation is in dialogue with both of 
these authors, but my study of the peak oil movement suggests that there is a largely 
ignored political dimension to the changes Bellah and Putnam observed.  In chapter 3, I 
argue that the rise of libertarian ideals in the United States—beginning with the 1960s 
countercultural concept of idea of “doing your own thing” as a political act, continuing 
with the fiscal libertarianism of conservatives like Ronald Reagan and the Tea Party, and 
embedded in Internet technology—played a key role in this trend. 
In this way, I present this subculture as a microcosm of a broader trend that 
scholars have been actively debating for two decades. Although peakists have certainly 
adopted an unusual, counterhegemonic system of beliefs, the peak oil movement does not 
seem quite as “fringe” in most other respects.  Participants were, for the most part, in the 
demographic mainstream of the United States in the mid-2000s—primarily white, 
middle-aged, and middle-class.  Few had suffered mental illness or severe depression, 
and few believed in conspiracy theories or other uncommon beliefs.  Until their 
                                                
15 Putnam, 23. 
16 For critiques, see Pamela Paxton, “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator 
Assessment,” American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 1 (1999): 188-127; and Everett Ladd, The Ladd 
Report (New York: Free Press, 1999).  On the acceptance of the decline of social capital, see the 
symposium on Bowling Alone in Contemporary Sociology 30, no. 3 (2000): 223-30; Stefano Bartolini, 
Ennio Bilancini, Maurizio Pugno, “Did the Decline in Social Capital Decrease American Happiness? A 
Relational Explanation of the Happiness Paradox,” Social Indicators Research 110, no. 3 (2013): 1033-
1059.  Sociologist Wayne Baker, analyzing data from the World Values Survey, noticed a similar trend.  
See America’s Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 56-
60.   
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ideological transformation, there was very little to distinguish them from their peers.  By 
aligning my survey questions with national polls regularly taken over the last thirty years, 
I am able to establish the peak oil movement as representative of broader currents in 
American political culture.  Peakists consider themselves liberal but exhibit a 
distinctively conservative response to a perceived threat, and this apparent contradiction 
has broad implications in the study of American politics. 
 
Conservatism Beyond Conservatives 
Most American historians who have begun to address the events of the last three 
decades agree that we live in, or in the shadow of, the “Age of Reagan.”17  Whether one 
considers the fortieth president to be the nation’s greatest chief executive, as a plurality of 
Americans claimed in a 2011 poll, or merely the charismatic figurehead for the 
conservative movement, Reagan’s ideas, rhetoric, and policies have defined the political 
culture of the United States for the last thirty years.18  Even as a Democrat occupies the 
White House, the vital center of American politics have moved so far to the right that, as 
one journalist noted in 2012, “virtually every major policy currently associated with the 
Obama Administration,” including the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), had 
previously been “a Republican idea in good standing.”19  Or as historian Kim Phillips-
                                                
17 See, for example, Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York, Harper, 2008); 
Steven F. Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980-1989 (New York: 
Random House, 2009); Jerome L. Himmselstein, To the Right: The Transformation of American 
Conservatism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 13.   
18 Frank Newport, “Americans Say Reagan is the Greatest U.S. President,” Gallup, February 18, 2011.  
19% of respondents named Reagan as the “greatest” President; Abraham Lincoln came in second, at 14%. 
19 Ezra Klein, “Unpopular Mandate: Why Do Politicians Reverse Their Positions?” New Yorker, June 25, 
2012. 
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Fein recently commented, conservative principles “seem to have transcended the 
movement itself and to have become the new common wisdom, so much so that we 
appear still to be living in the age that began with Reagan’s election.”20 
 Since conservatives came to possess something approaching intellectual hegemony 
by the mid-2000s, we might begin to turn our attention from the various causes of the rise 
of conservatism to its effects.  As Phillips-Fein asked, “are we thinking only of the 
narrative of the [conservative] movement itself—its rise, its obstacles, its victories? Or 
are we thinking of the broader changes in American politics—a growing uncertainty 
about the potential of government, a greater faith in the free market, and a deepening 
sense of anxiety about collective action?”21  For thirty years, conservative ideas have 
dominated American political discourse, and—when paired with power—ideas do have 
consequences.  As Sean Wilentz observed, “the impact of the age of Reagan is indicated” 
most strongly not in the passion and effectiveness of movement activists but “by the 
guiding assumptions and possibilities of American politics and government, and the hold 
they have on public opinion.”22   In this dissertation, I argue that the individualism of 
peakists is one measure of this impact. 
 Conservative principles of individual choice, reliance on the free market, and the 
need for a smaller state—libertarian ideas—though unevenly enacted by actual 
conservatives in positions of power, are now central subjects of debate in mainstream 
political discourse.  Furthermore, while American social conservatism has not proved 
                                                
20 Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 3 
(2011), 742. 
21 Phillips-Fein, 742. 
22 Wilentz, 8. 
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particularly influential overseas, libertarian ideas honed in the United States, whether 
characterized as market fundamentalism or neoliberalism, have been exported throughout 
the world.23  In this dissertation, I address the impact of conservative governance and 
intellectual influence beyond movement conservatives, on Americans who do not 
consider themselves conservatives.  I ask questions that are central to understanding the 
contemporary politics and the impact of conservatism in the United States: What is the 
social influence of the conception of society as merely a collection of individuals?  How 
have repeated criticisms of “big government” and the pervasive distrust of government 
affected the way individuals conceive of government’s ability to address major social 
problems?  Have conservative ideas, as many critics allege, led to a sense of de-
politicization?  
 
Peak Perspectives 
  The phrase “peak oil” refers specifically to the peak of global oil production, the 
point at which half of the world’s petroleum has been pumped and consumed.  Peakists 
allege not that we are “running out of oil” but that we will soon witness a scarcity of 
cheap oil.  Evaluating this argument requires an elementary understanding of the process 
of oil extraction.  In any oil field, the “energy returned on energy invested” (EROI), the 
margin of energy acquired from a particular energy source, decreases over time.  Initially, 
natural reservoir pressure pushes oil out of newly discovered fields (creating “gushers” 
                                                
23 See Steven Teles and Daniel A. Kenney, “Spreading the Word: The Diffusion of American 
Conservatism in Europe and Beyond,” in Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., Growing Apart? 
America and Europe in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 136-
169. 
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pictured in films like Giant and There Will Be Blood), but over time increasingly 
expensive technology and risky methods must be used to access and recover the 
remaining oil, such as water injection, carbon dioxide flooding, or microbial treatments.24   
The average EROI on conventional petroleum extracted in the United States in the 
1930s was 100:1.  By the 1970s, it was down to 30:1, and the figure is between 18:1 and 
11:1 in the 2000s.25  (When EROI has reached 1:1, it is no longer profitable to extract.)  
The United States reached its own peak of production in 1970, and (as of 2009) at least 
50 of the 54 oil-producing nations had reached their respective peaks.26  While new oil 
fields are still being discovered, the rate of discovery has significantly decreased over 
time, and newly discovered fields tend to be much smaller than the giants discovered in 
the 1960s and 1970s.27  However, new technologies, made feasible by rising oil prices, 
allow producers to recover more oil from older fields, forcing analysts to revise their 
predictions of when the global peak will occur. 
                                                
24 Giant, George Stevens, 1956; There Will Be Blood, Paul Thomas Anderson, 2007. 
25 For EROI data, see C.J. Cleveland, R. Costanza, C.A.S. Hall and R. Kaufmann, “Energy and the U.S. 
economy: a biophysical perspective,” Science 225 (1984): 890–897; C.J. Cleveland, “Net energy from oil 
and gas extraction in the United States, 1954–1997,” Energy 30, no. 5 (2005): 769–782; C.A.S. Hall, C.J. 
Cleveland and R. Kaufmann, Energy and Resource Quality: The Ecology of the Economic Process (New 
York: Wiley, 1986).  For an overview of current EROI data for petroleum and other energy sources, see 
Ajay K. Gupta and Charles A.S. Hall, “A Review of the Past and Current State of EROI Data,” 
Sustainability 3, no. 10 (2011): 1796-1809.  For a discussion of the importance of EROI, see Charles A.S. 
Hall, “Editorial Introduction to Special Issue on New Studies in EROI (Energy Return on Investment),” 
Sustainability 3, no. 10 (2011): 1773-1777. 
26 See Praveen Ghanta, “Is Peak Oil Real? A List of Countries Past Peak,” 
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5576.  Accessed July 15, 2012.  Although there is a great deal of debate 
about whether a few major countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are at their peak, there is little debate about 
others, such as the United States, Iraq, and Mexico. 
27 For example, while 120 “giant” oil fields (100,000 barrels per day for more than one year) were 
discovered in the 1960s, less than 60 were discovered in the 1980s, less than 40 in the 1990s, and so on.   
Although “giants” make up only one percent of total world oil fields, they made up over 60% of world oil 
production as of 2005.  See Mikael Höök, Robert Hirsch, and Kjell Aleklett, “Giant oil field decline rates 
and their influence on world oil production,” Energy Policy 37, no. 6 (2009): 2262-2272. 
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  Since there is a finite amount of petroleum on the planet, peak oil is not so much a 
theory as a geologic fact—the question is exactly when it will occur, and whether it 
actually matters.  Given the number of variables involved, there is no way to accurately 
predict the global peak.  The exact number of “proven reserves” of petroleum is 
unknown, since oil-producing countries (such as Saudi Arabia) closely guard this 
information, and many governments tend to overestimate oil reserves.28  Future 
technological developments that will allow producers to squeeze more petroleum out of 
each field are also impossible to predict, as is the public’s tolerance for the environmental 
impact of newer methods of production or “unconventional” sources of petroleum, such 
as tar sands and oil shale.  Further complicating the situation, the actual global peak can 
only be deduced in retrospect, some years after it has occurred, by analyzing global 
production.  As a result, as one petroleum engineer put it, “peak oil is a moving target,” 
since oil, as a commodity, “is always a function of price and technology.”29  That said, 
there is some precedent for fears of an abrupt peak.  Historian Richard H.K. Vietor 
recounts that the U.S.’s own peak in 1970 was a surprise even to industry observers—as 
late as 1968 petroleum journals were confidently reporting that the American producers 
had 2.5 million barrels per day of spare capacity.30   
                                                
28 There are two potential motivations for nations to overestimate reserves.  The first is to avoid a panic 
about running out of oil, which could raise prices in the short-term (and thus prove profitable for net 
exporters) but also stimulate development of renewable sources.  The second is that groups like OPEC tie 
production to proven reserves.  By overstating proven reserves, OPEC members would free themselves to 
extract more oil.  For example, in the 1980s, a number of OPEC countries announced massive jumps in 
proven reserves almost overnight, with no explanation for the change. 
29 Jeff Hatlen, quoted in Jad Mouawad, “Oil Innovations Pump New Life Into Old Wells,” New York 
Times, March 5, 2007, A1. 
30 Richard H.K. Vietor, Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 199; American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and 
Figures (New York: API, 1971), 101. 
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Given these uncertainties, predictions about the inevitable global peak vary 
widely.  A recent (2011) forecast by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, for 
example, claimed that the peak could occur as late as 2067, 31 while the United Kingdom 
Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security reported in late October 2008 that 
peak oil would likely occur by 2013.32  In 2009, the widely-respected International 
Energy Administration estimated that it would occur in 2020, while independent 
researchers from Oxford University argued, in 2010, that production would peak before 
2015.33 
In contrast, most peakists believe that global oil production is currently at the 
plateau of peak production.  For them, the date of the global peak is critical information: 
afterwards, as Cassandra put it, “the world supply will drop and prices will skyrocket.”  
There will be no orderly transition to a replacement for petroleum, since awareness of 
impending scarcity will cause panic and “resource wars” over the remaining oil that will 
siphon funds from the development of alternative energy source.34  Skeptics assert that 
the precise date of a global peak is insignificant, since markets will spring into action, 
pushing producers to exploit old fields in new ways and researchers to develop 
                                                
31 For an extrapolation of the date of peak oil from the Energy Information Administration 2011 report, see 
Eric L. Garza, “The US Energy Information Administration's faulty peak oil analysis,” 
http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-08-19/us-energy-information-administrations-faulty-peak-oil-
analysis.  Accessed August 27, 2012. 
32 Duncan Clark, “UK Will Face Peak Oil Crisis Within Five Years, Report Warns,” The Guardian, 
October 29, 2008. 
33 Nick A. Owen, Oliver R. Inderwildi, David A. King, “The status of conventional world oil reserves—
Hype or cause for concern?” Energy Policy 38, no. 8 (2010): 4743-4749. 
34 Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2001). 
   15 
alternative energy sources.35  They also point out that this is far from the first prophecy of 
oil depletion.  In 1855, for example, an advertisement for Kier’s Rock Oil advised 
consumers to “hurry, before this wonderful product is depleted from Nature’s 
laboratory.”36  In 1919, the director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines predicted that “within 
the next two to five years the oil fields of this country will reach their maximum 
production, and from that time on we will face an ever-increasing decline.”37  During the 
1970s, these concerns were renewed, often by mainstream economists—in 1973, for 
example, Foreign Affairs published an article with the descriptive title, “The Oil Crisis: 
This Time The Wolf Is Here.”38  
 While I remain agnostic on the timing of the wolf’s arrival and the severity of its 
consequences, the broadest claim of the “peak everything” theory—that human action, 
life, and progress are dependent on material resources that are not infinite—is opposed 
only by a small minority of futurists, science-fiction authors, and other extreme techno-
optimists.  In this study, I use the peak oil movement as a prism through which we might 
see refracted the contours of our country’s political culture, our own reliance on 
petroleum, and our passivity in the face of other, related carbon catastrophes (notably 
climate change).  As Shane Mulligan put it, oil is “an essential element of human 
ecology,” and as a result, “the energy resources on which our economic system relies 
                                                
35 See, for example, Dieter Helm, “Peak oil and energy policy—a critique,” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 27, no. 1 (2011): 68–69; Marian Radetzki, “Peak Oil and other threatening peaks—Chimeras 
without substance,” Energy Policy 38, no. 11 (2010): 6566–6569.  Stephen M. Gorelick’s Oil Panic and the 
Global Crisis: Predictions and Myths (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) offers the most detailed 
scholarly refutation of the peak oil scenario. 
36 E. D. Porter, “Are We Running Out of Oil?” API Discussion Paper No. 081, 1995, American Petroleum 
Institute. 
37 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: ABC, 1996), 194. 
38 James Akins, “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here,” Foreign Affairs 51, no. 3 (1973): 462-490. 
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may be as essential to human life, in their way, as water, biological diversity, or an intact 
ozone layer.”39  Readers should, at the very least, take the threat of oil depletion 
seriously.  While peakists assert that their predictions are based on basic geology, and 
their opponents respond by referring to the quasi-magical machinations of the market, 
historians will recognize that the timing and form of concerns over oil depletion are as 
dependent on social, political, and economic factors as geology.  
  This dissertation is primarily about the political implications of the peak oil 
movement’s response to the threat of ecological crisis, but it is also by necessity about oil 
itself, rightly labeled the “most powerful fuel and versatile substance ever discovered.”40  
While peakists may be mistaken about the immediacy and gravity of peak oil, their belief 
that petroleum depletion has the potential to cause “the end of our American way of life,” 
as a Virginia peakist put it, is not.41  The importance of petroleum has rarely been 
reflected in American scholarship and non-fiction writing, however.  When historians 
have written about petroleum, have primarily focused their energies on the oil industry, 
petro-politics, environmental disasters and individual wildcatters.42  Following the lead of 
                                                
39 Mulligan, 87. 
40 Tyler Priest, “The Dilemmas of Oil Empire,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012), 236. 
41 Respondent 9569301. 
42 On the oil industry, see Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York: McClure, 
Phillips & Co. 1904); Kendall Beaton, Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States (New 
York, 1957); Harold F. Williamson et al., The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Energy, 1899–
1959 (Evanston, 1963); and Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 
They Shaped (New York: Bantam Books, 1975). On oil politics, see Oil and Ideology: The Cultural 
Creation of the American Petroleum Industry (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2000); F. William Engdahl, A 
Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press 
2004); and Yergin 1996.  On wildcatters, see Edgar Wesley Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders: A History of 
Exploration for Petroleum (The American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975); and Lon Tinkle, 
Mr. De: A Biography of Everette Lee DeGolyer  (New York: Little, Brown, 1970).  On production in 
individual states or regions, see Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900-1940.  On oil 
spills, see Robert Olney Easton, Black Tide: The Santa Barbara Oil Spill and Its Consequences (New 
York: Delacorte Press, 1972); Noah Berlatsky, ed., The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Farmington Hill, MI: 
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scholars in geography, as well as non-fiction authors, they are only recently turning their 
attention to the ways that petroleum has influenced and organized life in the United 
States.43  In 2012, when the Journal of American History dedicated an entire issue to “Oil 
in America,” it was something of a landmark.44  As Brian C. Black noted there, the 
“increasing appreciation of petroleum’s importance” in history and other fields “demands 
that we also revise our historical narratives—that we acknowledge the hidden hand (or 
nozzle) when it was most essential to American life and history.”45 
 Because of its seeming inexhaustibility and price-stability throughout the 
twentieth century, historians and other scholars have often ignored energy.  Statistics—
such as the fact that Americans use approximately 19 million barrels of oil per day—
often fail to convey the pervasiveness of petroleum.46  Consider, for example, the 
physical manufacture of the dissertation that you hold in your hands.  The black cover is 
mostly polyester, a synthetic compound derived from petroleum.  The paper was shipped 
by truck from a paper mill in Wisconsin.  The ink used to print these words (from Xerox 
toner), is mostly a mixture of petroleum-based oils and resins, which was mixed in 
Webster, New York and then shipped to the University Bindery in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  Petroleum was likely used in each of the machines used to harvest trees, 
                                                                                                                                            
Greenhaven Press, 2011). Two notable exceptions to these categories include Eating Oil: Energy Use in 
Food Production (Boulder, 1978); and Peter H. Spitz, Petrochemicals: The Rise of an Industry (New York, 
1988). 
43 For recent popular works, see Peter Maass, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil (New York: 
Knopf, 2009); Lisa Margonelli, Oil on the Brain: Adventures from the Pump to the Pipeline (New York: 
Broadway, 2008); and Roberts 2004 among many others.  
44 Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012). 
45 Brian C. Black, “Oil for Living: Petroleum and American Conspicuous Consumption,” Journal of 
American History 99, no. 1 (2012), 41. 
46 In 2010 and 2011, Americans consumed an average of 19.18 and 18.83 million barrels of refined 
petroleum products and biofuels per day, respectively (U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
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operate the paper mill, and deliver the pages, ink, and cover to the printer, whether by 
truck, airplane, or ship. 
If you’re reading this work digitally, petroleum was used in every step of your 
computer’s long and complicated commodity chain.  One analysis estimates that each 
computer utilizes over 150 gallons of petroleum before it reaches the consumer.47  
Precious metals were mined all around the world, transported (each step using petroleum) 
many thousands of miles, manufactured (along with plastics derived from 
petrochemicals) in factories, stored in other buildings (often heated using heating oil), 
before the final product was shipped to consumers—each step requiring massive amounts 
of petroleum or products derived from it.  While most observers are more than familiar 
with petroleum’s primary use, as the world’s most “energy-dense, easily deliverable 
source of fuel for transportation,”48 less than half of each barrel of crude oil is turned into 
gasoline.49  The rest is used to produce items such as asphalt, pharmaceuticals, 
detergents, synthetic fibers, artificial colors and flavors for food, refrigerants, all kinds of 
plastics, and fertilizers for large-scale agriculture.  In all of these ways, “oil runs through 
the bloodstream of our daily lives,” not just our automobiles.50  So it runs through these 
pages as well. 
 
Review of Relevant Literature and Methodology 
                                                
47 “Combien de pétrole dans mon ordinateur?” http://www.linternaute.com/actualite/savoir/07/petrole-
yaourt/7.shtml.  Accessed July 17, 2012. 
48 Jay Hakes, “A Decidedly Valuable and Dangerous Fuel,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012), 
19. 
49 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Refinery Yield,” 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PNP_PCT_DC_NUS_PCT_A.htm.  Accessed August 1, 2012. 
50 Carl Solberg, Oil Power (New York: Signet, 1976), 8. 
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 Scholars, primarily in the United Kingdom, have already examined the theory of 
peak oil from a number of perspectives.  They have critiqued the immediacy of the 
threat,51 discussed the dangers of peak oil in relation to climate change,52 viewed it in the 
context of capitalist “energy imperialism,”53 and examined the founder of the peak oil 
theory, former Shell geologist M. King Hubbert.54  Others have speculated how the 
United States55 and the entire world56 will collectively respond to oil depletion, and 
attempted to assess its potential impact on future tourism,57 urban areas,58 public health,59 
children’s welfare,60 globalization,61 and transportation.62  A few others have even 
                                                
51 Helm 2011; Marian Radetzki, “Peak Oil and other threatening peaks—Chimeras without substance,” 
Energy Policy, 38 (11), 6566–6569. 
52 Josep Peñuelas and Jofre Carnicer, “Climate Change and Peak Oil: The Urgent Need for a Transition to 
a Non-Carbon-Emitting Society,” Ambio 39 (2010): 85–90. 
53 John Bellamy Foster, “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism,” Monthly Review 60, no. 3 (2008), 12. 
54 Emma Hemmingsen, “At the base of Hubbert’s Peak: Grounding the debate on petroleum scarcity,” 
Geoforum 41, no. 4 (2010): 531–540. 
55 Jessica G. Lambert and Gail P. Lambert, “Predicting the Psychological Response of the American 
People to Oil Depletion and Declining Energy Return on Investment (EROI),” Sustainability 3, no. 11 
(2011): 2129-2156. 
56 Jörg Friedrichs, “Global energy crunch: How different parts of the world would react to a peak oil 
scenario,” Energy Policy 38, no. 8 (2010): 4562-4569. 
57 Susanne Becken, “Developing indicators for managing tourism in the face of peak oil,” Tourism 
Management, 29 (2008): 695–705; James Leigh, “New Tourism in a New Society Arises from ‘Peak Oil,’” 
Tourismos: An International Multidisciplinary Journal of Tourism 6, no. 1 (2011): 165-191. 
58 Peter Newman, “Beyond Peak Oil: Will Our Cities Collapse?” Journal of Urban Technology 14, no. 2 
(2007): 15–30. 
59 Nikhil Kaza, Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Isolde Knaap and Rebecca Lewis, “Peak Oil, Urban Form, and Public 
Health: Exploring the Connections,” American Journal of Public Health 101, no. 9 (2011): 1598-1606; 
Hanlon, P. and McCartney, G. (2008), “Peak oil: will it be public health's greatest challenge?” Public 
Health 122, no. 7: 647-652; Brian S. Schwartz, Cindy L. Parker, Jeremy Hess, and Howard Frumkin, 
“Public Health and Medicine in an Age of Energy Scarcity: The Case of Petroleum,” American Journal of 
Public Health 101, no. 9 (2011), 1560-1567; Peter Winch and Rebecca Stepnitz, “Peak Oil and Health in 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Impacts and Potential Responses,” American Journal of Public Health 
101, no. 9 (2011): 1225-1234. 
60 Paul J. Tranter and Scott Sharpe, “Escaping Monstropolis: child-friendly cities, peak oil and Monsters, 
Inc.,” Children’s Geographies 6, no. 3 (2008): 295–308. 
61 Fred Curtis, “Peak Globalization: Climate Change, Oil Depletion and Global Trade,” Ecological 
Economics 69, no. 2 (2009) 427–434. 
62 Montira Watcharasukarn, Shannon Page and Susan Krumdieck, “Virtual reality simulation game 
approach to investigate transport adaptive capacity for peak oil planning,” Transportation Research 46, no. 
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discussed responses to peak oil by individuals and groups by charting the psychology of 
“peak oil acceptance,”63 by analyzing different kinds of peak oil narratives,64 and by 
examining the Transition Town movement in the United Kingdom.65 
 I utilize this secondary literature throughout this dissertation, but most of my 
claims are based on original research conducted over the last five years.  My mixed 
methodology includes interviews with peak oil leaders and rank-and-file believers, 
discourse analysis of movement websites and online forums, visits to Transition Towns, 
literary analysis of peak oil novels and non-fiction works, and archival research.  The 
evidence for my claims also relies on two large-scale online surveys (N=1128 and 
N=628) conducted in 2011.  Both surveys were anonymous and used snowball sampling 
(or “chain-sampling”) to recruit participants,66 while specific questions ensured that 
respondents belonged to the target population.67  The number of responses was evidence 
                                                                                                                                            
2 (2012): 348–367. 
63 Lyle K. Grant, “Peak Oil As a Behavioral Problem,” Behavior and Social Issues 16, no. 1 (2007): 65-88; 
Ugo Bardia, “Peak oil: The four stages of a new idea,” Energy 34, no. 3 (2009): 323–326; Adrian Atkinson, 
“Progress in acknowledging and confronting climate change and ‘peak oil,’” City 14, no. 3 (2010): 314-
322; Lin Zhao, Lianyong Feng, Charles A.S. Hall, “Is peakoilism coming?” Energy Policy 37, no. 6 (2009): 
2136–2138. 
64 John C. Pruit, “Considering Eventfulness as an Explanation for Locally Mediated Peak Oil Narratives,” 
Qualitative Inquiry 17, no. 2 (2011): 197-203. 
65 Smith; Bailey, Hopkins, and Wilson; North. 
66 Online surveys are especially useful for research on “hidden” populations and populations with 
unpopular political views.  See Kevin B. Wright, “Researching Internet-Based Populations: Advantages 
and Disadvantages of Online Survey Research, Online Questionnaire Authoring Software Packages, and 
Web Survey Services,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 10, no. 3 (2005). As a survey 
method, snowball or chain sampling was chosen because it aids in recruiting “hidden” populations.  I 
allowed any interested party to complete the surveys, and asked respondents to forward the links to their 
“peak oil aware” friends and acquaintances.  The potential biases inherent in this methodology—such as 
the accuracy of self-reported information and self-selection bias—were counterbalanced by other research 
methodologies.  For example, the potential that the population of peakists who would answer an online 
survey (or even use a computer) might answer in systematically different ways than peakists who would 
not answer an online survey (or use a computer) was disproven by interviews with believers at peak oil 
conferences and Transition Towns. 
67 For example, in response to the question, “If you had to quantify your level of certainty in the 
fundamental theory of peak oil -- that global oil production will peak in the next decade (if it hasn't 
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of the size of this community: the first survey, conducted in January 2011, gathered over 
one thousand responses to multiple-choice and open-ended questions within one week 
from just two links on peak oil websites.  These surveys provide statistically significant 
support, but, perhaps more importantly, a wealth of detailed responses to open-ended 
questions.  My respondents, as informal members of a group generally ignored or 
caricatured by the media and marginalized by their friends, co-workers, and family, were 
often eager to share their thoughts.  As a result, this dissertation provides a wealth of 
detail and a level of analysis of the peak oil phenomenon that has not previously been 
possible. 
  My methodology benefitted from the tools of the sociologist—gathering such 
detailed information from already hard-to-find actors would be impossible years or 
decades after the fact—but my approach to this subject is historical.  This dissertation is a 
recent history of the peak oil movement; to the extent that the period and events 
described should be immediately recognizable and not a distant, “foreign country,” it 
might be considered a “history of our own time” or even a “history of the present.”68  
Writing about recent events has its hazards: the passage of time allows for a broader 
perspective, with the release of previously unknown sources and the ability to consider 
competing interpretations.  Writing accounts of recent events requires a sense of self-
                                                                                                                                            
already), and that this event will have grave and potentially apocalyptic effects on the United States and 
around the world -- on a scale of 1 to 10, what would it be?  1 is disbelief, 10 is complete certainty,” 93.8% 
of respondents to the first survey, and 85.6% of respondents to the second survey answered “7” or more.  
The mean for each question was 8.70 and 8.85, respectively. 
68 L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between (London: H. Hamilton, 1953); Llewellyn Woodward, “The Study of 
Contemporary History,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 1 (1966): 1-13.  Although the phrase 
“history of the present” is often attributed to Michel Foucault, it was first used by John Dewey, and 
possibly appropriated by Foucault.  See Randall E. Auxier, “Foucault, Dewey, and the History of the 
Present,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2002): 75-102. 
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awareness, since, as Michael S. Roth put it, “writing a history of the present means 
writing a history in the present, self-consciously writing in a field of power relations and 
political struggle.”69 
Even so, I contend that recent histories have their virtues.  In the wake of the 
recent economic recession, history departments throughout the United States are being 
trimmed, and support for historical research is diminishing.70  In classrooms, instructors 
face students who question how a greater understanding of history, or the humanities in 
general, will benefit them.71  While “history for its own sake” should certainly not be 
ignored, “histories of the recent past promise to fulfill another key role that history has 
often sought to achieve” but only rarely acknowledge explicitly, as Renee C. Romano 
noted in a recent essay on historiography: “to shed light and historical understanding on 
the world we live in today.”72  Recent histories, or scholarly works explicitly connecting 
historical subjects to the contemporary world, can play an important role in doing this, 
                                                
69 Michael S. Roth, “Foucault's ‘History of the Present,’” History and Theory 20, no. 1 (1981), 43. 
70 See Robert B. Townsend, “History Under the Hammer,” and Anthony Grafron, “History Under Attack,” 
Perspectives on History 49, no. 1 (2011). 
71 In a discussion with journalist Bob Woodward on his historical legacy, President George W. Bush the 
now-common view that history requires a distant perspective: “‘Well, how is history likely to judge your 
Iraq war,’ says Woodward. ‘And [President Bush] said, ‘History,’ and then he took his hands out of his 
pocket and kind of shrugged and extended his hands as if this is a way off. And then he said, ‘History, we 
don't know. We'll all be dead.’” (Rebecca Leung, “Woodward Shares War Secrets,” CBS News, December 
5, 2007.) 
72 Renee C. Romano, “Not Dead Yet: My Identity Crisis as a Historian of the Recent Past,” in Claire Bond 
Potter and Renee C. Romano, eds., Doing Recent History: On Privacy, Copyright, Video Games, 
Institutional Review Boards, Activist Scholarship, and History That Talks Back (Athens and London: The 
University of Georgia Press, 2012), 42.  At least one historiographer has noted that this has always been a 
concern of American historians.  As Herman Ausubel summarized, “judged by their presidential messages, 
many leaders of the American Historical Association were less concerned with the past than with the 
present…if one theme figured more prominently than any other in their messages, it was that of the 
immediate usefulness of history.” Ausubel, Historians and Their Craft: A Study of the Presidential 
Addresses of the American Historical Association, 1884-1945 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965). 
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and thereby make history more perceptibly relevant at a time when the humanists are 
increasingly being called on to justify their value.73 
 
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1 introduces the range of Americans involved in the peak oil movement, 
their motivations, their responses to the threat of ecological collapse, and the social 
consequences of their actions.  I use quotes from my surveys and peakist online forums to 
explain the ideology and shared experiences of peak oil believers: their quasi-religious 
conversion experiences, dramatic change in thinking, and reordering of their personal 
cosmologies.  As a window into the peakist subculture, I profile two well-known figures, 
evangelist James Howard Kunstler and “Peak Shrink” Kathy McMahon.  Kunstler was 
peak oil’s Jeremiah, a one-time journalist whose blog, speaking tours, television 
appearances and non-fiction books, such as The Long Emergency: Surviving the 
Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-First Century (2005), spread the peak oil gospel.  
McMahon, the “Peak Shrink,” was a psychotherapist and professor who transformed her 
practice and personal life after learning about peak oil.  In her popular “Peak Oil Blues” 
blog and subsequent book, ‘I Can’t Believe You Think That!’ Relationship Struggles 
around Peak Oil, Climate Change and Economic Hard Times (2011), she addressed the 
psychological and emotional fallout of “peak oil awareness.” 
                                                
73 Openly connecting history to the present might seem in danger of exposing an objective appraisal to 
infection by political and other biases.  This charge may have carried some weight a few decades ago, but it 
no longer sticks. “Objectivity” remains a goal, of course, but most historians now acknowledge that it is 
ultimately unattainable, like the distant limit in Zeno’s paradox. Instead, we are more likely to judge a work 
by its evidence, fairness, originality, and contribution to existing knowledge.  See Peter Novick, That Noble 
Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 415-629. 
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McMahon formulated an alternative profile of psychological health, where acute 
awareness of ecological crisis and preparation for the collapse of global society was not a 
symptom of emotional instability or mental illness but a sign of lucidity and health.  
Conversely, she pathologized “normal” responses to environmental problems, from “rigid 
Cheneyism” to “neoliberal economanic tendencies.”  Chapter 1 applies this through-the-
looking-glass perspective to an experience shared by almost all peak oil believers: social 
marginalization as a result of discussing and acting on grim environmental theories, such 
as peak oil and anthropogenic climate change.  Using Barbara Ehrenreich’s (2010) and 
Karen Cerulo’s (2006) analyses of American optimism, I highlight the ways that peakism 
deviates from the American “dominant social paradigm” of implicit faith in technology 
and the inexhaustibility of crucial resources. 
Chapter 2 places the peak oil movement in historical context by exploring the 
convergence of peakism in the early 2000s as well as popular beliefs about abundance, 
scarcity, and limits in recent U.S. history.  Many believers were drawn to the peak oil 
theory by three major events that placed petroleum squarely in the public eye, as had only 
previously occurred during the 1970s oil crises: America’s invasion and occupation of 
Iraq, which critics claimed was motivated by geopolitical energy concerns (“blood for 
oil”); the sudden rise of oil and gas prices after a decade of stable, low prices; and the 
growing awareness of climate change.  Through analysis of media coverage, website and 
forum membership statistics, and interviews with influential geologists, authors and 
lecturers, I trace the diffusion of the concept of peak oil and the formation of a primarily 
virtual social movement. 
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I then situate peakism in a much longer historical context by looking at popular 
beliefs about abundance, scarcity, and limits—often centered around energy 
availability—in the United States over the last century.  From post-war optimism, 
buttressed by full exploitation of petroleum for industrial purposes, to the “Malthusian 
moment” of the late 1960s and 1970s, to the reassertion of limitless goals and 
consumption in the 1980s, these patterns of beliefs in abundance and concerns over 
scarcity are the backdrop against which assertions of recent assertions of limits are often 
understood.  I conclude by assessing the return of “limits” discourse, around climate 
change as well as resource depletion, in the last decade.    
In chapter 3, I argue that the surprising individualism of peakists is evidence of 
the influence of libertarian ideas on Americans who do not consider themselves 
conservative.  For the most part, peakists prepared alone, stockpiling goods, conserving 
energy, changing jobs and purchasing land.  They doubted the ability of political 
institutions to address contemporary ecological crises.  This skepticism of the federal 
government to manage major societal issues—whether environmental problems, 
healthcare, or de-segregation—is considered one of the hallmarks of conservatives, not 
what one might expect from a group composed of self-identified “liberals” and 
“progressives.”  Using public polls and secondary literature in political science and 
history, I view the peak oil movement in the context of a transformation in American 
political culture over the last three decades: the growth of libertarian ideals.  As the result 
of the conservative movement that fully emerged with Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980, 
Americans of all parties and persuasions came to conceive of themselves and their 
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citizenship in distinctly libertarian terms—individualistic, market-based, and privatized 
—and this has had a significant impact on politics and social life in the United States. 
This shift has been accelerated by the use of Internet technology.  The peak oil 
movement, as a primarily virtual phenomenon, demonstrates the tendency (or “social 
affordance”) of the Internet to create a culture of “networked individuals,” participants in 
fleeting virtual communities that rarely transition into the offline world.  Despite the 
widespread hype of the Internet’s impact on politics, I argue that the virtual medium can 
also serve to de-politicize participants.  Although the Internet has often been compared to 
the crowd, it lacks most of the characteristic experiences of participating in mass actions, 
such as de-individuation and collective empowerment; in the case of the peak oil 
movement, participants also tend to underestimate their size, and thus dismiss their 
potential for political action.  With reference to the libertarian origins of the American 
Internet, I show that these effects are the product of the Internet’s formation during the 
ascendancy of neoliberalism and design by engineers with a tendency towards “cyber-
libertarianism.” 
Chapter 4 situates beliefs about ecological collapse in the context of the long 
history of American apocalypticism and highlights the ways that peakist narratives have 
borrowed and diverted from previous millennial prophecies.  From the Puritans to atomic 
hysteria to the post-holocaust novels of recent years, Americans have always been drawn 
to apocalyptic scenarios.  I chart the influence of one recent manifestation of this 
tendency, eco-apocalyptic Hollywood disaster movies of the 1990s and 2000s, on 
peakists’ conception of environmental change.  Using the genre of peak oil fiction, a 
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close-reading of James Howard Kunstler’s prophetic novel World Made By Hand (2008) 
and debates on online forums, I explore the political implications of the apocalyptic 
predictions of many peak oil believers.  I connect the “excitement” about the post-peak 
world that many believers experience to their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist aspirations.  
At a moment when solutions to ecological crises through electoral politics seem unlikely 
to many Americans, the prophecy of peak oil provides one means of imagining a 
significantly different world.  Adherents see peak oil as an imminent, transformative 
event that will put an end to American imperialism, capitalism, and environmental 
destruction and deliver a superior, more environmentally balanced future.  This 
revolution will not be authored by elected politicians or social movements, but by the 
petroleum-dependent American way of life tripping over its ecological limits.  I suggest 
that certain aspects of this group’s political quiescence reflects a similar dynamic among 
the broader environmentally aware American left.  
Using peak oil fiction, online forum comments and survey responses, I explore 
the racial and gender dynamics of the peak oil movement.  Some male peakists seemed to 
fear that gender equality and immigration would erode their own privilege.  These fears 
were exacerbated by the long-term political economic changes and the recent economic 
recession (or “mancession”), which led some male peakists to posit (or hope for) the 
reversal of feminism in a post-carbon world.  Acutely aware of changing conditions, 
many posit a return to a mythical pioneer masculinity as a solution to the most recent 
“crisis” of white masculinity.  With these issues in mind, I explore the similarities 
between peak oil believers, survivalists, and liberal “preppers,” including an analysis of 
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the television show Revolution (2012-2013). 
 My conclusion summarizes the lessons of Peak Politics and applies them to our 
contemporary political and environmental situation.  I contend that the very real crises 
that Americans and the planet now face, which include climate change, a globally 
interconnected economy, and eventual resource depletion (including fossil fuels), 
requires a intra- and international communitarian engagement that demands a historical 
break with the long tradition of American individualism and the more recent culture of 
optimism.  As such, the rise of libertarian ideals (whether embodied by conservatives, 
moderates, liberals, or leftists), which were the product of the frontier spirit, a half-
century of post-WWII American wealth and hegemony and a Reaganite opposition to any 
discourse of limits (ecological or geopolitical), may prove ill-suited for the near future.  
The sooner we recognize this incongruity, the better off we will be for it.
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Chapter 1: The Peak Oil Ideology and Subculture 
 
I look for ways to use less energy and go lighter upon the land (white male, 
liberal, Florida, 50-55) 
 
It has changed my entire being. I went from a futurist cornucopian to a 
doomer in about 2 years. I gave up my car and ride a bike everywhere now. 
I installed a little solar and I take steps to try to prepare for the coming 
squeeze (white male, mathematician, Mississippi, 36-40) 
 
Anyone who points out the ridiculousness of our current way of life and its 
dependence on a fundamentally unsustainable resource is laughed at as 
crazy or shunned as a 'downer' (white male, Democrat, Florida, 30-35)1 
 
As these comments suggest, the theory of peak oil inspired intense conviction as 
well as action.  Peak oil believers described their awareness of oil depletion and 
environmental crisis in terms that were strikingly similar to a religious conversion.  They 
recalled the exact moment it occurred, their emotional reaction, the dramatic change in 
thinking, and the reordering of their personal cosmology.  Long-held normative 
assumptions about the natural environment, the nation, the future, and ethical conduct 
were questioned and often swept aside.2  Many believers found new occupations, 
purchased land, and sundered ties with friends and family.  In this chapter, I explore the 
ideology of “peakism,” a belief-system that began with simple doubts about energy 
                                                
1 Respondents 9566752, 9682014, and 9576993. 
2 As this experience of conversion suggests, belief in peak oil bears a “family resemblance” to proper 
religions.  After becoming “peak oil aware,” adherents share a belief in worldly destruction and a new 
conception of proper or ethical conduct; practice rituals of prediction, prophecy and preparation; and 
attempt to evangelize and convert their friends and family.  See Bron Taylor, “Exploring Religion, Nature 
and Culture,” Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 1, no. 1 (2007): 5-24. 45% of 
respondents said that their religious preference was “none,” and 62% said that religion was “not very 
important” to them.  In a similarly worded poll of all Americans taken a year before, only 14% of 
Americans answered “none,” while 20% answered “not very important” (Gallup 2010).  That peakists are 
much less likely than other Americans to believe in God and describe religion as important to them 
suggests that for some, peak oil is not compatible with or serves similar functions to traditional religions.  
For a minority, however, peak oil does imply a spiritual element—see, for example, Carolyn Baker’s 
Sacred Demise: Walking the Path of Industrial Civilization’s Collapse (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2009).  
Although peakism lacks a conception of the sacred or supernatural for most adherents, belief in the peak oil 
theory certainly has religious dimensions.   
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security and led for many to a dramatic personal transformation.  I use information culled 
from my surveys to illustrate the beliefs that peakists held in common, and then examine 
the ways that this belief-system was been expressed in real-world actions and a rich 
virtual subculture by profiling the motivations, concerns, and contradictions of three peak 
oil believers and two influential authors and bloggers, peak oil jeremiah James Howard 
Kunstler and “Peak Shrink” Kathy McMahon.  I conclude by differentiating peakism 
from the “dominant social paradigm” held by most Americans, characterized by an 
implicit expectation of social progress, unlimited economic growth, and technological 
solutions to future problems, and document some of the social consequences of adopting 
a radical ecological identity such as peakism. 
 
Peakism 
“Peakism” is the ideology of peak oil believers.3  As historian Eric Foner defined 
it, ideology is a “system of beliefs, values, fears, prejudices, reflexes and commitments—
in sum, the social consciousness—of a social group.”4  Belief in “peak oil” is much more 
than an isolated opinion about petroleum reserves, but comprises an entire system of 
beliefs, since it “poses another Answer For Everything competing for the roles against 
many hundred other Answers,” as an Arizona man put it.5  Specifically, peakism is 
                                                
3 Feng and Hall 2009.  In an article on Energy Bulletin, Kurt Cobb asks the question, “What should 
members of the peak oil movement call themselves?”  He considers “peakists,” “doomer,” “peak oil 
advocate,” “peak oiler,” “peak oil believer,” and “peak oil activist.”  Kurt Cobb, “What should members of 
the peak oil movement call themselves?” http://www.energybulletin.net/node/38052.  Accessed November 
18, 2011. 
4 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 4.  Throughout this book, I use “ideology” and “belief-
system” interchangeably. 
5 Respondent 9686672. 
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marked by many of the same characteristics of recognized ideologies, including internal 
coherence; intellectual abstractness; specificity; sophistication; dogmatism; and affective 
investment.6  While “ideology” is a contested term in contemporary scholarship, in this 
case it appropriately represents the degree to which peakists adopted a package of beliefs 
and expectations that set them apart from most Americans.7  My use of “ideology” does 
not carry the pejorative connotation of false consciousness, but it does recognize that the 
adoption of a counterhegemonic ideology often “entails an aggressive alienation from the 
existing society.”8   
“Peak oil” refers to the maximum rate of global petroleum production, after which 
oil prices are expected to rise steeply.  Peakists believe that the peak of production is 
almost upon us or has already passed, while most geologists and oil industry insiders 
believe that a peak in conventional global petroleum prediction is years if not decades 
away.  Befitting a “people of plenty,” most Americans have a tacit, (if unexamined) faith 
in the development of new technology to provide energy for future generations, but 
peakists are pessimistic about the potential for other fossil fuels and renewable energy 
sources to replace petroleum, not only as fuel for transportation but to produce plastics, 
pharmaceuticals and the enormous array of petrochemicals our current way of life 
demands.  They hold fast to a set of practical doubts about the feasibility of other energy 
                                                
6 Edward Shils, “Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology,” in Paul Edwards, ed., The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 4, (New York: MacMillan, 1967): 974-978. 
7 The degree of belief in the theory of peak oil—the question of who is and who is not a peak oil believer—
was most directly measured by responses to the question, “If you had to quantify your level of certainty in 
the fundamental theory of peak oil -- that global oil production will peak in the next decade (if it hasn't 
already), and that this event will have grave and potentially apocalyptic effects on the United States and 
around the world -- on a scale of 1 to 10, what would it be?  1 is disbelief, 10 is complete certainty.”  The 
mean for both surveys was 8.7, with over 95% answer “7” or higher. 
8 Shils, 66. 
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sources replacing petroleum, which constitute articles of faith so central to their ideology 
that they are worth explaining in some detail. 
Natural gas is subject to its own limits, it is difficult to transport, and the U.S. 
lacks the infrastructure needed to replace gasoline with natural gas as fuel for 
transportation—most oil pipelines are too porous for natural gas, for example.  Coal is an 
inefficient energy source (compared to petroleum), and the health and environmental 
consequences of coal mining and combustion are increasingly considered intolerable.  As 
the Fukushima disaster in Japan showed, nuclear meltdowns could render entire countries 
uninhabitable, and the question of safe nuclear waste disposal has never been answered.  
While renewables such as solar and wind power will be critical to energy production in a 
post-petroleum world, they are seen as not reliable or efficient enough to replace fossil 
fuels on a global scale.  Even if an Apollo-style project of renewable energy development 
were to be implemented, peakists believe that it is simply too little, too late.  ‘Resource 
wars’ over remaining petroleum will siphon funding funds and expertise that could go 
towards the development of alternative energy sources.  As billions of people in the 
global South (such India and Brazil) and less-developed countries (such as China) seek 
and achieve a first-world, high-energy lifestyle—the average American currently uses 
over four times as much as energy per year as her Chinese counterpart—the global 
demand for a finite resource will only grow.9   
                                                
9 See, for example, Julian Darley’s High Noon for Natural Gas (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 
2004); Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert’s Peak (New York: Hill & Wang, 2005); Paul Roberts, The 
End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004); Richard Heinberg, 
The Party’s Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies (Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 
2003); Michael Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Holt, 2002).  
For energy use per capita per annum, see the World Bank Databank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE.  Accessed May 19, 2013.  As Timothy 
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Despite its name, the peak oil ideology is more accurately described as “peak 
everything,” reflecting the limits-to-growth environmental paradigm that emerged in the 
United States in the late 1960s.10  Peakists are concerned with the threat of an ecological 
collapse of which petroleum is the central symbol, and most consider peak oil and 
climate change to be interconnected twin crises.  A young peakist from Nevada argued 
that oil depletion is not an isolated issue, but “part of a larger pattern including climate 
change, over-population, degradation of our physical earth (deforestation, denuding of 
farming landscapes, etc),” and a Virginia woman in her late forties agreed, claiming that 
peak oil is “part of larger environmental crisis.  Other resources are peaking or declining 
as well (fertile topsoil, wild fish, pollution sinks).”  A New Yorker identified the problem 
even more broadly: “how humans interact with the environment overall.”   “Peak oil” is 
not so much an obsession with oil, then, but a form of radical environmentalism that 
comprehensively re-evaluates the ecological relationship between humans and the natural 
resources we depend on.  Although the “peak” in “peak oil” is a reference to the standard 
graph of petroleum production (see Fig. 1.1), which approximates a bell curve, it is also a 
metaphor: whether a plateau or a cliff, a “peak” is the point after which an inexorable 
decline sets in. The y-axis of this graph represents global oil production, but for many 
believers it could be replaced with something much more meaningful, such as the 
expectation of continued progress, societal complexity, or capitalism—or something 
much more subjective, such as quality of life, happiness, or peace.  
                                                                                                                                            
Mitchell has noted, expanding demand and shrinking supply now mean that a new equivalent of Saudi 
Arabia must be discovered approximately every three years.  Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the 
Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011), 232. 
10 Richard Heinberg, Peak Everything: Waking Up to a Century of Decline (Gabriola Island: New Society 
Publishers, 2007). 
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 For peakists, basic doubts about the future of energy production led to an 
ideological conversion and personal transformation.  The moment that peakists “learned 
about peak oil” or “got it” was often revelatory—the difference between their conception 
of the future before and after their awakening is so stark that it cleaves their lives in 
two.11  A Washingtonian said that his “future plans are framed by a peak oil future” and a 
Minnesotan in his late twenties said that peak oil “will influence all” of his “future 
occupation and lifestyle choice.”12  For most others, the change had already become 
evident in their lives.  A Hawaiian man in his late fifties said that a “complex of 
environmental issues,” including peak oil and climate change, had “defined my adult and 
professional life,” while a carpenter admitted that “all of life is now seen through the lens 
of a lower energy future and that has affected all of my choices.”13 
                                                
11 Although a religious awakening is one obvious parallel to this experience, political transformations also 
provide some interesting similarities.  Many second-wave feminists, for example, describe the “click” of a 
personal revelation about gender and patriarchy.  See J. Courtney Sullivan and Courtney E. Martin, eds., 
Click: When We Knew We Were Feminists (New York: Seal Press, 2010). 
12 Respondents 9576345 and 9649893. 
13 Respondents 9688522 and 9575766.   
Fig. 1.1.  Left, a graph of world oil production to 2004 and prediction of bell-shaped decline.  Right, a 
popular peakist representation, reproduced on dozens of websites and T-shirts designs. 
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For these Americans, “peak oil” refers to a dramatic teleology in which energy 
scarcity leads to the collapse of the late-modern capitalist system.  Pessimists, known as 
“doomers,” envision a millennial series of events involving warfare over scarce 
resources, epidemics, famine, and billions of deaths that will leave survivors in a dark 
age, while more hopeful adherents imagine a less violent transition into a post-peak world 
that is simpler, smaller, and less globalized.  There is significant variation in the beliefs of 
the peakist community, but they are primarily disagreements over the degree and 
immediacy of the crisis.  Some claim that global oil production peaked in the early 2000s 
(and is now on a plateau), while others predict that it is a decade away.  Early adherents 
portrayed the peak oil crisis as a discrete event that would unfold over a few months; 
others, citing books such as Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of Complex Societies and 
Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, predict a decades-
long decline.14  Some believe that the effects will not be felt for a few years, while others 
consider energy scarcity to be the root cause of the recent economic recession. 
Nonetheless, my surveys show that peakists do share a set of beliefs that 
differentiate them from socio-economically similar Americans in important ways.  While 
most people who have contemplated these issues (already a minority of Americans) tend 
to believe that any future energy shortages will be solved by technological leaps and 
renewable energy sources, few peakists agree.  On average, they viewed “resource wars” 
for petroleum, a halved or quartered global population, and an apocalyptic scenario, 
including mass epidemics and billions of deaths, as three times more likely than 
                                                
14 Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); 
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Allen, 2005). 
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continued “business as usual.”  Almost all expected a significant drop in quality of life 
for Americans.15  This ideology is almost the inverse is of the expectation of social 
progress and unlimited economic growth that was still widespread in the pre-recession 
United States, a contrast I return to at the end of this chapter. 
Their values and sense of self often change along with their ideology.  A 
Maryland man said, “I am more aware of how my personal lifestyle, as well as that of 
broader society, is dependent on fossil fuel, and how we will all be affected,” while a 
Coloradan in his late forties is now “living more for the moment” as opposed to 
“planning for the future.”16  A woman in her sixties, who sees peak oil and climate 
change as a “wake up call that our civilization is going through a paradigm change,” said 
that she had “learned to live with a whole lot less” and was “discovering that what's 
important to me is not driving an expensive car or living in a 5,000 sq ft house or flying 
halfway around the world to go on vacation.”17 
These psychological preparations for collapse and its aftermath were often 
emotionally painful, and most respondents admitted to short-lived feelings of depression 
and hopelessness after becoming peak oil aware.  However, a surprising number reported 
that their transformation had been psychologically beneficial.18  The Mississippi man 
                                                
15 In response to the question, “Which of the following do you see as most likely for the country you 
currently reside in?  Please rate each on a scale of 0 to 10,” American peakists provided the following 
responses: Business as usual with no major consequences = 2.01; Better technology and new energy 
sources allow for little change = 2.26; A gradual shift into a lower-energy world = 5.71; Apocalyptic 
scenario (i.e. violence, epidemics, die-off) = 6.37; A smaller population = 7.35; Resource wars for 
remaining energy = 8.18; A significant drop in quality of life = 8.24.  In discussions about energy futures, 
“business as usual” denotes a continuation of current energy regimes and global neoliberal capitalism 
without a major shift in course. 
16 Respondents 9568924 and 9569376. 
17 Respondent 9592049. 
18 Respondent 9707518. 
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quoted in this chapter’s epigram claimed that his conversion brought on “the opposite of 
depression. It gave me a framework, and people who believed the same.”19  Many 
seemed to believe that, as a poster to the website Life After The Oil Crash put it, “there's 
an amazing identity and purpose behind realizing [peak oil].  [It] has helped me take 
closer notice of life, and spend more time with family and friends, and appreciate the 
qualities of people and the world round me.”20  A Nevada woman in her early fifties said 
that she is now “living a much simpler life,” and “approach[ing] life more a day at a time.  
Spending much more time with loved ones and much less time focused on money and 
possessions.  The changes have been good for me and my family,” and a New York man 
of the same age is now “more aware of what I have and enjoy 'simple' everyday things 
like reading a good book or taking a nice brisk walk.”21  A surprising number of believers 
even found in environmental apocalypticism the motivation to get in shape, such as the 
Arkansas man who said, “I slowly begun to take more care of my physical health because 
it will be necessary for a day with less energy.”22 
 
From Belief to Personal Action 
Becoming “peak oil aware” caused most believers to change the way that they 
lived to reflect their revised goals, priorities, and expectations.  A Colorado man in his 
fifties said that his new “lifestyle is patterned after educating myself to how to live in a 
world with less oil,” while a new father in his thirties said that his awareness of oil 
                                                
19 Respondent 9682014. 
20 “Flycreeper,” “Preparation Philosophy,” Life After the Oil Drum, 
http://www.lifeaftertheoilcrash.net/902385028.  Accessed April 26, 2009. 
21 Respondents 9574456 and 9575542. 
22 Respondent 9680012. 
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depletion “has changed my entire being.  My wife and I are totally restructuring our 
future.” 23  A New Yorker who had helped found the MeetUp group “Peak Oil NYC” and 
organized peak oil conferences in 2005 and 2006 said that his “awareness of the 
impending reality of Peak Oil is both directly & indirectly, the underlying driver for most 
of my activities.”24  What actions did he and others take?  Nearly three-quarters of 
American peakists have begun preparing food and supplies for the coming crisis, one in 
five has changed their occupation to reflect their new interests or require less carbon-
intensive commuting, 53% drive less and 32% purchased a more energy-efficient car.  
Only 11% have yet to act on their beliefs.25  As I will show, these actions were primarily 
personal, and not political—for reasons that I explore in chapter 4, only 28% of 
respondents had engaged in political activities related to peak oil, and many of these had 
attended only one meeting.26  Before exploring the wide range of responses, let us look in 
closer detail at the “peak oil narratives” of three representative individuals.  
A native Tennessean in his late fifties, “Robert” first heard of peak oil in 2001, 
and quickly “began reviewing other sources to confirm what I had read, as well as paying 
more attention to current news and analyses about energy topics.”  He saw oil depletion 
as a part of “a convergence of problems facing humanity,” which include “climate 
change, imperialism, increasing income disparities and poverty, corporatist capitalism” 
and “infrastructure obsolescence and decay.”  He described himself as a socialist, and 
                                                
23 Respondents 9682014 and 9573763.  
24 Respondent 9593771. 
25 72% of American peakists answered “Yes” to the question, “As a result of your knowledge of peak oil, 
have you done any of the following - Prepared food or other supplies for yourself and your family.” 
26 While this number might be considered evidence of politicization for some groups of Americans, many 
respondents already had long histories of political activism.  
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was so “disgusted with both parties” that he no longer even voted.  After the major peak 
oil websites (described in the next chapter) went on-line in 2004, he became an active 
member of the virtual community, checking in multiple times every day until 2010, when 
he decided to shift from gathering information to preparing.  His life was then organized 
around the question, “If I prepare now, how can I maintain a good quality of life for my 
family when energy becomes much more expensive, rationed, or intermittently 
unavailable?'”  Despite having never physically met another peak oil believer, he reduced 
his energy consumption by moving “closer to [my] job and family” as well as “trying to 
walk more.  Trying to eat less meat,” since meat (in the United States) is two to four 
times more energy-intensive as vegetables and grains, and “trying to buy local food” that 
had not been shipped from thousands of miles away.  He cut down on energy waste by 
“turning down [the] thermostat in winter, up in summer.  Insulating home.”  To prepare 
for the collapse and its aftermath, he was “trying to grow, preserve and store food,” as 
well as “buying bikes, sweaters, long underwear,” which would be in high demand.  He 
altered his physical environment, by “planting trees,” as well as his financial investment 
strategy, by “investing in precious metals and long-term oil futures.”  Beyond these 
tangible preparations, Robert was actively “maintaining awareness” about the timing of 
the expected crisis and “educating [his] family.”27 
“Mary” from Massachusetts told a similar story of transformation and 
preparation.  She first learned about peak oil in 2005, when she “wanted to become self-
sufficient and learn more about gardening and preserving food.”  She “began perusing 
websites. I saw the term 'peak oil' on Sharon Astyk's site [The Chatelaine’s Keys] and the 
                                                
27 Respondent 9590253. 
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Homesteading Today forum. I picked up a link to The Automatic Earth,” a blog 
discussing issues such as peak oil, climate change and the economic recession, and 
“began reading/studying their archives and links to other sites.”28  From 2006 to 2009, 
she checked these websites many times a day.  Although she had never suffered from 
depression before this period, she said that becoming “peak oil aware” had a significant 
(though short-lived) impact on her mental state.  She now foresees, in the near future, 
resource wars and a social collapse, including violence, a ‘die-off,’ and mass epidemics.  
Like many believers, she found her new ideology to be socially isolating: 
After sharing my concerns with family members and a few friends, I realized very 
few people were willing to take the issue seriously. They would look at me like I 
was crazy. When you learn your whole world is going to change, it is 
overwhelming. Most of the responses that I got were 'we're discovering new oil 
fields all the time' or 'technology will save us.' My favorite response is 'If that 
were true, it would be all over the news!' 
Despite never physically meeting another peak oil believer, Mary also decided to 
transform her life: 
We planted fruit trees, grapevines, began gardening and preserving our food. 
Stockpiled food/seeds. We added chickens and bees to our homestead. Learned to 
make bread from wheat that we grind. Began assessing energy needs. Considered 
                                                
28 Sharon Astyk, The Chatelaine’s Keys: Finding the Keys to the Future, http://sharonastyk.com.  
Homesteading Today: Neighborly Help and Friendly Advice, http://www.homesteadingtoday.com.  The 
Automatic Earth, http://theautomaticearth.com/Front-Page.html.  Accessed December 1, 2012. 
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moving to a smaller place. We've bought some hand tools. We evaluate every 
purchase in terms of the post peak world.29   
“Michael,” a fifty-something teacher with a PhD, considered himself an anarchist 
and had always been active in environmental campaigns.  After reading an article about 
peak oil author James Howard Kunstler in 2006, Michael “looked up the topic on line and 
started reading books and articles and following forums like [The Oil Drum].”  From 
2007 to 2011, he checked these websites sites every day, because they “provide (mostly) 
intelligent conversation with (mostly) people who have a clue.”  Unlike Robert and Mary, 
he had attended collective meetings, such as Transition Town gatherings and peak oil 
lectures, and was politically active in the Democratic Party, the Green Party, and around 
specific environmental issues.  Michael sees oil depletion as an issue endemic to “growth 
oriented industrial economies, especially now capitalism with [its] hyper-consumption,” 
exacerbated by “over-population.”  He argues that contemporary capitalism, which 
originated in “Indo-European patriarchal, militarist and expansionist ideologies,” tends to 
see “the world as something to conquer,” and is willing to “burn and break things to get 
what it wants.”  As a result, he foresees an “economic collapse” in the United States, in 
which the “gov[ernment] [is] unable to fund basic services,” with “massive 
unemployment and mortgage defaults (already [happening]).  Mostly more and more of 
us falling into the deeply poor with a small super-wealthy class—unless movements 
overturn them.” 
Michael said that climate change was “as much” of a motivation as oil depletion 
for his numerous actions: 
                                                
29 Respondent 9569860. 
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I don't fly, and mostly don't drive. Picked job close to home. Picked home close to 
many amenities and good neighbors. Pulled all cash out of stocks before the 
[economic] crash [of 2008]. Paid off house. Bought an electric car three years 
ago. Work topics [of peak oil and climate change] into my classes regularly. 
Despite emphasizing environmental sustainability in every aspect of his life, Michael 
agreed that “fictional portrayals of post-apocalyptic scenarios have influenced [his] image 
of what the post-peak period will be like,” and listed the films Waterworld, The Day After 
Tomorrow, War of the Worlds, Children of Men and The Happening as some of the (post-
)apocalyptic films he’s seen.  Like most peakists, he finds it difficult to bring up the issue 
of peak oil with others, because it is “similar to [climate change] issues—the topic is too 
big to bring up casually, and most conversation is casual.”  Despite his immersion in the 
peakist virtual community, he did not consider peak oil to be a “community” or 
“movement” but rather a “group of unrelated individuals following their own goals.”30 
  In the following chapters I pick up and explore the cultural, political and 
environmental implications of the stories told by Robert, Mary, and Michael—the 
difference between individualistic actions and political or collective engagement, the 
impact of cultural narratives (such as films) on conceptions of environmental change, and 
the ‘network effect’ of the Internet on its users—but first I explore in more detail the 
kinds of actions that were taken by other respondents.  In their responses to contemporary 
environmental crises, Robert, Mary and Michael were not exceptions.  Most peakists 
became more actively engaged in “planning their own future” after becoming peak oil 
aware, and most said that their chief priority was “protecting themselves and their family 
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from the immediate consequences of peak oil,” rather than “educating others” or 
“working with others to try to avert the worst consequences.”  Befitting a twenty-first 
century movement, most peakists—61% in my first survey, 53% in the second—had 
never physically met another believer.  There was no correlation between real-world 
meetings and real-world actions, which is to say that there were lots of respondents just 
like Robert and Mary.  For example, almost half of the 26 respondents to my first survey 
who had left their spouse or partner as a result of their newfound belief-system had never 
met another peakist.  Instead of seeking out physical communities of people with similar 
beliefs, they sought information and fellowship through the Internet and transformed their 
own lives.   
 
Immediate Changes  
 I divide the actions that they have taken into two categories: immediate changes 
and “prepping” for the post-carbon future.  Immediately after converting, most believers 
“look for ways to use less energy and go lighter upon the land,” and the quickest way to 
accomplish this goal is to drive less. 31  A California man in his early forties said he now 
“bicycle[s] much more,” while a Florida man “started riding [a] bicycle and walking” as 
a result of his “deep concern for [the futures of] my children and grand child,” cutting his 
hydrocarbon consumption “from 10 gals. of gas a week to 10 gals. per month on 
average.”32  Those who resided in cities took advantage of mass transportation, like the 
“progressive” Washingtonian who started “taking public transit to work,” a New York 
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woman who tried “to use public transit more frequently,” and a Missouri socialist who 
now “use[s] public transportation exclusively.”33  Many peakists were willing to 
discontinue their leisure pursuits as well, such as a libertarian in his early fifties who 
“gave up a motorcycling hobby,” since it was “for sport and not transportation.”34  
 More than half of all Americans are invested in the stock market in some way, 
and the expectation of imminent collapse led many to adjust their portfolios immediately.  
Some, expecting a complete collapse, pulled out of the market, such as the Colorado man 
in his late twenties who “bought gold” and “exited the stock market, excluding some 
upstream oil & gas investments.”35  Some consulted the peakist investment guides 
published in the mid-2000s, The Coming Economic Collapse: How You Can Thrive When 
Oil Costs $200 a Barrel and The Oil Factor: Protect Yourself and Profit from the 
Coming Energy Crisis, which predicted a bear market in the late 2000s and suggested 
investments in oil futures and energy companies.36  A father of two in New York state 
began to “invest (in every sense of the word) in post-peak assets, from shovels, rakes and 
wheelbarrows to firewood harvesting and processing equipment to Schlumberger [a large 
oilfield services company] and Petrobank Energy [a Canadian oil exploration and 
development company],” and a North Carolina doctor began a “radical change in 
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investment strategies (anticipate economic shocks, invest in oil, gas, gold).”37  (The 
decision to invest in oil and gas stocks is one of many areas where some peakists and 
more mainstream environmentalists, some of whom are organizing a campaign to ask 
institutions to disinvest from fossil fuels, part ways.)  A number of respondents noted that 
these strategies had already “paid off,” due in the part to the economic recession of 
2008.38  For example, a Minnesota man who “randomly encountered a peak oil website” 
in 2005 said that he developed “a framework for planning ahead that has already yielded 
financial advantages over what I would have done without knowing about the oil peak.”39 
 Their relationship to a different form of capital—debt—often changed as well.  
Expecting the system of global capitalism to collapse—and motivated, no doubt, by the 
changed circumstances of many American homeowners after the housing bubble burst—a 
Virginia woman “focused on paying off loans,” while a man in his late thirties took a 
“second job” to “get out of debt” and “save more money” so as to “purchase precious 
metals” that would retain their value after capitalism’s demise.40  Others took the 
opposite approach, like the Colorado man who was so convinced that “the system will… 
collapse or reset based on lack of growth and high unemployment” that he was “not 
concerned with paying of any debts, especially real estate debt.”41 
Most peakists immediately altered their consumption patterns as well.  Acutely 
aware that national chains have steadily replaced local stores, which could leave them 
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with few options should the global distribution system based on inexpensive petroleum 
break down, many followed the model of a North Carolina man who supports “local food 
sourcing” as much as possible, and the Washington woman in her seventies for whom 
“fostering a local food supply has become a full time occupation” since she became an 
“urban farmer and proprietor of local food store.”42  A Rhode Island woman in her late 
sixties “joined [a] local [Community Supported Agriculture group] & cut way back on 
supermarket shopping,” as well as purchasing “clothing that is functional & durable 
rather than fashionable.”43  With similar considerations in mind, a former activist in New 
York City said he had “acquired simple tools and household items made from strong 
materials that will last a long, long time instead of plastic crap made in China.”44  Others, 
well aware of the ecological footprint of consumer goods manufactured with 
petrochemicals and shipped from far away, simply “buy less stuff in general.”45 
Energy considerations framed not only their long-term decisions, but everyday 
concerns as well.  A young man from Nevada said, “everything that I buy I consider can I 
get it locally, will it be available in a limited energy economy, and should I consider an 
alternative.”46  This was true even for respondents that had yet to take action, such as the 
Ohio man who said, “I make plans and think about what I'll do when the collapse 
happens,” as well as a Wisconsin doctor who is “keeping [his] eye on the horizon, and 
                                                
42 Respondents 9559141 and 9564383. 
43 Respondent 9566499. 
44 Respondent 9568832. 
45 Respondent 9570009. 
46 Respondent 9568679. 
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forming plans to put in place as needed.”47  For a number of peakists, oil depletion was 
such a constant concern that they now drive more slowly, so as to preserve gasoline.  
 
 “Prepping” for the Post-Carbon Future 
 After these immediate responses, many peakists began preparing for a future that 
would look very different from their present.  Most started by embarking on a course of 
study about topics they previously knew little about, like the “progressive” Colorado man 
whose “lifestyle is [now] patterned after educating myself… to live in a world with less 
oil.”48  Towards this end, a California woman was busy “collecting books on topics I 
might need in a world with no power sources but human or animal,” while a 
“progressive” man in his fifties “started reading obsessively about agriculture and simple 
tech[nology].”49  A New York City resident had “acquired many books on subjects that 
would be helpful for local living with fewer resources imported from outside a 
community—foraging, fixing tools,” and an environmental activist in her late sixties 
promised to “continue to educate myself and family members about what to expect and 
how to prepare” by “collecting a library of books and resources.”50 
 A global collapse and disintegration of nation-states might require survivors to 
learn skills that were once common but have largely been forgotten (in the United States) 
as a result of labor specialization.  To this end, a central element of the Transition 
Initiative movement is the “Great Reskilling,” a collective project to acquire the practical 
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skills that few members of Western industrial society possess.51  A young man from New 
Jersey who had become “peak oil aware” only a few months before taking my survey 
said he was “working on developing actual useful skills (woodworking, organic 
gardening) and ha[d] turned away from mainstream entertainment (Television, video 
games, etc.),” while a “progressive” Oregonian in her early thirties “decided not to go 
back to school and instead just focus on building a cob house [constructed with straw and 
clay]” and  “learn everything I can about growing & preserving food on my own.”52  A 
Native American woman had already “learned new skills” such as “fruit and vegetable 
gardening, canning, fermenting, dehydrating, storing food,” while a middle-aged man in 
Santa Clara planned to go “back to basics” through the “learning of lost arts,” including 
“candle making, furniture building, etc.  Anything that would help us learn to rely less on 
imports and commercially made goods and services.”53  Others planned to hone their 
skills in trades that they expected the post-peak period to value, such as the teacher who 
was “leaving teaching to start a new career apprenticing” as “a traditional wooden boat 
builder.  I hope that I can offer these skills to earn a living” and “become a valuable 
member of a community somewhere.”54  As I explore in chapter 5, these efforts 
dovetailed with similar developments in mid-to-late 2000s, such as the “D.I.Y.” or 
“make” movement, and a renewed interest in Depression-era activities, such as gardening 
and canning, as a result of the economic recession.55  
                                                
51 See, for example, the blog Transition Culture, http://transitionculture.org/2010/10/05/ingredients-of-
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52 Respondents 9562083 and 9570857. 
53 Respondents 9602470 and 9594065. 
54 Respondent 9576587.   
55 See Doreen Jakob, “Crafting your way out of the recession? New craft entrepreneurs and the global 
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When the price of electricity is low, as it has been since the 1950s, energy 
efficiency and distributed (local) power generation are not particularly vital concerns for 
most Americans.  But peakists who owned their homes took on impressive construction 
projects that they expected to pay off when energy is at a premium.  Most tried to 
increase their efficiency and install renewable home power generation to maximize their 
self-sufficiency for that day when the electricity grid becomes unreliable.  A Nebraska 
man, for example, had “purchased solar panels” and found “alternative ways to heat my 
house (mainly wood stoves and fireplace enhancements).  Also, I have better insulated 
my house, turned down the thermostat, wear sweaters inside and have heavier 
blankets.”56  A “liberal” man in his thirties “added solar photovoltaic and solar thermal 
systems to my home,” while an architect from Colorado said he had “built a few passive 
solar houses, one of which I live in.”57 
 For those that did not already own a home, acquiring land for a post-peak 
homestead was a priority.  With this in mind, a New York woman in her thirties “bought 
an urban greenhouse with vacant land for cultivation,” an African-American man in 
Virginia “purchased a 190-acre farm and started a winery” and was “working to 
transition there full-time, with the intention of being as self-sufficient as possible,” and a 
                                                                                                                                            
economic downturn,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 6, no. 1: 127-140; David 
Brodwin, “Americans Leading a 'Do It Yourself Economy' As Washington Stalls,” U.S. News & World 
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Pennsylvania man “bought property” with the intention of “moving off grid.”58  A ham 
radio enthusiast had “moved out to [his] land in the country” in Alabama, where he 
“added insulation to the house.”59  Peakists expect that some regions and cities will be 
better positioned to survive the twin crises of global warming and peak oil, based on their 
climate and proximity to agriculture.  When “gas prices spike[d] after Katrina,” a 
Virginia woman began to “reconsider the status quo” and eventually “moved from one 
state to another [because] of better climate and less dependence on automobile [sic],” 
while a believer in Queens (New York City) was “moving to [Vermont].”60  Similar 
considerations motivated a man in his early fifties to relocate to rural New York: “I 
moved 6 years ago, researched cities with the best water quality and furthest from nuclear 
reactors and not on the ocean.  I now own a very efficient organic farm, and have hybrid 
vehicles, soon to be totally electric.”61 
  Cheap oil enabled suburban spatial development in the post-WWII period, and 
gasoline is still inexpensive enough in 2013 (despite an increase of over 300% since 
1998) for most Americans to live comfortably in the suburbs.62  Peakists believe this will 
soon cease to be the case, and American life will become local once again.  A North 
Carolina man in his late twenties reported that his “family moved to a more traditional 
‘walkable community,’ where we can walk or ride bikes to local stores, parks, etc,” while 
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a California man in his late sixties, who had “been engaged in social activism since [his] 
college days (e.g., Vietnam war),” was “actively planning to migrate to [a] small town” 
where there would be no “need for long commutes by car” and the “impacts of climate 
change might be less.”63  Other respondents relocated for fear of losing touch with their 
loved ones when air travel becomes prohibitively expensive.  An anarchist related that “at 
the time I became peak oil aware, I was living thousands of miles away from where I 
grew up and where most of my family was residing… I sold my house (sale finalized 
about 20 months after I became peak oil aware) and moved back to my native state to be 
nearer to family and friends I had grown up with.”64 
 Others even sought a lower-energy life abroad.  After researching “peak 
everything,” a scientist in his forties decided to “move from California back to France to 
be in a more stable place, with better public transportation.”65  A recent emigrant, who 
considered most Americans “deeply ignorant and poorly educated” about  “understanding 
energy from all levels… physics, biology, systems dynamics, economics” learned about 
peak oil on the Internet in 2003, began to “study economics, which led to [the] topic of 
[a] housing crisis looming in the future, which led us to sell our house and apartment, 
rent, then move abroad to a city” in Denmark, “where we dont [sic] need a car” and enjoy 
a “more sustainable, lower-energy life-style.”66  
 The vast majority of respondents did not expatriate, but they tried to develop as 
much self-sufficiency as possible.  For many, this included engaging in practices that 
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they associated with right-wing survivalists, such as stockpiling goods and even arming 
themselves.  Most peak oil believers, like a Virginia lawyer, were quick to note that they 
were not “survivalists,” since this “implies the hermit in the woods,” whereas “an 
appropriate response” to peak oil and climate change is “simply a return to local 
agriculture, work/home proximity, closer communities [without a] dependence on things 
distant.”67  Nonetheless, 72% of my respondents stockpiled supplies.  The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency recommends that all citizens store at least three days of 
canned food and water, but most peakists prepared for a much longer crisis.  A woman in 
her sixties reported having stockpiled “food, fuel, survival necessities and tools,” while a 
Georgia man began “stockpiling food and water” after reading James Howard Kunstler’s 
The Long Emergency.68  A Pennsylvanian became so concerned about the future that in 
2010 he began “trying to stock pile text books so our history and knowledge isn't lost” 
after the collapse.69  Given the tradition of non-violence among liberals and leftists, guns 
and ammunition were a source of concern for many peakists, since their left-liberal 
beliefs clashed with their desire for personal preparedness.  A “liberal” Washington 
woman, for example, planned “to buy and learn how to use weapons, which we have 
never before felt the need to do, & which in & of itself is hugely depressing.”70  Many 
liberal “preppers” refused to purchase weapons as a matter of principle, like the Arkansas 
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man who had “installed [a] wood stove, bought [a] greenhouse” and “dug up back yard 
and built garden beds” but insisted, “I have no guns and am ready to help neighbors in 
my small town.”71 
 
Fig. 1.2. Sandpoint Transition Initiative co-founder Richard Kuhnel working in his garden in 
Sandpoint, Idaho.  Source: Author. 
 
While a few respondents endeavored to enjoy what they expected to be the last 
gasps of the age of oil—one Floridian was “learn[ing] to enjoy hydrocarbons while we 
have them,” while a Latino man in his thirties took “long driving tours of the US because 
I know the driving era will soon end”—most were attempting to ease the inevitable 
transition by modeling post-collapse life in the here and now.72  Although  
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many peakists had previously gardened as a hobby, they now expanded their operations.  
A Maryland woman in her fifties was “improving [her] soil,” an Oregon woman was 
“keeping chickens,” and a Georgia woman said she “now grow[s] two-thirds of my 
vegetables.”73  A California man who had attended the first Association for the Study of 
Peak Oil (ASPO) conference in 2004 had constructed a “self-sufficient homestead,” 
while a former aeronautics engineer was working on improving his farm, “not so much 
for me… but to give my daughters the possibility of a bit longer life span after” the 
coming collapse.74 
 
The Peakist Subculture 
The vast majority of these actions were pursued individually—changes in driving 
and consumption patterns, farming or gardening, and increased energy-efficiency in 
transportation and housing.  While comparatively few believers made concerted efforts to 
form real-world communities or engaged in political actions, many focused their energies 
on erecting an impressive virtual community. Online, they collectively constructed an 
extensive subculture of peakist films, videos, YouTube channels, podcasts, blogs, songs, 
poems, cartoons, short stories, novels and non-fiction books.  While the potentially wide-
reaching implications of oil depletion have been the subject of dozens of recent scholarly 
articles from fields as diverse as public health, tourism management and urban studies, 
the labyrinthine subculture of peakists has been overlooked.75  The Internet enables the 
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easy creation of subcultures and subcultural identities, but can often obscure the extent to 
which these identities are psychologically or emotionally meaningful, or expressed in the 
“real” (offline) world.76  The facility of conducting discourse analysis of websites can 
lead, on one hand, to exaggerated claims about the significance of online trends, but the 
physical invisibility of meaningful virtual communities can also lead scholars and 
commentators to underreport the popularity and significance of these phenomena.77  
Many peakists have primarily focused their energies on websites, blogs, and online 
forums, but in the twenty-first century United States these are crucial sites for the 
formation of identities and the creation of community. 
As I discuss in chapter 3, the movement’s reliance on the Internet as its 
communicative medium led it to mirror the architecture of the network itself, but even 
decentralized, leaderless groups select influential tastemakers.  Well-known authors, 
bloggers and website moderators played a crucial role in popularizing the peakist 
ideology and shaping its vision of the future.  They have much in common with their fans 
and readers, and their biographies speak to the motivations, concerns, and contradictions 
of this community.  As a window into the formation of this primarily virtual community, 
I profile two popular and influential figures, peak oil evangelist James Howard Kunstler 
and “Peak Shrink” Kathy McMahon. 
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The Peak Oil Evangelist: James Howard Kunstler  
 James Howard Kunstler is the most widely known and influential peak oil author.  
In 2007, he appeared at Magers & Quinn bookstore in Minneapolis, Minnesota, to 
promote his nonfiction book, The Long Emergency: Surviving the Converging 
Catastrophes of the Twenty-first Century.  Approximately thirty people sat in the back of 
the store in gray plastic chairs, muttering excitedly in hushed voices, while another 
fifteen stood behind them.  From snippets of overheard conversations, it was clear that 
most were already familiar with Kunstler’s ideas from his books, blog, or appearances in 
documentary films.  A barrel-chested man in his late fifties with thinning brown hair, a 
thin moustache and a mischievous smile, Kunstler was dressed comfortably in blue jeans 
and a button-down shirt.  He was an energetic speaker, pacing back and forth, 
opinionated and sarcastic.  He summarized the argument presented in The Long 
Emergency: as a result of peak oil and climate change, the United States and the world 
will shortly enter a “long emergency” that will constitute the collapse of the world as we 
know it.  Survivors will experience conditions slightly better than they were in eighteenth 
century North America.  During the question-and-answer session, a slender man in his 
twenties stepped forward from the crowd with a hopeful question: “Do you have any 
advice for young people who will live most of their lives in the long emergency?”  
Kunstler paused for a moment and responded, without expression, “No.”  As the crowd 
filed out, there was the electricity of a brief brush with celebrity, and very little evident 
disappointment or dejection. 
 Like many peakists, Kunstler is a baby boomer, born in New York City in 1948.   
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He graduated from the State University of New York at Brockport, where he was a 
journalist, theater major and student government president.  After college, he worked for 
a number of local or regional newspapers, such as Albany’s Knickerbocker News, and 
was a staff writer for Rolling Stone in the early 1970s.  In 1975, Kunstler became a full-
time author, publishing seven moderately successful novels between 1979 and 1989.  In 
the late 1980s, he penned a number of articles for The New York Times on 
environmentalism and urban development in the Northeast.  His first non-fiction book, 
The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-Made Landscape, 
was published in 1993 and established Kunstler as an authority on American suburbia.  It 
presented a critical history of suburbanization, not dissimilar from Kenneth T. Jackson’s 
Crabgrass Frontier, alongside a Jane Jacobs model of urban neighborhoods as healthy 
communities, with special attention to the built environment.78  The Geography of 
Nowhere was popular enough to be reviewed widely in national media and local 
newspapers.  A typical review, from The Washington Post, noted that although “nothing 
that he says is really new,” Kunstler “has a nice gift for invective and a well-developed 
sense of outrage.”79  Despite having no formal training in architecture or related fields, 
Kunstler became known as one of the leading proponents of the architectural design 
movement New Urbanism.  In 1998 he spoke at the annual meeting of the American 
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Institute of Architects, and, according to The Chronicle of Higher Education, Geography 
of Nowhere became “standard reading in architecture and urban planning courses.”80 
In early 2001 Kunstler started a blog, “Clusterfuck Nation,” and in the wake of 
the September 11th attacks he began focusing on energy depletion, oil politics, and then 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  His career took another unpredictable turn in 2005, 
when he published The Long Emergency, which was read by over seventy percent of my 
respondents.  It shared a number of elements with other peak oil nonfiction books, 
delivered with Kunstler’s sweeping scale and caustic wit—a history of oil production, a 
description of the centrality of petroleum to our daily lives and its role in modern 
geopolitics (including the Iraq war), and an unequivocal dismissal of the potential of 
alternative fuels.81  However, it stood alone in its far-reaching predictions of the social, 
economic, and political consequences of the expected crisis.82  In the long history of 
apocalyptic literature in the United States, it most closely resembles The Late, Great 
Planet Earth, Hal Lindsey’s 1970 best-seller, which interpreted the Bible in the context 
of Cold War geopolitics.  In the same way, Kunstler dramatizes peakist ideology into an 
apocalyptic declension narrative.  His vivid imagination struck a chord—thousands of 
devoted readers echoed the sentiment of a member of the website Peak Oil News & 
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Message Boards, who wrote, “I read his book in two or three sittings. I couldn’t put it 
down.”83 
 The “long emergency” is Kunstler’s term for the drawn-out collapse of the 
modern world—which has already begun.  Like most peakists, he believes that without 
cheap and plentiful oil, the twenty-first century world will grind to a halt.  American 
suburbs, dependent on automobility, will become isolated and uninhabitable.  Cities such 
as New York and Chicago, without easy access to local farming, will be abandoned.  
Food will have to be grown locally, since the cost of transport (via trucks, planes or 
ships) will rise, and billions will starve without the petroleum-derived pesticides and 
fertilizer that enable modern agricultural yields.  Competition for remaining resources 
will cause global wars, and immigrants from poorer nations will overrun wealthier 
nations.  As economies stagnate, jobs disappear and unrest grows, elites will attempt to 
hold power by force.  Electricity will become scarce.  The United States will eventually 
crumble, with only the Northeast resembling the contemporary U.S., while Mexican 
nationals retake the Southwest, and Western states, overly reliant on cars and air 
conditioning, are abandoned.  The Northwest will have more complicated problems, since 
it will “be especially vulnerable to raids emanating from the disintegrating nations of 
Asia.”84  For those that remain, every aspect of life will be very different, “increasingly 
and intensely local and smaller in scale.”  The world will return to a “dark age” as high 
schools and colleges close and children are put to work.  Survivors will see a rise in 
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religious fundamentalism and a return to religious authority; indentured servitude and 
even slavery and may return to the United States.85  Although Kunstler maintained that 
“just because I say a particular unpleasant thing may happen doesn’t mean I want it to 
happen, or that I endorse its happening,” critics accused him of wishing for collapse.86  
As a reviewer from Fort Wayne’s Journal-Gazette put it, “Kunstler takes a curmudgeon's 
delight in ticking off the many extravagances humanity will have to do without in the 
years ahead.”87 
His popular blog was cut from this same cloth.  “Clusterfuck Nation” is a 
freewheeling weekly commentary on American politics, economics, architecture, 
suburbia, energy and culture, which the New Yorker described as “a sustained critique of 
the cheerful globalism championed by Thomas Friedman.”88  In 2005, the New York 
Times also took note, informing its readers that Kunstler had “taken to the Web in a big 
way” and “moved beyond slash-and-burn suburbia to take on economics and global 
commerce.”89  The titles of his posts, such as “The Creeping Nausea of American 
Exceptionalism,” “Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?” and “The First Die-
Off,” give a sense of his dramatic vision.  Despite its dark tone, the site is remarkably 
popular.  In 2008 alone, there were 2.5 million unique visitors, with over 80% located in 
the United States.  In 2006, “Clusterfuck Nation” had an average of 80,000 visitors a 
month; 100,000 in 2007; 175,000 in 2008; and a peak of over 300,000 in September 2008 
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alone.  Almost half of them were categorized as “returning visitors,” who might have 
arrived at www.kunstler.com out of curiosity but returned within the month.90 
“Clusterfuck Nation” was also syndicated on “Peak Oil News” as well as “Energy 
Bulletin,” a news aggregate site maintained by the Post Carbon Institute.91   
In addition to his impressive web presence—a Google search for “James Howard 
Kunstler” and “peak oil” in December of 2011 returned approximately 286,000 web 
pages—Kunstler was busy in the real world.92  He regularly lectured around the country 
and appeared in a number of peak oil documentary films, such The End of Suburbia 
(2005), Radiant City (2007) and Escape from Suburbia (2007).  In each, he played the 
role of the TV historian to a tee, paraphrasing decades of history into provocative sound 
bites.  His academic reputation made Kunstler a frequent spokesperson on peak oil in 
mainstream news articles, but he was also active within the peakist subculture.  For 
example, Kunstler participated in a four-part interview with performance artist Kris Can, 
on her video blog and YouTube channel, “Peak Oil Action and Adventure.”  
 
Detour: ASPO’s 2009 International Peak Oil Conference, Denver, Colorado 
Can, like “Oily Cassandra,” attempted to use sex appeal to attract viewers and 
theneducate them about energy scarcity.  Her signature, sepia-toned video, “Public 
Service Message,” featured an apparently naked Can swaying behind two oil cans while 
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she delivers a raspy monologue on oil depletion.93  I learned about this interview at the 
sixth annual Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO) International conference in 
Denver in October 2009, where over a thousand people gathered for three days of 
workshops and panels about peak oil and climate change.  ASPO, which formed and 
began annual conferences in 2002, describes itself as a “network of scientists and others, 
having an interest in determining the date and impact of the peak and decline of the 
world’s production of oil and gas.”94  There are ASPO chapters in 23 countries, including 
the United States.   Although his opinionated speculation was anathema to ASPO’s 
scientific, disinterested tone, Kunstler was a regular speaker. 
 His jeremiads exerted an influence despite his absence that year.  Asher Miller, 
former director of the Post Carbon Institute (“leading the transition to a more resilient, 
equitable, and sustainable world”), told me that he first learned about peak oil after 
picking up The Long Emergency.95  Brian, a 32-year old electrical engineer, who attended 
the conference because he thought that with rising fuel prices “it might be the last 
opportunity to fly” anywhere, said his vision of the future was “Kunstler-esque.”96  Held 
in the Sheraton Hotel, the ASPO gathering had the buttoned-down professional 
atmosphere of a business conference, but a spirit of camaraderie was also evident.  Bill 
Fickas, a 47-year old libertarian computer programmer who framed his future in terms of 
Kunstler’s work (“it could go World Made By Hand”), said that part of the draw of 
peakist conferences was the sense of community created by face-to-face meetings: 
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It helps to find other people who share the opinion, and it is a positive thing 
coming to things like this.  Just being able to see that there are other people out 
there on the Internet is great, but to actually be in a room that if you talked about 
this don’t think that you’re a nutbar, it certainly helps.97 
Some attendees literally wore their ideology on their clothes.  Steve Allen, for example, 
sported a T-shirt with a graphic depicting the Malthusian “Olduvai theory” (below), 
which holds that industrial civilization will endure for only one hundred years, to be 
followed by a “post-industrial stone age.”   Like other subcultures, peakists expressed and 
advertised their identities through commercially produced and distributed goods.  Next to 
us, Smiley Oil, a conference sponsor, was busy demonstrating its educational peak oil 
video game, Energy Worlds.  Its logo was sinister but somehow appropriate to its 
referent, a cartoonish drop of black gold with a white Cheshire grin.  A young woman 
sold ASPO mugs alongside shirts that proclaimed “I ♥ Peak Oil,” and a much wider 
variety of items could be found online, including bumper stickers, flags, and baby bibs.98 
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 Outside the Sheraton, a local oil company thought the conference enough of a 
threat to the status quo that it waged a small-scale public relations battle.  Aspect Energy, 
LLC paid two men to dress in chicken costumes and pass out leaflets outside the hotel.  
They began, 
My oil industry colleagues and I have been fielding lots of questions recently 
from Chicken Littles worried that petroleum is running out.  After I calmed some 
of them down, they volunteered to hand out a little bit of additional information to 
anyone who seemed to be casting one worried eye on the sky.99 
The documents listed three “Overlooked Remarkable Facts” about seemingly unlimited 
petroleum reserves and reprinted a recent New York Times op-ed piece, “‘Peak Oil’ Is a 
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Fig. 1.3: Left: Steve Allen, a participant in the 2009 Association for the Study of Peak Oil 
International conference at the Sheraton Hotel, in Denver, Colorado.  Source: Author.  Right: a 
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Waste of Energy.’”100  Hopeful conference-goers interpreted the street theater as a sign 
that perhaps their message was finally being heard. 
 
The Peak Shrink: Kathy McMahon 
Those peakists whose relationships suffered because they thought “the sky was 
falling” might have been well-advised to read Kathy McMahon’s 2011 book, ‘I Can’t 
Believe You Actually Think That!’ A Couple’s Guide to Finding Common Ground about 
Peak Oil, Climate Catastrophe, and Economic Hard Times.101  McMahon is the “Peak 
Shrink,” a practicing psychotherapist, psychology professor, and author of the blog “Peak 
Oil Blues.”  She began blogging in May 2006 with a candid declaration that she could no 
longer square her belief in peak oil with her expected professional perspective: “My 
actions seemed ‘irrational’ to the pre-Peak Oil mental health professional in me, and 
looked ‘crazy’ to those who were unaware, disinterested, or rejected the concept of [peak 
oil].”102 While most sites in the mid-2000s were engaged in debates about the timing and 
fallout of peak oil, “Peak Oil Blues” carved out its niche by examining the emotional and 
psychological effects of peak oil and climate change awareness.  It was so successful that 
in 2010 McMahon formed a commercial website (The Feisty Life) offering one-on-one 
counseling sessions online.103 
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Although “Peak Oil Blues” was not as popular as “Clusterfuck Nation,” it was far 
from an isolated outpost in the peakist constellation.  Other blogs, such as “Powering 
Down: A Journey of Preparation,” “Dark Optimism: A Better Future for a Troubled 
World,” and “Failing Gracefully: Finding Resilience in Uncertain Times” dedicated posts 
to praising “Peak Oil Blues.”104  McMahon appeared on several peakist or survivalist 
podcasts, such as “Extraenvironmentalist,”  “Public Service Broadcasting for the Post 
Carbon World,” and “The Radio Ecoshock Show,” and was featured on peakist YouTube 
channels, such as the “Women & Peak Oil” episode of “Gasoline Gangsters.”105  Her 
videos were regularly posted on “Peak Oil News & Message Boards,” where they 
provoked lengthy debates.  Like Kunstler, McMahon’s online readers turned out to see 
her speak in person—the theme of her 2010 tour was “How to Stay Sane as the World 
Goes Crazy.” 
The majority of “Peak Oil Blues” posts followed a “Dear Abby” style in which 
the Peak Shrink answers questions posed by regular readers with pseudonyms such as 
“Homesteader in Paradise,” “Off-Grid Girl,” and “Preparing to Persevere.”  The tone was 
informal, empathetic and warm, McMahon more likely to playfully speculate on the 
difficulty of finding the “ideal peak oil mate” than fulminate against excessive energy 
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consumption.106  The exact number of her regular readers is not available, but the figures 
from 2011 suggest it was at least in the tens of thousands.107  In their letters, they 
complained of the depression and even suicidal thoughts that resulted from peak oil 
awareness.  “Grim Newlywed,” for example, wrote, “I sometimes have moments of terror 
when I get an intimation of what things will be like when it actually starts to unravel full 
throttle…it makes me wonder how I could kill myself, rather than suffer things I can’t 
even imagine.”108  The comfort that they found in her website is attested to in letters and 
comments by devoted readers such as “Stray Kitty,” who asked in July of 2008, “How 
many times have I searched the web trying to find comfort for my anxiety about the 
future and preparedness?  Then I found this site.”  Another wrote, “What you are 
attempting to do here, by allowing me and others to vent our deepest fears, is nothing 
more than a form of liberation. I can only hope that others are lucky enough to be 
directed here or like me stumble blindly until they find some kind of light.”109 
The Peak Shrink grew up in Boston, the daughter of a firefighter and third of five 
children, and still carries her New England accent.  After raising two children of her own 
and earning a doctorate in clinical psychology from Antioch University, she served as the 
Director of the Master’s Program in Counseling Psychology at her alma mater.  Even as 
she assumed her online persona in the late 2000s, she taught in graduate psychology 
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programs and remained a licensed psychologist specializing in couples therapy.  Before 
“learning about Peak Oil,” she said, “I saw the world through the eyes of a middle-class 
US citizen” who believed that “electricity came from light switches.”110  She described 
her conversion in the same quasi-religious terms that many peakists use: 
Then I learned about Peak Oil. After that, I could no longer see the world in the 
same way. I realized that psychotherapy, while helpful to people in a ‘normal’ 
world, could easily become destructive to those with a PO view of the world. . . .I 
was trying to come to grips with a future cultural transformation that was to be so 
dramatic, so overwhelming, it disturbed my equilibrium and challenged my very 
sense of reality.111 
While her psychological perspective, professional credentials, and lively writing 
style were part of the Peak Shrink’s appeal to her readers, she also served as a model of 
healthy awareness, engagement and action.  Unlike some of them, who were “living a 
double life” by keeping “the big secret” of peak oil from their friends and family, or were 
too “paralyzed with fear” to take action, McMahon was psychologically well-adjusted 
and well-prepared for the future.112  From her frequent anecdotes, she seemed to have 
fashioned a rural life for herself that the woebegone survivors in Kunstler’s The Long 
Emergency would recognize and envy, tending a large garden and raising chickens.  
Having moved in 1999 to find “more room for my dogs and a less expensive plot of 
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land,” McMahon and her husband lived in a small town in rural Massachusetts, where, as 
she put it, “people cut hay with a scythe, and build homes without power tools.”113 
The Peak Shrink provided more than a model of peak psychological robustness 
and advice about discussing “the peak” with family members.  She formulated an 
alternative profile of psychological health, where concerns about environmental crisis 
and preparation for the collapse of modern society are not a symptom of emotional 
instability or mental illness but a sign of lucidity and health.114  This through-the-looking-
glass psychology was elucidated in her most popular post, “Do You Have a Panglossian 
Disorder? Or Economic and Planetary Collapse: Is it a Therapeutic Issue?”  The 
“Panglossian disorder,” named after the delusionally optimistic Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s 
Candide, was defined as “the neurotic tendency toward extreme optimism in the face of 
likely cultural and planetary collapse.”  McMahon pathologized ‘normal’ responses and 
divided them into fifteen common subtypes, including “rigid Cheneyism (‘The American 
Way of Life is non-negotiable’),” “Neoliberal Economanic Tendencies (‘A belief that 
market forces control all—including geological realities’),” and “Nascarian Feature” 
(“People love their automobiles” so “a solution will have to be found to keep us 
driving”).  The post struck a chord with her readers, who responded by saying, “Beautiful 
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article, simply beautiful,” and “thank you for writing this.  It puts my isolated world in 
perspective.”115  
 
Ecological Identity and Social Marginalization 
 McMahon’s alternative psychology is one perspective from which we might view 
the experience that united almost all survey respondents: a painful social marginalization 
stemming from their ecological identity.  While peakists define themselves according to 
their environmental beliefs, they are also shaped by social forces such as the responses of 
their friends, family, and co-workers to their ideology.  While most scientists agree that 
we are living in an age of environmental crisis—with widespread environmental 
toxification and runaway ocean acidification, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and 
climate change—Americans whose concern over environmental issues leads them 
radically change their lives in a proportionate response—by going beyond green 
consumerism to bicycle more, drive less, refuse to fly, move to walkable cities and alter 
their homes—are more likely to be considered “crazy” “survival nuts,” “hippies,” 
“whackjobs,” “tree-huggers,” “kooks,” and “crackpots,” to borrow a few terms from my 
respondents, than responsible citizens.  Peakists contended that not being emotionally 
and/or psychologically disturbed by contemporary environmental crises was itself the 
sign of a kind of mental illness, not the melancholy they experienced after becoming 
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“peak oil aware.”  As a Vermont woman put it, “Who wouldn't be depressed with climate 
change, mass extinctions, suburban sprawl, factory farms, [genetically modified 
organisms in our food], etc.? You'd have to be nuts to feel otherwise.”116  With these 
inverted, conflicting psychological perspectives in mind, let us explore some of the 
common reactions that American peak oil believers elicited from their friends, family, 
and co-workers, so as to further differentiate peakism from normative American thinking 
in the early twenty-first century. 
 Given their passion and the gravity of their concerns, two out of three peakists 
found it difficult to discuss their environmental beliefs with other people.  The responses 
that they received from their friends, family, and co-workers explain why.  A Rhode 
Island woman noted that “the topic can engender disbelieve [sic] and hostility,” while a 
New York man said, “I have often encountered verbal abuse if I press the issue (and I do 
not phrase my explanations about peak oil as an end-of-the- world phenomena). It’s like I 
am attacking their entire way of life and their very personhood.”  A Colorado woman 
confessed that “the reactions from people make it hard to discuss.  I have an old friend 
that is now barely speaking to me because I discussed this with her,” and a New 
Hampshire man joked that it was “not difficult to talk about,” but “so difficult to watch 
their eyes glaze over and imaginations go catatonic.”117  
Without hearing the other side of these conversations we have a limited 
perspective on them, of course, but one frequently cited explanation for this common 
reaction was the prevalence of optimism in the United States.  As scholars from a range 
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of fields have demonstrated, the United States developed in the twentieth century a 
powerful culture of optimism, which C. Vann Woodward once called a “national 
philosophy in America.”118  Social scientists such as Neil D. Weinstein have shown that 
optimistic biases are much more common than pessimistic biases in the United States, 
and numerous cross-cultural studies have corroborated Americans’ tendency towards 
optimism.119 
In Bright-Sided: How Positive Thinking is Undermining America, Barbara 
Ehrenreich observed that “the injunction to be positive is so ubiquitous that it’s 
impossible to identify a single source,” but cited Dale Carnegie’s descendants in the 
motivation industry as well as the immense influence of positive psychology.120  The 
cultural bias against negative thinking is even written into diagnostic psychology 
manuals, as sociologist Karen A. Cerulo has observed: “People who routinely focus on 
the worst-case scenario, those who cannot seem to sustain any real optimism, will likely 
be diagnosed with dysthymic disorder (commonly known as depression).”121  A peakist 
in her early forties reversed this diagnosis, wondering whether “there is [a] collective 
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delusion on the parts of those living in the US, who believe that nothing bad could ever 
happen here.”  A number of European peakists agreed, noting that they did not have the 
“same denial complex in Europe” about environmental issues, while a Canadian found 
that “even raising the issue of peak oil disturbs North American [sic] happy, happy, 
eternal optimistic attitude.”122  Similarly, a college professor noted that peak oil and 
climate change are “difficult topics to discuss at faculty meetings or business meetings 
where optimism toward the [business as usual] future reigns supreme.  [My colleagues] 
are all delusional, of course.  Amazing to witness.”123  This sense of invincibility has 
been only partially punctured by America’s military failure in Iraq and the economic 
recession. 
As a Connecticut man in his twenties observed, the prevalence of optimistic 
biases means that many Americans wear “such deeply rose colored glasses that they 
interpret peak oil as ‘negative thinking.’”124  As Cerulo noted, “when those fixated on the 
worst cannot or will not be “cured,” they will likely be distanced from the broader 
community, their deviance underscored.”125  Since “bad news is bad manners,” as a New 
York woman put it, dozens of respondents described an experience similar to the middle-
aged Massachusetts man, whose friends “either say I’m crazy or just roll their eyes and 
back away.”126  If they weren’t viewed as “crazy,” most peakists were considered 
“downers” by friends and family, leading a California man to conclude that “80% of 
Americans do not want to think about the environment, or anything more controversial 
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than who played well or badly in the last football game,” while a “progressive” 
Minnesota grumbled that the “lack of seriousness is growing.  Happy faces are 
preferred.”127 An Oregonian complained that “due to the brainwashing and the cheer-
leading attitudes which prevails in the US one really can’t speak the truth unless it is 
pleasant.”128 
 
Energy Optimism: Cornucopianism and Technological Solutionism 
 On energy and environmental issues, American optimism is manifested as a 
hegemonic faith in the “dominant social paradigm,” a “common sense” that has existed 
since at least the post-World War II period with two basic pillars: “cornucopianism” and 
“technological solutionism.”  The “dominant social paradigm” in the contemporary West, 
which Richard McNeill Douglas has described as “the working faith of our civilization,” 
is characterized by “abundance and progress, growth and prosperity, faith in science and 
technology, and commitment to a laissez-faire economy.”129  In a capitalist economy 
dependent on continual growth (of at least 5% of gross domestic product per year), those 
who embrace the dominant social paradigm—that is, most Americans—implicitly accept 
that that the natural resources we depend on are limitless, or can be made limitless 
through technological developments.  Buttressing this expectation of infinite growth is a 
faith in the development of technologies that will solve future problems so deep and so 
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rarely challenged that many peakists said that discussing it was “almost like talking about 
religion.”130 A North Carolina woman asserted that “the belief in technological progress 
is a secular religion, including among the academics with whom I interact,” and a 
Colorado man posited that “one must embrace the religious tenets of ones [sic] time, and 
the main religious tenet of our time is the religion of technology, that technology will 
save us in the end.”131  As a “progressive” Colorado man who was now “living 
relentlessly within his means” put it, “those who do not embrace this religion are viewed 
as heretics and are shunned by their community.”132 These tenets are rarely considered 
rationally, as a septuagenarian noted: “when I [ask my interlocutors] how they think a 
new technology will hold up beneath the weight of scale — i.e. powering millions upon 
millions of electric cars… they don’t seem to have an answer.”133  As I discuss in the next 
chapter, Americans in the post-WWII period saw such incredible technological 
developments that the nation gradually adopted what Evgeny Morozov terms 
“technological solutionism.”  This unwieldy but useful terms signifies, at the most basic 
level, the expectation that technology will solve future societal problems, but it also 
recasts “all complex social situations either as nearly defined problems with definite, 
computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes that can be easily 
optimized”—as opposed to situations that might require concerted political, social, and/or 
cultural responses, or even sacrifices.134  Faith in technological solutionism is often 
                                                
130 Respondent 9590707. 
131 Respondents 9563017 and 9577121. 
132 Respondent 9577121. 
133 Respondent 9563747. 
134 Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2013), 5.  This question is also addressed, in a slightly different way, by sociologists of risk 
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supported, at some level, with a dose of American exceptionalism, the expectation that 
“American ingenuity will come up with something else.”135 
Hostile responses to concerns about resource depletion, climate change, species 
loss, and technological solutionism evinced the age-old tendency to shun the messenger, 
but they also seemed to hit too close to home.  As a North Carolina man noted, “people 
do not want to look at the limits to their lifestyle.  I have found the pointing out flaws and 
weaknesses in systems is seen [as] criticism of people personally.”136  Claiming that there 
are limits to infinite growth not only “challenges their assumptions regarding the way the 
world works” as well as “their future expectations,” it “implicates their way of life as part 
of the problem,” as a young peakist observed.137  As a result of these responses, many 
believers no longer communicate with their friends, family, and co-workers about 
environmental issues at all.  For example, a North Carolina woman found that “people get 
intensely angry even at the suggestion our life styles may be in for a change,” so she 
“shut[s] up and never mention[s] it.”  A Georgia woman said, “at this point, I'm very 
                                                                                                                                            
and disasters, with scholars like Ulrich Beck and Kai Erikson remaining wary of relying on technology and 
experts, while scholars such as Anthony Giddens, Penelope Canan, Nancy Reichman have much more 
confidence. 
135 Respondent 9565610. 
136 Respondent 9600939.  As many commentators have noted, the last public figure to criticize Americans’ 
lifestyles and call for sacrifice was Jimmy Carter, in his infamous “crisis of confidence” speech in 1979.  
Although the initial reaction to the speech was actually positive, the success of Carter’s political opponents 
(both Republicans and Democrats) in tying the assertion of limits to Carter’s political incompetence and 
impotence provided a lasting lesson about the demand for optimism in public rhetoric.   A noteworthy 
moment in this legacy was George W. Bush’s comments after 9/11 that Americans need not sacrifice in any 
way, but rather should continue their consumption. See Kevin Mattson, What the Heck Are You Up to, Mr. 
President? Jimmy Carter, America’s “Malaise,” and the Speech That Should Have Changed the Country 
(Bloomsbury: New York, 2009), and my discussion of the legacy of 1970s “limits” discourse in chapter 2. 
137 Respondent 9559395. 
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selective about who I’ll attempt to talk to about this and even our economic outlook in the 
U.S.”138 
In the context of a pervasive culture of optimism, what is perhaps most surprising 
is that the peak oil movement appeared in the mid-2000s at all.  How did this occur?  I 
turn to this question in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 Respondents 9589722 and 9574202. 
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Chapter 2: Abundance, Scarcity, and Limits in the Age of Oil 
  
In this chapter, I first present a short history of the peak oil movement, and 
explore the political, economic, and environmental conditions that precipitated its 
coalescence.  Three developments in the mid-2000s led to the genesis of a social 
movement motivated by energy concerns: the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 
2003, sharp increases in the price of oil and gasoline and growing awareness of 
anthropogenic climate change.  Two additional necessary elements were widespread 
Internet access and the circulation of concerns about oil depletion in traditional mass 
media.  
Second, I place these concerns about resource depletion and scarcity in a broader 
historical context by looking at popular beliefs about abundance, scarcity, and limits in 
the United States over the last century.  These patterns of beliefs in abundance and 
concerns over scarcity are the backdrop against which recent assertions of limits—
peakism as well as climate change—are often understood.  I conclude by assessing the re-
emergence of “limits” discourses in the twenty-first century. 
 
A Brief History of the Peak Oil Movement 
By the late 1990s, Colin Campbell had spent four decades working in the oil 
industry as a petroleum geology consultant for major oil companies.  He had also been 
“crying wolf,” as the Wall Street Journal later put it, for over two decades about the 
threat of oil depletion, and in 1998, he penned an article in Scientific American on “The 
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End of Cheap Oil” and published a book on The Coming Oil Crisis.1  Along with 
petroleum engineer Jean Laherrère, Campbell inspired Ron Swenson, an American 
engineer and former professor with decades of experience in renewable energy 
development and computer security, to create peak oil’s first website, “The Coming 
Global Oil Crisis.”  In 2000, Campbell convened a network of “interested scientists and 
government officials,” calling itself the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO), 
and began to advocate the theory of peak oil in interviews.2  In 2001, two additional 
websites popped up, the technical “Oil Analytics” and the generally Malthusian “Die 
Off.”3  In 2002, ASPO held its first conference, an International Workshop on Oil 
Depletion, in Uppsala, Sweden.  The next year, the second ASPO meeting in Paris 
received minor press coverage, and in 2003 ASPO created its own website.4   
 From the era of the civil rights movement until the mid-2000s, television offered 
the most direct and effective means for social movements to gain publicity and promote 
their cause.5  The peak oil movement operated below this level of publicity, in part 
because it often lacked a powerful visual element—bell curves and oil barrels don’t 
                                                
1 Jeffrey Ball, “As Prices Soar, Doomsayers Provoke Debate on Oil's Future,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 21, 2004, A1.  Colin J. Campbell, “The End of Cheap Oil,” Scientific American 278, no. 3: 60-
65.  Campbell, The Coming Oil Crisis (London: Independent Publishers Group, 1998).  
2 Leonardo Maugeri, "Squeezing more oil from the ground." Scientific American Magazine 301 no. 4 
(2009): 56-63.  For one of these interviews, see Michael C. Ruppert, “Colin Campbell on Oil: Perhaps the 
World’s Foremost Expert on Oil and the Oil Business Confirms the Ever More Apparent Reality of the 
Post-9-11 World,” From the Wilderness, 
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/102302_campbell.html.  Accessed May 25, 2013.  Personal 
correspondence with Colin Campbell, February 6, 2010. 
3 The Coming Global Oil Crisis, http://www.hubbertpeak.com/; Oil Analytics, http://www.oilanalytics.net; 
Die Off, http://www.dieoff.com.  In this section, I trace the origins and development of websites using the 
Internet Archive (also known as the “Wayback Machine”), http://www.archive.org/index.php.  Accessed 
November 22, 2009.   
4 Doris Leblond, “ASPO sees conventional oil production peaking by 2010,” Oil and Gas Journal, June 30, 
2003, 28.   
5 Carol A. Stabile, White Victims, Black Villains: Gender, Race and Crime News in US Culture (New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
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exactly capture the imagination.  Although the peak oil movement coalesced on the 
Internet, traditional (“old”) media, meaning newspapers, magazines and television, 
played a major role in alerting their audiences to the theory of peak oil.  This reflects 
what media studies scholar Henry Jenkins calls a “convergence culture,” which has 
emerged over the last two decades.  In this new, constantly shifting terrain, old media 
place “issues on the national agenda” through their wide distribution, but active 
consumers, working through grassroots media, blogs, and online forums, “reframe those 
issues for different publics.”6  Peak oil is an exemplar of this dynamic, in which the mere 
mention of peak oil, even in a distinctly negative light, was instrumental in motivating 
Americans to explore the subject on the Internet, with consequences that the authors of 
these reports could not expect or intend. 
The first article on peak oil in American newspapers ran on the Associated Press 
Business Wire in 2002 and was picked up by newspapers from Dubuque’s Telegraph – 
Herald to Connecticut’s Hartford Courant.  Before pronouncing concerns about oil 
depletion misguided, “Oil Experts Draw Fire for Warning” explained the concept of peak 
oil and the existence of institutions and experts (such as Colin Campbell) dedicated to it.  
It introduced a central figure, Matthew Simmons, described as “an investment banker 
who helped advise President Bush’s campaign on energy policy.”7  By 2003, petroleum 
trade journals (such as Oil & Gas Journal and Offshore) begin publishing arguments for 
                                                
6 Henry Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 7, 
no. 33 (2004): 35.  For a fuller description of convergence culture, see Jenkins, Convergence Culture: 
Where Old and New Media Collide (New York : New York University Press, 2006). 
7 Bruce Stanley, “Oil Experts Draw Fire for Warning,” Telegraph – Herald, May 27, 2002, B5.  Simmons, 
a speaker at almost every ASPO conference until his passing in 2010, was noteworthy not so much for his 
actual expertise but for the imprimatur of legitimacy he provided.  In this 2002 article he is described as 
one of many advisers to candidate George W. Bush on energy issues, but by the end of the decade many 
peakists described him as something akin to President Bush’s right hand man. 
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and against predictions of an imminent peak of global production, but few imagined the 
media momentum the subject gained in 2004, when a flood of books were published, 
articles and reviews written, and websites launched.8 
Non-fiction books either converted readers or pushed them to search the Internet 
for “peak oil,” which led them to a host of new websites, such as “The Energy Bulletin,” 
“The Oil Drum,” “Peak Oil News & Message Boards” and “Life After the Oil Crash.”9  
These sites might serve different functions.  The first two, for example, offered updates 
on oil- and energy-related news from sources around the world, as well as expert 
opinions.  The latter two, with large memberships and freewheeling, mushrooming 
forums, created the sense of community described in the last chapter.  When peakists 
began to speak to friends and family about their new belief-system or attend the MeetUp 
peak oil groups that were forming around the country, the subject was suddenly 
newsworthy.10  The peak oil phenomenon, which an Ontario newspaper referred to as the 
“peak oil cult” in 2004, suddenly merited attention from national newspapers and 
magazines, such as The New York Times, Washington Post and Harper’s Monthly.11 
                                                
8 For example, Michael C. Lynch, “Petroleum resources pessimism Debunked in Hubbert model and 
Hubbert modelers’ assessment,” Oil & Gas Journal, July 14, 2003, 38, 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-101/issue-27/special-report/petroleum-resources-pessimism-
debunked-in-hubbert-model-and-hubbert-modelers-assessment.html.  Accessed May 25, 2013.  John H. 
Wood, Gary R. Long, David F. Morehouse, “World conventional oil supply expected to peak in 21st 
century,” Offshore, April 2003, http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-63/issue-
4/technology/world-conventional-oil-supply-expected-to-peak-in-21st-century.html.  Accessed May 25, 
2013. 
9 This process is well-documented by sociologists and journalists, of course. See, for example, Peter L.M. 
Vasterman, “Media-Hype: Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic Standards and the Construction of 
Social Problems,” European Journal of Communication 20, no. 4 (2005): 508-530. 
10 “Peak Oil News & Message Boards,” http://www.peakoil.com; “The Energy Bulletin,” 
https://www.energybulletin.net; “The Oil Drum,” http://www.theoildrum.com; “Life After the Oil Crash,” 
http://www.lifeaftertheoilcrash.com.  Accessed February 11, 2008. 
11 Daniel Yergin, “Imagining a $7-a-gallon Future,” New York Times, April 4, 2004, WK1; Terence 
Corcoran, “The ‘Peak Oil’ cult,” National Post (Don Mills, Ontario), October 12, 2004, FP15; Michael R. 
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 In 2003, only a handful of titles relating to the dangerous scarcity of oil were 
available, but in 2004 and early 2005, the following non-fiction books appeared in 
national bookstores: The Last Hours of Ancient Sunlight: The Fate of the World and What 
We Can Do Before It’s Too Late (2004); High Noon for Natural Gas (2004); Out of Gas: 
The End of the Age of Oil (2005); Crude: The Story of Oil (2004); The Coming Oil 
Crisis; Oil, Jihad, and Destiny (2004); Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the 
American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil (2004); Beyond Oil: The View from 
Hubbert’s Peak (2004); Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s 
Growing Oil Conspiracy (2004); and Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post-
Carbon World (2004).12  Many were written by established authors, and their dramatic 
titles give a sense of their tone—each work proclaiming the limits to economic growth, 
national power, and personal consumption, intending to pierce America’s imperial 
optimism with the authority of Moses returning from Mount Sinai.  They educated a 
public largely ignorant of the subject—according to a 2004 “Peak Oil News & Message 
                                                                                                                                            
Duffey, “Prognosticating oil supplies: Lower reserves and higher prices ahead?” Washington Times, 
November 3, 2004, A23; Paul Roberts, “Cheap oil, the only oil that matters, is just about gone,” Harper’s 
Magazine, August 2004. 
12 In 2003, the major peak oil book available was Richard Heinberg’s The Party’s Over. Peak Oil News & 
Message Boards poll entitled “I First Learned About Peak Oil,” 
http://peakoil.com/modules.php?name=Surveys&op=results&pollID=2.  Accessed December 13, 2009.  
Thom Hartman, The Last Hours of Ancient Sunlight: The Fate of the World and What We Can Do Before 
It’s Too Late (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004); Julian Darley, High Noon for Natural Gas (New 
York: Chelsea Green, 2004); David Goodstein, Out of Gas: The End of the Age of Oil (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2005); Sonia Shah, Crude: The Story of Oil (Toronto: Seven Stories Press, 2004); 
Colin Campbell, The Coming Oil Crisis (London: Multi-Science Publishing Co. Ltd, 2004); Ronald R. 
Cooke, Oil, Jihad and Destiny (New York: Opportunity Analysis, 2004); Michael Ruppert and Catherine 
Austin Fitts, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire (New York: New Society 
Publishers, 2004); Kenneth S. Deffeyes, The View From Hubbert’s Peak (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2004); Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing 
Dependence on Petroleum (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004); and Richard Heinberg, Powerdown: 
Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World (West Sussex, UK: Clairview Books, 2004). 
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Boards” poll, 80% of that site’s members had learned of the subject from between 2001 
and 2004.   
 Concerns about oil depletion spread quickly.  Befitting a twenty-first century 
social movement, peakism’s existence was enabled by growing access to the Internet in 
the United States—the percentage of Americans with Internet access increased from 44 
percent in 2000 to 66 percent in 2004 (and in 2013 stands at 78 percent).13  The first 
month that Peak Oil News & Message Boards went online, March 2004, only 25 new 
members joined, but by the end of the year, over 200 members were signing up each 
month, so that the fledgling website already had 1,500 people actively participating.  
With new information and analyses posted dozens of times a day, these websites 
confirmed peakists’ developing psychological, emotional and financial investments in the 
ideology, since every new development could be interpreted to vindicate the theory; 
aided them in converting their family, friends, and others; and helped them plan their 
futures.14  Through these websites, peakists learned that they were not alone, and they 
quickly began to develop a subculture that reinforced their concerns.  In 2004, for 
example, Caryl Johnston promoted her self-published novel, After the Crash: An Essay-
Novel of the Post-Hydrocarbon Age, as “The First Peak Oil Novel.”  The End of 
                                                
13 Pew Internet and American Life Project Surveys, http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Digital-
differences/Main-Report/Internet-adoption-over-time.aspx.  Accessed May 19, 2013. 
14 By the late 2000s, the stream of peak oil evangelical works has turned into a flood.  Some of the most 
significant works are Tom Mast, Over a Barrel: A Simple Guide to the Oil Shortage (New York: Hayden 
Publishing, 2005); Matthew R. Simmons, Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the 
World Economy  (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005); Peter Tertzakian, A Thousand Barrels a 
Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy Dependent World (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006); Edwin Black, Internal Combustion: How Corporations and Governments Addicted 
the World to Oil and Derailed the Alternatives (New York: St. Martin’s, 2006); David Strahan, The Last 
Oil Shock: A Survival Guide to the Imminent Extinction of Petroleum Man (New York, John Murray, 
2007); Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: 
Holt Paperbacks, 2008). 
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Suburbia: Oil Depletion and the Collapse of the American Dream, featuring emerging 
authorities such as Campbell, Heinberg, Simmons and Kunstler, was released that same 
year, and reviewed in the New York Times.15  By early 2005, adherents were purchasing 
and wearing “PeakGear” and a wide range of YouTube videos were being posted.  
MeetUp groups were formed in urban centers, and New York City’s was the subject of 
another Harper’s piece in 2006.16   
 As the movement expanded, its concerns shifted from intellectual study to 
personal action, and a dedicated core began to plan and prepare for the post-peak world.  
The shift was reflected in the media’s coverage of peak oil.  Although the central 
argument of the peak oil theory—that cheap oil will disappear sooner rather than later—
was still the primary assertion that most journalists were interested in (refuting), there 
was also attention paid to the “movement” or “cult” of peak oil.  From 2005 to 2009, 
peak oil was a relatively popular topic in mainstream American news.  The Washington 
Post, USA Today, the Los Angeles Times and Time magazine all ran at least one original 
analysis of the issue, and the Associated Press (AP) distributed four articles to its legion 
of subscribers.17  The New York Times ran six feature articles about the peak oil 
phenomenon, with titles like, “Duck and Cover, It’s the New Survivalism,” and “The End 
                                                
15 Caryl Johnston, After the Crash: An Essay-Novel of the Post Hydrocarbon Age (Self-published, 2004).  
The End of Suburbia: Oil Depletion and the Collapse of the American Dream (The Electric Wallpaper Co., 
2004); Natalie Cavanor, “Running on Empty; Two Video Producers Paint a Bleak Picture of Oil Wars and 
the End of the American Suburbs,“ New York Times, March 13, 2005, LI1. 
16 Bryan Urstadt, “Imagine There’s No Oil: Scenes from a Liberal Apocalypse,” Harper’s Monthly, August 
2006. 
17 James Howard Kunstler, “Wake Up, America.  We’re Driving Toward Disaster.” The Washington Post, 
May 28, 2005, B3; Joe Raedle, “Are We There Yet?  Oil Joyride May Be Over,” USA Today, May 28, 
2005; Matthew DeBord, “‘$20 Per Gallon’ by Christopher Steiner, Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2009; 
Justin Fox, “Peak Possibilities,” Time, November 21, 2007. 
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is Near! (Yay!)”18  On radio and Internet news, where subject matter is often more 
sensational, peakism’s presence was been far greater—sources ranging from National 
Public Radio Salon, and CNBC to Fox News covered the movement numerous times 
during this period.  Indeed, in a 2009 op-art graphic in the New York Times, Philip 
Niemeyer portrayed peak oil as the national “fear” of 2007.19  
                                                
18 Peter Maass, “The Breaking Point,” New York Times, August 21, 2005, E30; Joseph Nocera, “On Oil 
Supply, Opinions Aren’t Scarce,” New York Times, September 10, 2005, C1; Paul Brown, “The 
Deathwatch for Cheap Oil,” New York Times, October 14, 2006, C5; Roger Lowenstein, “What Price Oil?” 
New York Times, October 19, 2008, 46; Jon Mooallem, “The End is Near! (YAY!)” New York Times, April 
19, 2008, 28; Michael Lynch, “‘Peak Oil’ is a Waste of Energy,” New York Times, August 25, 2009, A21.   
19 Philip Niemeyer, “Picturing the Past Ten Years,” New York Times, December 27, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/12/27/opinion/28opchart.html.  Accessed May 19, 2013.  
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Fig. 2.1: In Philip Niemeyer’s retrospective New York Times Op-Ed Chart of December 27, 2009, 
peak oil is represented as the national “fear of 2007. 
 
Although evaluations of the contemporary media ecology tend to downplay the 
reach and influence of traditional media, the impact of the mere mention of oil depletion 
in popular newspapers, magazines, and on television cannot be understated.  In late May 
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of 2006, for example, Samantha Gross of the Associated Press wrote an article about 
peakists—“Energy Fears Looming, New Survivalists Prepare: Too Late to Save the 
Planet, They Say, So They Focus on Saving Themselves”— that was picked up by news 
sources across the country, from MSNBC.com, USA Today, and the San Francisco 
Chronicle to the popular conservative website The Drudge Report.20  What made this 
story exceptional is that it mentioned the URL of a specific website, Peak Oil News & 
Message Boards.  On that site, the number of new members per month had fluctuated 
between 250 and 350 users during the previous year, but 2,928 people joined in May.21 
A similar event occurred in early June of 2008, when the same website was 
mentioned on the CNN Saturday Morning News.  During a segment on oil prices, CNN 
correspondent Deborah Feyerick explained that  
Peak oil is the point when global oil production peaks then goes down. The 
remaining supply is limited and will be harder to get at, and that means fewer 
barrels a day. Some oil experts say that day is here, others predict it is twenty to 
thirty years away.  But as gas prices rise, Web sites like peakoil.com and 
survivalblog are getting more and more visitors talking about the end of cheap oil 
and the possible threat of political and economic instability around the world.22 
                                                
20 Samantha Gross, “Energy Fears Looming, New Survivalists Prepare: Too Late to Save the Planet, They 
Say, So They Focus on Saving Themselves,” MSNBC.com, May 24, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24808083.  Accessed November 23, 2009; Samantha Gross, “Energy Fears 
Looming, New Survivalists Prepare,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 2006; The Drudge Report linked 
directly to the Associated Press News website in their “May 25, 2008 00:45:23 GMT edition,” 
http://www.drudgereport.com/.  Accessed November 23, 2009. 
21 The connection between Gross’ article and the site’s membership was confirmed by an administrator of 
Peak Oil News and Message Boards.  Private message from “Aaron,” January 28, 2009. 
22 CNN Saturday Morning News, “Oil Prices Soar, Stocks Plummet: How Bad Is Our Economy?; Hillary 
Clinton Accepts Defeat,” aired on June 7, 2008, transcript at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0806/07/smn.02.html. Accessed May 19, 2013. 
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After this story, tens if not hundreds of thousands of Americans visited these websites, 
and almost five thousand became members of Peak Oil News & Message Boards.23   
 Media attention directed Americans to peak oil websites, but it did not lead them 
to become members or alter their lives to prepare for an apocalyptic collapse.  They were 
pushed and pulled in this direction by three of the central events of the 2000s: the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq; rising gas prices; and the spread of apocalyptic 
environmentalism, motivated by concerns about climate change. 
 
America in Iraq: Blood for Oil? 
 The United States’ controversial invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 led 
many Americans to consider global energy politics for the first time in a generation, if not 
their lifetimes.  Beginning in 2002, when the groundwork for the invasion was being laid, 
and increasingly as President Bush’s official justifications for the war (Iraq’s possessin of 
nuclear or biological weapons) failed to materialize in 2003, the media speculated on 
potential hidden motives for the action.  Bush’s critics, citing “blood for oil” as the 
President’s secret motivation, mounted the largest group of coordinated protests in the 
nation’s history in February and March of 2003, but the Bush administration’s adept 
public relations strategies and the failure of mainstream journalists after 9/11 kept these 
claims on the political fringe.24 
                                                
23 As these examples show, traditional media retains its power to spread information in our convergence 
culture, but it does not define the terms of debate. 
24 See John W. Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American 
Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); and W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence 
and Steven Livingston, When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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Anti-war protesters, pacifists and leftists began to oppose the imminent attack in 
2002, culminating in a day of coordinated global protests on February 15, 2003 in over 
sixty countries.  Over 150 different American cities participated, with somewhere 
between 100,000 to 300,000 people marching in New York City alone.25  Although 
protestors criticized the imminent invasion from a variety of political positions, the 
simple slogan “no blood for oil” was a rallying cry.  The mainstream media tended to 
bury this critique, and rarely elaborated on its potential insight or veracity.26  By late 
2004, when it became clear that Iraq did not possess chemical or nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction, the primary justification for the war was simply shunted to the sidelines 
and politicians began to trumpet the liberation and democratization of Iraq as its ultimate 
goal.  But, despite continuing support for their soldiers, few Americans were convinced: 
in a 2007 poll, 73 percent of Americans said they believed that controlling Iraq’s oil 
supply was at least a factor in the decision to invade Iraq.27  Once a marginal, 
conspiratorial whisper, the claim that “the Iraq war [was] largely about oil,” as Alan 
Greenspan put it, became widely accepted.28 
                                                
25 Gary Leupp, “The Weekend the World Said No to War: Notes on the Numbers,” Counterpunch, 
February 25, 2003, http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/02/25/the-weekend-the-world-said-no-to-war-notes-
on-the-numbers.  Accessed May 19, 2013. 
26 For example, one CBS report juxtaposed the following aspects of an anti-war event: “‘Can you justify 
blood for oil?’ read a sign held by 14-year old Marianna Daniels at a rally in Madison, Wis.  The New York 
rally was opened by Singer Richie Havens performing ‘Freedom,’ just as he did 34 years earlier at the 
original Woodstock Festival.  Speakers included Susan Sarandon, Harry Belafonte and Pete Seeger.”  By 
linking a potentially insightful critique of American militarism alongside with its author’s age, musical 
entertainment, and the Woodstock Festival, the article implicitly minimizes the claim of petro-imperialism, 
while associating it with the historical memory of the 1960s.  Sue Chan, “Massive Anti-War Outpouring: 
Crowds Huge and Small Demonstrate Against Possible War With Iraq,” CBS News, February 15, 2003. 
27 Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed 
Money in the 21st Century (New York: Viking, 2006), 69. 
28 Bob Woodward, “Greenspan is Critical of Bush in Memoir: Former Fed Chairman Has Praise for 
Clinton,” Washington Post, September 16, 2007, A1. 
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Peakism provided a ready-made ideology for interpreting the Iraq war not as an 
isolated occupation but a “resource war” heralding a post-Cold War age of conflict.  
Early tracts such as Michael Klare’s Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global 
Conflict (2001) predicted that oil scarcity would lead nations into prolonged resource 
wars for the remaining petroleum.29  As the official rationale for the invasion vanished, 
the Iraq war seemed to fulfill the prophecy, and many peakists discovered the peak oil 
theory while researching its government’s true motives.  A North Carolina man said that 
“answering the question of why we were in Iraq led inevitably to oil and energy 
resources,” while a woman in her sixties “wondered what in the world could cause the 
US to preemptively attack a country (Iraq) that was not linked to 9/11,” until she 
“discovered the Colin Campbell projections.”  A Connecticut Democrat said that “the 
invasion of Iraq makes little sense until viewed from a position that takes into account 
resource scarcity,” so that peakism “provid[ed] a world view” with “explanations of 
events and trends that makes more sense than the popular narrative provided by more 
mainstream media outlets.”30 
 
Rising Gas and Oil Prices 
  The second event that drew Americans toward peakism was the rising price of 
gasoline throughout the 2000s.31  The United States developed a special relationship with 
                                                
29 Klare 2001. 
30 Respondents 9573008; 9589283; and 9683776. 
31 Although gasoline prices generally reflect the cost of a barrel of oil, the U.S. Department of Energy 
estimates that the price of crude has only a 67% stake in determining the price of gasoline at the pump.  
The rest is the costs of refining, distribution and marketing by corporations, state and federal taxes, and 
   91 
oil throughout the twentieth century, as it became the lifeblood of the country’s rise to 
superpower status.  The history of the connection between petroleum and major events in 
American history is not the subject of this dissertation, but this back story is so well-
known by most American peakists—most introductory works on peak oil include a 
lengthy section on the subject—that it constitutes a cornerstone of their ideology.32 
The combination of large, easily accessible oil fields, technological expertise and 
industrial infrastructure put the U.S. in the driver’s seat of global production from 
roughly 1860 to 1940, when it still produced two-thirds of the world’s oil.33  Americans 
consumed most of the world’s oil during this period, too—by 1929, 78 percent of the 
world’s cars were in the U.S.34  Petroleum first emerged as a major source of national 
power during World War I, when the U.S. supplied over eighty percent of the Allies’ oil, 
fueling decisive military innovations such as submarines, airplanes and tanks.  Access to 
oil was a crucial factor in the Allies’ victory in WWII as well—America’s petro-
advantage was overwhelming, and energy considerations were a crucial (if often 
overlooked) factor in various military decision and outcomes, such as Hitler’s decision to 
invade the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.35  In both wars, then, 
the United States “floated to victory upon a wave of oil.”36   
                                                                                                                                            
station markup.  Since station managers themselves must predict what the price will be before they 
purchase drums of gasoline, the price of gasoline is, at times, temporarily out of step with the price of oil. 
32 See, for example, Heinberg 2003; Kunstler 2005; and Roberts 2004. 
33 David S. Painter, “Oil and the American Century,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (2012): 26. 
34 Yergin 1996, 208. 
35 Painter, 27.  Yergin 1996, 334-367. 
36 Comment by Britain’s Lord Curzon on the Allies victory, Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference at 
Lancaster House, 1918.  Quoted in Yergin 1996, 183. 
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In the post-war period, the “century of oil” fueled the “American Century.”37  
Cheap oil enabled the rise of the automobile, which became the signature commodity of 
the post-war years and produced elemental transformations in social life, such as the 
rapid growth of interstate highways and decentralized suburbs.  Cars provided physical 
mobility, symbolic social mobility, and, perhaps most importantly, a “psychological 
mobility that freed the individual from the limits of space and time.”38  The establishment 
of the “consumers’ republic” of the post-war period relied on petroleum-based products; 
cheap oil was responsible for “regularizing overconsumption and making it the new 
normal.”39  Familiar products were suddenly inexpensive enough for mass consumption, 
as “cheap oil allowed chemists to derive cheap replication of costlier products,” and 
“reliance on these products helped define basic patterns of consumption in twentieth-
century America.”40  Cheap oil made for cheap food, too, as “oil-powered machinery and 
petrochemical-based pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers also sparked unprecedented 
increases in agricultural production,” known as the Green Revolution.41  In all of these 
ways, the suddenly cheap, price-stable, abundant resource provided “the building block 
for a proliferating array of consumer goods” and thus “underpinned a steadily rising U.S. 
standard of living” in the post-war period.42 
                                                
37 Yergin 1996, 15. Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life Magazine, February 17, 1941. 
38 Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-
1980 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 89. 
39 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2003). Typical of most social and political histories in its marginalization of energy 
as a factor in American history, Cohen’s influential work barely mentions petroleum. 
40 Black, 50. 
41 Painter, 25. 
42 Priest, 236. 
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The 1973 OPEC embargo brought petroleum to the forefront of national attention 
for the first time and changed the rosy relationship between Americans and oil.  
However, “black gold” would deliver another boon to the United States behind the 
scenes.  By the 1980s, the Soviet Union quietly became to world’s largest oil exporter, its 
economy and ability to support its satellite states heavily reliant on the price of 
petroleum.  The oil glut of the 1980s, which halved the price of a barrel of crude, 
devastated the Soviet economy and expedited the collapse of the U.S.S.R.43 
The price of both crude oil and gasoline were relatively steady throughout the 
1990s before skyrocketing between 2000 to 2009—the average price of gas in the U.S. 
increased by over 300% (from January of 2000 to July 2008), while the cost of a barrel of 
crude increased by almost 600%.44  For the latter, this jump did not necessarily reflect 
any real scarcity, but rather investors’ hopes and fears, the result of unsubstantiated 
rumors and public relations campaigns.  The price of gas rose slightly after 9/11 on 
general fears of instability in the Middle East, hovering around $1.50 per gallon, before 
beginning to increase in December 2002.  While many commentators pegged this 
increase to concerns about Venezuela instituting an oil embargo on the United States—at 
the time, Venezuela supplied the United States with almost one billion barrels per day, 
and its President, Hugo Chavez, was an outspoken critic of President Bush—the primary 
cause was the threat of war with Iraq.45  Even the quick and triumphant victory that 
                                                
43 Priest, 245.  Also see Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
44 The average price of gasoline rose from $1.27 in January of 2000 to a high of $4.11 in July 2008, while 
the average barrel rose from $22.68 to a high of $133.60. 
45 The specific number is 0.827 million barrels per day. U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Independent statistics and Analysis, “Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries.” 
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neoconservatives predicted might remove Iraq’s oil from the global market for some 
time, which could lead to a global shortage.  OPEC’s promise to increase production in 
the case of such an event did not convince investors, and fears of scarcity caused the 
price to climb.  Since the cause of the price of gasoline is inscrutable to many consumers, 
the peak oil theory provided a commonsensical, easily intelligible explanation.   
 Oil and gas prices rose steadily until 2008, with two spikes.  The first was the 
actual invasion of Iraq—the week of “Shock and Awe” the average gallon cost $1.72, a 
25% increase from only three months before.  The second was Hurricane Katrina, which 
destroyed over forty offshore oil platforms and forced the temporary closure of nine 
nearby refineries, generating renewed fears of a shortage.46  Immediately after Katrina, 
the price of crude jumped almost seven dollars from the previous month. The prices of oil 
and gasoline were followed so closely on television, in print, and on the Internet—from 
December 2002 to December 2010, Time magazine alone ran over one thousand stories 
(online or in print) that mentioned oil and gas prices—that the national mood seemed to 
be tethered to the price of “the Devil’s excrement.”  As one peakist investor in his early 
sixties reported, “as the price of oil rose, I began to investigate the causes of the price 
increases,” eventually leading him to peak oil.47   
                                                
46 Insofar as Hurricane Katrina was a major factor in the increase of gas prices, one could potentially 
subsume gas prices under the category of “environment” in this section.  However, to do so would present 
at least two problems. First, it would suggest that gas prices are as ‘natural’ as the weather, either through 
an environmental determinism or a naturalization of free market principles (supply and demand) which are 
assumed to control commodity prices.  While environmental factors clearly have a major impact on the cost 
of energy production, there are many other factors, which this section tries to consider.  The tendency to 
subsume energy (particularly oil) under the general category of “environment” can be expedient, but it can 
also be misleading. 
47 Respondent 9592346. 
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In a CBS poll taken just after Hurricane Katrina (late August 2005), nearly nine in 
ten Americans said their lives had been affected by rising gas prices.  In my surveys, one 
out of ten peakists said that these specific increases led them to the peak oil theory.  A 
trucker in his fifties who spent $15,000 a month on diesel gasoline, for example, reported 
that the “!!!!!@#$%&^*!!! price of diesel” after Katrina led him to peakism.  A Virginia 
woman in her thirties said that the “gas prices [sic] spike after Katrina” led her to 
“reconsider the status quo,” while a liberal in his early thirties, who had “been watching 
the steady climb in gas prices since 2000, when Katrina spiked prices over $3,” found in 
peak oil the explanation for this increase—“earlier in the year I had discovered the 
writings of James Kunstler.  I went back to his website and others and felt I discovered 
the missing element in my thinking… The logic of Peak Oil and [M.] King Hubbert 
seemed sound to me.”48 
 
Environmentalism and Climate Change 
 Anxiety and concern about climate change was the third major event that led 
Americans to the peak oil movement in the mid-2000s.  The threat of anthropogenic 
climate change has been on the public radar since 1988, and as early as early as 1991 35 
percent of Americans said they were “a great deal… worried” about global warming.49  
However, until very recently it consistently rated low on the level of public concerns, far 
behind the economy, unemployment, foreign policy, and healthcare.  This level of 
                                                
48 Respondents 9569670; 9564499; and 9569883. 
49 27% answered “a fair amount,” 21% “only a little” and 12% “not at all.”  Gallup, “In U.S., Concerns 
About Global Warming Stable At Lower Levels, March 14, 2011, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146606/concerns-global-warming-stable-lower-levels.aspx. Accessed May 19, 
2013. 
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concern seemed to be changing in the mid-2000s, when general awareness and public 
concern over climate change grew to new heights. 
 Scientific evidence of a general warming trend, drought, and even extreme 
weather events have only so much impact on concerns about climate change.  Popular 
culture has been especially significant in affecting the debate over climate change, and 
we might appropriately date this millennial concern to Roland Emmerich’s 2004 film The 
Day After Tomorrow, which portrayed a spectacularly abrupt climate change that 
produces an ice age almost overnight, and sparked a newfound interest in the potential 
immediate impact of climate change in newspapers and blogs.50  Hurricane Katrina, 
which 68 percent of Americans associated with climate change, seemed to present a 
turning point for climatic awareness.51  Previously, many Americans had little first-hand 
knowledge of the potential negative consequences of carbon emissions since, as Michael 
Ziser and Julie Sze pointed out, “the most tangible evidence of warming on U.S. soil was 
to be found in coastal arctic villages.”52  If Katrina brought the potential consequences of 
climate change home, so to speak, former Vice President Al Gore’s film of the following 
year, An Inconvenient Truth, seemed just as influential, presenting clear science, stark 
predictions, and arresting images, such as the flooding of Manhattan.53  As a work of 
propaganda, the film was successful: a Nielsen poll showed that 89% of American 
                                                
50 A number of audience surveys found that the film significantly increased its audience’s concern about 
climate change.  See, for example, Andrew Balmford, Linda Birkin, Andrea Manica, Lesley Airey, Amy 
Oliver and Judith Schleicher, “Hollywood, Climate Change, and the Public,” Science 305, no. 5691: 1713. 
51 Zogby International, “Americans Link Katrina, Global Warming,” 
http://www.zogby.com/News/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1161.  Accessed October 20, 2010. 
52 Michael Ziser and Julie Sze, “Climate Change, Environmental Aesthetics, and Global Environmental 
Justice Cultural Studies,” Discourse 29, nos. 2/3: 402. 
53 An Inconvenient Truth, Davis Guggenheim, 2006. 
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viewers said they were more aware of climate change’s causes and consequences, and 
74% said they had begun taking individual actions.54  However, Gore’s association with 
climate change allowed conservative climate denialists to politicize the issue by claiming 
that climate science was simply liberal propaganda. 
 
Fig. 2.2.  The price of gasoline rose throughout the 2000s, while the percentage of Americans 
concerned about climate change ebbed and flowed.  Source: Gallup. 
 
 That same year, the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), an international, United Nations-affiliated organization composed of thousands 
of scientists, released a comprehensive report on climate change which seemed to finally 
put to rest any doubts about the existence of a scientific consensus; Al Gore shared the 
Nobel Peace Prize with the IPCC; and MTV sponsored a “Live Earth” concert that 
                                                
54 Nielsen, “Global Consumers Vote Al Gore, Oprah Winfrey and Kofi Annan Most Influential to 
Champion Global Warming Cause: Nielsen Survey,” July 2, 2007, available at 
http://nz.nielsen.com/news/GlobalWarming_Jul07.shtml.  Accessed May 14, 2013. 
   98 
spanned all seven continents.  In one poll, 59% of Americans agreed that “it’s necessary 
to take major steps starting very soon.”55  From Hollywood films with environmental 
messages (in 2008 alone: Wall-E, The Happening, and The Day the Earth Stood Still) to 
corporate greenwashing campaigns, a sea change in environmental concern seemed to be 
at hand. 
 Many peakists were led to anxieties about resource depletion through their 
research into climate change.  A computer programmer said, “I learned about peak oil 
while I was studying climate change,” while a retired Denver meteorologist “got 
interested in peak oil ancillary to my environmental studies.  I just happened to catch a 
couple of authors who had written peak oil books speaking to the environmental issue 
and picked up on the concept.”  An Idaho man said that “abnormally warm weather 
during the winter upset” his winter ski plans, which “led me to getting informed about 
climate change.  This led to me getting informed about our dependence on fossil fuels 
which led me to peak oil.”56 
 
Abundance, Scarcity and Limits in Recent American History 
While the Iraq war, rising gas prices, climate change awareness and Internet 
access provide the proximate causes of the peak oil phenomenon, these events and 
developments played out amidst shifting popular conceptions about energy availability, 
the free market, and technology.  Concerns about oil depletion should be located in the 
                                                
55 Gary Langer, “Poll: Public Concern on Warming Gains Intensity,” ABC News, March 26, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/GlobalWarming/story?id=1750492&page=1.  Accessed May 19, 2013. 
56 Interview with Steve Allen, November 11, 2009.  Interview with Bill Fickas, November 12, 2009. 
Respondent 9569902. 
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series of historical cycles of beliefs about abundance, scarcity and limits in recent 
American history.  In the second half of this chapter, I situate peakism and the American 
“culture of optimism” in this ebb and flow, before returning to the present to identify 
contemporary discourses about environmental limits. 
Confidence in abundance and a general optimism are certainly consistent with 
longstanding mythology about the “national character” of Americans.  From the earliest 
chronicles of the United States, such as Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic Democracy in 
America, through the 1970s, Americans have traditionally been cast as optimists, whose 
vision of the future was as boundless as their expanding Western border.  Knowing the 
United States only through its literature and reputation, Franz Kafka, while conducting 
researching for his novel Amerika, told his compatriots in 1912, “I like the Americans 
because they are healthy and optimistic.”  Half a century later, John F. Kennedy asserted 
that “the American, by nature, is optimistic,” and few would have disagreed. 
However, the role of “nature” in this formulation is more interesting than 
Kennedy may have intended.  To what extent was twentieth century American optimism 
reliant on or the product of an imagined natural abundance?  Throughout the last century, 
a chief determinant of what one might call the national mood was an estimation of the 
abundance or scarcity of natural resources, especially petroleum.  In a direct, tangible 
way, cheap oil played a crucial but often unacknowledged role in the development of 
American geopolitical power and its citizens’ high quality of life in the post-WWII 
period, essentially mixing an expectation of unlimited cheap energy into the foundations 
upon which post-war life was constructed.  In the late 1960s and 1970s, this expectation 
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was challenged by environmentalists, whose concerns about limits to continued growth 
were seemingly corroborated by concerns about global population growth, environmental 
disasters, oil embargoes, and economic woes.  In the 1980s, behind Ronald Reagan’s 
optimism and a global petroleum glut that led to low prices, these concerns vanished for 
almost two decades.  In the second half of this chapter, I place the peak oil movement in 
this historical context. 
Before tracing the history of growth, abundance, and scarcity in American 
popular political economic thought, we need to define these terms.  While “growth” 
usually denotes a significant increase in economic production and consumption, the term 
has assumed connotations far beyond the economic sphere.  Over time, it has come to 
mean progress itself, with attendant industrial development, material consumption, and 
technological innovation.  Economic growth is a key aspect of the “dominant social 
paradigm” identified in the last chapter, but it was not always so.  The idea that progress, 
national strength, and even general happiness are the necessary byproduct of an 
indefinitely expanding economy, measured as the percentage rate of increase of gross 
domestic production from one year to the next, is a nearly-universal assumption of 
contemporary public discourse with which few Americans seem to disagree.  But it 
would have struck many in the first three decades of the twentieth century as a strange 
notion indeed.   
The Great Depression is the most appropriate place to begin any discussion of 
modern notions of growth, which one historian has called “easily the most important idea 
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of the twentieth century.”57  During the 1930s, most politicians and economists spoke not 
of economic growth, but merely of “balance” and “security,” while the federal 
government adopted policies intended to avoid economic “stagnation,” such as cutting 
farm production to steady prices.  Three decades after Frederick Jackson Turner declared 
that the frontier was closed, many spoke of the nation’s maturity and impending decline, 
while some Southerners feared that continued industrial development and modernization 
would weaken local communities and deliver power and wealth to distant interests.58  
After Pearl Harbor, however, ambivalence about economic growth disappeared, as the 
entire industrial machinery was put toward the war effort.  Historians have called World 
War II a “gross national product war” with good reason, as the war ultimately turned not 
so much on strategy or moral rectitude, but on which side might produce more materiel 
(tanks, trucks and aircraft) and produce devastating new weapons.59  
During the war, as historian Godfrey Hodgson put it, “American society seemed 
to have discovered the secret of economic progress,” and in its aftermath few were 
interested in returning to the modest goals of balance and stability.60  In the immediate 
                                                
57 McNeil, 336. 
58 Collins, 2-3. 
59 Russell Frank Wiegley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military and Policy (New 
York: Macmillan, 1973), 146.  Even more broadly, speaking of a national economy before the 1940s is 
somewhat anachronistic.  As Timothy Mitchell argues in Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of 
Oil (New York: Verso, 2011), no political economist referred to an object called “the economy” prior to the 
1930s.  The emergence of “the economy” was dependent on two factors that did not emerge until this 
period.  First, the expanded national administrative machinery that emerged only with the New Deal.  
Second, a consensus in the field of economics about how to measure a national economy, or whether that 
was even possible or desirable.  In the 1920s, economists such as Richard T. Ely and Thorstein Veblen 
“wanted economics to start from natural resources and flows of energy,” while a competing group wanted 
“to organize the discipline around the study of prices and the flows of money” (132).  The second group 
won out, and as a result the national economy has been measured by the amount of times that money 
changes hands, and has, for the most part, ignored questions of energy and natural resources. 
60 Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time: From WWII to Nixon—What Happened and Why (Garden 
City, NJ: Doubleday, 1976), 48. 
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post-war period, then, economic advisers and government economists formulated a 
lasting political philosophy that economic historian Robert M. Collins has termed 
“growthmanship,” raising growth “from an overriding economic goal (first among 
equals) to a new organizing principle for a neo-corporatist political economy.”61  By his 
1949 State of the Union, President Truman announced that it would not be enough to 
“float along ceaselessly” or “merely to prepare to weather a recession if it comes.”  
Instead, the country must “constantly… achieve more and more jobs and more and more 
production,” which “will mean more and more prosperity for all the people.”62 
In the 1950s, conditions seemed to bend their will to this new ideology of growth.  
The baby boom (1946-1964) constituted the largest population increase in American 
history, and gross national product per capita increased 24 percent between 1947 and 
1960, while personal consumption spending increased by 22 percent.  Behind strong 
labor unions, the middle class swelled.  With only seven percent of the global population, 
the United States now accounted for half of global manufacturing output, and accrued 
nearly half of the world’s income each year. 
In a historical moment in which Western mythology played a large role in the 
national imaginary, economic growth was cast as a new and limitless frontier.63  Alvin 
Hansen, a leading American Keynesian economist, declared consumption to be “the 
                                                
61 Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in the Postwar World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 21. 
62 Harry Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 5, 1949.  
63 See Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New 
York: HarperPerennial, 1993), 347-533. 
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frontier of the future.”64  Notions of progress, linked to American exceptionalism and 
Manifest Destiny, were translated into the theory of economic growth, which relied upon 
and was expressed through material consumption.  In this vein, Lizabeth Cohen has 
described the “new postwar ideal of the purchaser citizen who simultaneously fulfilled 
personal desire and civic obligation by consuming,” in which consumption became an 
ethical imperative.65  This consumption ethic is evident in some of the era’s leading 
nonfiction.  In his 1954 book People of Plenty, for example, David Potter wrote that 
society expected the modern man to “consume his quota of goods—of automobiles, of 
whiskey, of television sets,” and “regards him as a ‘good guy’ for absorbing his share, 
while it snickers at the prudent, self-denying, abstemious thrift that an earlier generation 
would have respected.”66  Writing in The Organization Man two years later, William 
Whyte noted that “thrift is becoming a little un-American.”67 
If Dwight Eisenhower seemed reluctant to promote or rely on “growthmanship,” 
John F. Kennedy was not.68  The pursuit and expectation of economic growth became one 
of the key features of his New Frontier, an official imperative epitomized by his creation 
of a Cabinet Committee on Growth.  The signs were everywhere, sometimes quite 
literally—soon after his inauguration, placards asking “What have you done for Growth 
today?” were placed at every desk of the Department of Commerce.69  While growth 
                                                
64 Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State,” in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The 
Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930 – 1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 108. 
65 Cohen, 119. 
66 David Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1954), 70. 
67 William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), 14. 
68 On Eisenhower and growth, see Collins, 43-45. 
69 Collins, 52. 
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seemed, in this formulation, an end in itself, it actually served two key political functions 
during this period.  First, economic growth became a key site of competition in the Cold 
War.  As the Soviet Union and the United States sought to attract nonaligned states, their 
ability to produce cheap goods and thereby deliver material comforts and a high quality 
of life became a crucial issue.  This consumption race was embodied in the famous 
“kitchen debate” between Nikita Khrushchev and Richard Nixon in 1959. 
Second, economic growth would play a vital role in allowing American 
politicians to sidestep questions about the distribution of wealth, which had become a 
divisive issue in the 1930s.  In a metaphor of the era, the question of how to slice the pie 
of national wealth could remain unanswered so long as the pie continued to grow.  Major 
institutions that might have offered a differing vision followed this lead: unions, for 
example, shifted their focus from solidarity, power and structural changes to collective 
bargaining over wages and benefits.  As Hodgson observed, it became “tempting to jump 
to the conclusion that there was not much more to democracy,” or, for that matter, 
politics, “than keeping unemployment under 5 per cent, guaranteeing a swelling flood of 
consumer goods to the employed, and increasing the gross national product by a 
respectable percentage each year.”70  If post-war technocratic politics presented itself as a 
science, with similar universality and authority, we might view growthmanship as a new 
form of alchemy, through which finite physical resources would be transmuted into 
perpetual economic growth.71   
                                                
70 Hodgson, 52. 
71 While it is tempting to think of growth as a specifically capitalist goal, Communist regimes, particularly 
the Soviet Union, practiced their own form of competitive growthmanship.  Indeed, as J.R. McNeil has 
argued, while “Communism aspired to become the universal creed of the twentieth century,” in reality “a 
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Expectations of a continually expanding pie created a renewed sense of national 
possibilities.  As historian Lawrence R. Samuel observed, post-WWII American 
“futurism was, in a word, limitless,” envisioning a “consumer utopia” whose “sheer 
abundance [was] capable of solving all of our social ills.”72  Amidst an unprecedented 
boom in population growth, economic output, health, material consumption and quality 
of life, it is no surprise that, as James T. Patterson has noted, “the majority of the 
American people during the twenty-five or so years following the end of World War II 
developed ever-greater expectations about the capacity of the United States to create a 
better world abroad and a happier society at home.”73  The post-war ideology of growth, 
seemingly validated by an ever-rising GDP, enabled the country’s expansive Cold War 
foreign policy, including deep-pocketed support for allies and regular military 
interventions around the globe.  At home, the sense of unlimited national possibilities 
facilitated Eisenhower’s pragmatic acceptance of New Deal programs and enabled 
Lyndon Johnson’s pursuit of a Great Society.  In keeping with the gospel of growth, these 
programs would not necessarily redistribute wealth, but sought instead to democratize 
access to the “American way of life” and patterns of consumption.  
Beyond politics and foreign policy, a slew of technological innovations changed 
the way that Americans lived and the futures they imagined.  Research and development 
for WWII and Cold War technologies produced regular innovations that gave many 
                                                                                                                                            
more flexible and seductive religion succeeded where communism failed: the quest for economic growth.”  
Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New York: 
Norton, 2000), 336. 
72 Lawrence R. Samuel, Future: A Recent History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 108. 
73 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), vii. 
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Americans a sense of invincibility.74  The atom had been harnessed and might provide 
cheap, safe energy for thousands of years.  Medical research produced antibiotics, 
vaccines, pacemakers, and, in 1960, the birth control pill.  After the shock of Sputnik’s 
launch, the United States soared ahead in the Space Race—the moon was the next stop, 
and then perhaps Mars, if not even more distant destinations.  Drawing on the popular 
appeal of technological marvels that opened new, unconsidered possibilities, science 
fiction moved into the mainstream.  Presenting utopian visions of a grand tomorrow, 
futurists like Carl Sagan and Alvin Toffler, the influential space art of Arthur Radebaugh, 
and TV shows like The Jetsons (1962-1963) represented a projection of growthmanship 
into the future.75  As historian Brian C. Black noted, “the rise of technological progress” 
in postwar America “had convinced most people that human ingenuity could overcome 
all problems that came from limited resources.”76 
While human ingenuity played a vital role in America’s post-WWII economic and 
geopolitical growth, so did petroleum.  As Eisenhower himself noted in his 1955 State of 
the Union address, “at the foundation of [America’s] economic growth are the raw 
                                                
74 While these changes the related sense of growing possibilities affected almost most Americans, they 
were distributed unequally.  While people of color, gays and lesbians, and poor Americans still suffered 
from widespread discrimination, oppression, and disenfranchisement, the sense of growth and possibility 
may have played a role in the political movements that emerged in the 1960s. 
75 See Samuel, 77-108.  Radebaugh was an illustrator whose sleek, airbrushed advertisements for 
companies such as Coca Cola and United Airlines had a powerful influence on contemporary future 
imaginaries. His syndicated cartoon strip, “Closer Than We Think” (1958-1962), presented the mass 
attainment of a better life through technological progress, through cartoons demonstrating breakthroughs 
such as “Push-Button Education,” “Robot Warehouses,” and of course the flying automobile.  See Matt 
Novak, “Before the Jetsons, Arthur Radebaugh Illustrated the Future,” Smithsonian, April 2012.  Alvin 
Toffler was a well-known futurist whose articles, such as “The Future As A Way of Life” (Horizon, 
Summer 1965), and books, such as Future Shock (New York: Random House), had a wide cultural 
resonance. 
76 Brian C. Black, “Oil for Living: Petroleum and American Conspicuous Consumption,” Journal of 
American History 99, no. 1 (2012), 43.  
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materials and energy produced from [its] minerals and fuels.”77  The key ingredient in the 
prosperity and optimism of the postwar decades was cheap oil: from 1945 to 1970 the 
per-barrel price of crude oil remained below $20 in 2008 dollars (figure 2.3).  Cheap oil 
enabled the rise of the automobile, which became the signature commodity of the post-
war years, as the number of cars owned by Americans doubled between 1945 and 1950.  
This vast fleet benefitted from the 1956 Interstate Highway Act, which constructed 
41,000 miles of freeway, made mostly of asphalt, a petroleum derivative.  Cars and roads 
produced elemental transformations that fundamentally altered the structure of everyday 
life, such as decentralized suburbs and exurbs, long commutes to work, and a national 
drive-in culture.  Assuming an endless supply of cheap fuel, suburban developers and 
advertisers promoted suburbia as the ideal, and by 1960 more Americans lived in suburbs 
than cities. 
 
Fig. 2.3: Crude oil prices, 1861-2010.  Source: BP Statistical Review 2012. 
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Cheap oil made a whole world of products and services available to middle-class 
Americans for the first time.  All kinds of products were suddenly inexpensive enough 
for mass consumption, as “cheap oil allowed chemists to derive cheap replication of 
costlier products,” and “reliance on these products helped define basic patterns of 
consumption in twentieth-century America.”78  Plastics, now made from petroleum-
derived polymers, replaced wood and textiles in many homes, while refrigerators, laundry 
machines, dishwashers, lawnmowers, televisions and automobiles appeared in homes and 
garages.  Cheap oil made for cheap food, too, as “oil-powered machinery and 
petrochemical-based pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers also sparked unprecedented 
increases in agricultural production,” known as the Green Revolution.79  In all of these 
ways, the suddenly cheap, price-stable, abundant resource served as “the building block 
for a proliferating array of consumer goods” and thus “underpinned a steadily rising U.S. 
standard of living” in the post-war period.80 
While many Americans have long considered the post-war period, especially the 
1950s, to be an exceptional “golden age,” environmental historians have recently 
highlighted just how exceptional it was.81  Taking a longer view of history, we should 
recall that scarcity has been a regular concern for human societies for almost all of human 
history and pre-history.  As Collins put it, “in all prior civilizations and social orders, the 
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vast bulk of humanity had been preoccupied with responding to basic material needs,” 
but in the mid-twentieth century “the age-old bonds of scarcity were broken,” marking a 
“fundamental change in the human condition.”82  This leap became possible because of 
technological innovations, to be sure, but also because petroleum is a unique substance, 
formed over millennia, the likes of which human beings had never discovered and most 
likely will never discover again on this planet.  As we have come to rely on an ecology of 
oil, it is easy to forget just how unique petroleum is, and how historically significant its 
full application during this period was. 
As a historical event, the exploitation, refinement, and application of petroleum in 
industrial scales in the post-WWII period is perhaps best understood side-by-side with 
similar historical events.  The closest parallel is not to be found in whale oil or coal, but 
in the arrival of human beings on a new land mass, such as North America 
(approximately 15,500 years ago) and Australia (approximately 40,000 years ago).  In 
those cases, archaeologists have found, prehistoric pioneers also discovered a seemingly 
abundant source of energy in the caloric flesh of large mammals lacking natural defenses 
against humans.  In almost every case, they exploited this new source of energy quite 
inefficiently, driving entire herds over cliffs, for example, as well as carelessly, hunting 
them to extinction within a century.83  Population growth, the result of this energy 
abundance, could not be sustained when it disappeared. 
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Petroleum is just as unique as the giant ground sloths that once traversed North 
America because of two factors: its high energy density and its transportability.  As all 
forms of energy are essentially concentrations of solar radiation converted and stored 
through photosynthesis, their energy density reflects how much sunlight they contain.  
For millennia, humans consumed only sunlight that had recently fallen on plant matter, 
or, when those plants were consumed by fauna, accumulated in animal fat.  Pre-industrial 
societies had two primary sources of energy: human and animal labor, and biomass, 
especially wood—when burned, mature trees release the energy equivalent of decades of 
sunlight.  Coal, which is sunlight transferred through photosynthesis into plants, then 
compressed in high temperature and pressure over millions of years, constituted a historic 
step forward for human beings, since for the first time we were drawing on an ancient 
bank of sunlight.  But even algae and zooplankton contain far more concentrated sunlight 
than plant matter, and petroleum is composed of millions of years of such organisms, a 
seemingly limitless bank account of ancient sunlight compressed by geologic forces into 
a high energy density (figure 2.4).  Almost as important is petroleum’s liquidity, which 
makes it easily transportable and able to flow through inexpensive pipelines as coal never 
could. 
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Figure 2.4. Far more energy-dense than human power, wood (and other biomass) and coal, the 
ability to harness an ancient back of sunlight through petroleum led to an improved quality of life for 
hundreds of millions of human beings in the twentieth century.84   
 
 As Clive Ponting has pointed out, “all societies faced an energy shortage” until 
very recently, which effectively limited their ability to grow, in terms of population or 
what we now call economy, as well as the quality of life available to any more than a 
small number of people.85  By drawing on an ancient bank of sunlight through petroleum, 
and thus adding an unprecedented augmentation to their energy consumption (figure 2.5), 
Americans and other Westerners in the mid-twentieth century period entered a 
historically unique situation, which J.R. McNeill has described as a “liberation from the 
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drudgery of endless muscular toil and the opening up of new possibilities beyond the 
range of muscles.”86 
 
Figure 2.5.  With the aid of petroleum, U.S. energy consumption nearly doubled between 1940 and 
1972.  (Note: This does not include the use of petrochemicals in agriculture, food, and industry.)  For 
most of this period, Americans consumed between two and four times more energy than the global 
average.  Sources: Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Review and US census. 
 
   Of course, by the twenty-first century, very few Americans had first-hand 
experience of the transition from this “somatic” energy regime to the current regime of 
fossil fuels.  The historical uniqueness of the post-war world—and indeed the entire 
twentieth century, in which more energy was deployed than in all previous human history 
combined—has long been forgotten, its petro-foundation taken for granted.87  The 
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benefits of this historical rarity quickly became the new normal, mass consumption no 
longer conspicuous but expected.  In the longer context of human history, however, it 
becomes clear that abundance is hardly normal, and scarcity hardly an empty threat. 
 
 
Limits-to-Growth Environmentalism and the 1970s Oil Shocks 
 From this deep historical perspective, the concerns about energy that emerged in 
the late 1960s and 1970s were hardly exceptional.  Indeed, though they now seem 
unusual, the kinds of anxieties that motivated the emotional responses we saw from 
peakists in chapter 1 were at the center of environmental concern in the United States 
only four decades ago.  Historians have rightly celebrated Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(1962) as the catalyst of modern American environmentalism, but scholars such as 
Thomas Robertson have amended this narrative by highlighting the unprecedented public 
attention that the so-called “Malthusian” tracts of the late sixties and early seventies drew 
to environmental issues.88  These concerns are named after British economist Thomas 
Robert Malthus, whose 1798 tract, An Essay on the Principle of Population, argued that 
future population growth would inexorably outstrip food supply, causing poverty, 
epidemics, wars and general misery.  Although his work was read widely in nineteenth 
century Europe—Charles Darwin, for example, considered it an influence on his theory 
of natural selection—it had much less of an impact in the United States, where Thomas 
Jefferson’s vision of an expanding republic with limitless land and opportunities held 
sway. 
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 In the late 1960s, the faith in and expectation of perpetual growth underwent a 
sudden reversal.  By this time, population growth was already making headlines through 
its sheer numbers—global population, two billion in 1927, hit three billion in 1960 and 
was expected to surpass four billion in the early 1970s, marking the first time in human 
history that a generation had seen the global population double.  In this context, Paul 
Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller The Population Bomb ushered in a “Malthusian moment” in 
American culture that seems inconceivable today.  Updating Malthus’ pessimistic 
prophecies in a (melo)dramatic style, Ehrlich argued that the planet’s environmental 
crisis boiled down to one fundamental issue: too many human beings competing for a 
limited set of resources.   Its impact was bolstered by a cacophony of similar claims from 
other authors, such as ecologist Garrett Hardin, whose influential essay “Tragedy of the 
Commons” suggested that the United States would not be spared the consequences of the 
degradation of global environmental commons.  Historic international events added their 
own momentum to these apprehensions, such as Apollo 8’s space mission of the same 
year, which broadcast the first images of the entire planet Earth from outer space, 
encouraging a new conception of the planet as one interconnected, finite, and potentially 
fragile ecosystem.  
 As Malthusian environmental concerns moved into the public arena, they were 
called into service by diverse political actors for often disparate purposes.  As its title 
suggests, The Population Bomb dramatized the threat of overpopulation by framing the 
issue in classic Cold War terms of weapons and interdependence.  Overpopulation in the 
“Third World” would lead to scarcity and poverty, which might provide fertile ground for 
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the growth of Soviet communism in non-aligned nations.  In this way, the “population 
bomb” was just as immediate a threat to American interests as nuclear weapons.  At the 
same time, feminist activists repurposed Malthusian anxieties for their own ends, citing 
overpopulation as yet another reason that women should have legal access to 
contraception.89  Most importantly, The Population Bomb raised the stakes of 
environmental awareness.  Although environmental issues already had broad public 
support, Malthusian concerns “set the apocalyptic horizon of environmentalism,” as John 
S. Dryzek wrote, “giving the basic reason why care and concern about the environment 
were not just desirable, but also necessary.”90  The Population Bomb was a major 
influence on the architect of the first Earth Day, Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson, who 
even placed an article by Ehrlich into the Congressional Record in 1970.91  Whereas 
Silent Spring focused primarily on the influence of specific chemical contaminants on 
wildlife, Malthusian concerns argued that the very future of the human species was at 
stake.  The abrupt shift away from post-WWII growthmanship is remarkable—in one 
survey, 31 percent of Americans described themselves as “anti-growth,” with another 39 
percent “highly uncertain.”92 
 The second major work of Malthusian environmentalism was 1972’s Limits to 
Growth, which Max Lerner correctly predicted would “detonate through the debates of 
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the ’70s.”93  Limits to Growth argued that finite natural resources—from petroleum to 
heavy metals to arable land—would impose an eventual limit on the growth of 
contemporary human civilizations, and predicted a dramatic “overshoot and collapse” if 
the course were not altered.  Written collectively by an organization called the Club of 
Rome, composed primarily of scientists, part of the book’s appeal was its novel use of 
computer modeling, expressed in charts and graphs that peak oil authors would emulate 
three decades later.  Limits to Growth sold four million copies in its first four years, and 
the report and its reception made headlines in national newspapers for months.  
 For a short time, Limits to Growth pushed Malthusianism back into the center of 
public debate.  Many reviewers disagreed with specific contentions, but even 
conservatives granted its basic claim that economic systems expecting infinite growth 
(namely capitalism) were incompatible with natural resources that are finite.  Business 
Week, for example, commented that “for all the criticism, practically everyone agrees that 
on a finite planet, growth must end sooner or later.”94  Newspapers published articles 
such as a 1973 Chicago Tribune cover story with the headline, “Fuel, resources 
dwindling: Can America survive the 20th century?”  In it, future Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist Ronald Kotulak asserted that “our lives, our economy, and our country revolve 
around the grossly wasteful use of abundant energy,” but that since “fossil fuels, except 
for coal, are running out,” the Limits to Growth prediction—described here as a future 
“marked by an industrial flameout, breakdown of society, and a soaring death rate” until 
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a global “collapse around the year 2100”—must be heeded.95   Indeed, questioning the 
value of economic growth became widespread.  Nixon’s top environmental advisor, for 
example, made headlines in 1972 by calling for a “national debate on the desirability of 
growth,” noting that “the finite nature of man’s physical resources calls for systematic 
constraints on expansion to avert the degradation of ‘the quality of life.’”96 The impact of 
this “Malthusian moment” on average Americans could be measured even three decades 
later, by the number of older peakists who cited both The Population Bomb and Limits to 
Growth as books that significantly influenced their lives.  A New Jersey man, for 
example, explained his interest in peak oil by reporting that “way back in 1972 I read 
‘Limits to Growth,’ which was pivotal in my Environmental leanings.”97 
Scholars weighed in on the contributions of culture and politics in encouraging 
unsustainable growth, and economists such as Herman Daly began outlining what an 
economic system based on a steady-state might look like.98  E.F. Schumacher’s 1973 
nonfiction book Small Is Beautiful, which promoted a “maximum of well-being with a 
minimum of consumption,” became a bestseller even before its author was invited to the 
White House by Jimmy Carter.  In environmental scholarship, more attention was paid to 
the potential impact of resource scarcity on society than the impact of human societies on 
the natural environment.  As late as 1976, one state of the field described “the dominant 
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theme” as humanity “entering an era of ecological limits.”99  By the late 1970s, of course, 
the sense that the 1970s were an ‘age of limits’ went all the way to the top—shortly after 
leaving office in 1981, Carter opined that “dealing with limits” had been the “subliminal 
theme” running through his presidency. 
In this atmosphere, the 1973 oil embargo seemed to validate the limits-to-growth 
thesis.  In response to Israel’s attack on Syria in October of 1973, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Companies unsheathed its “oil weapon” by ceasing exportation of 
petroleum to countries that supported Israel, including the United States.100  The effect 
was immediate: the 1973 oil embargo led to a fourfold increase in the price of gasoline 
and major shortages of heating oil.  Long lines at gas stations, hoarding, and impatient, 
panicked, and even violent motorists compelled Nixon to impose a number of national 
conservation measures that seemed to presage if not register a national decline, such as 
lowering highway speed limits, cutting air travel, and even darkening monuments in 
Washington.101  Occurring in the same year as the Paris Peace Accords and the humbling 
return of U.S. forces from Vietnam, the embargo seemed to be a sign that Americans no 
longer enjoyed the power and freedom to do as they please, in the international political 
arena as well as their local gas station.  Thirty years later, some peakists still considered 
the embargo as one of the most influential events in their lifetime.  Of all survey 
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respondents who were at least five years old at the time of the 1973 embargo, one out of 
four cited it as the event that triggered their eventual conversion to peakism.  Indeed, this 
experience of scarcity and limits, so unfamiliar to Americans born since approximately 
1980, is one potential explanation for the advanced age of so many peakists, in 
comparison to other social movements.102 
 As quickly as these Malthusian concerns appeared, so did they vanish from public 
discourse.  By the mid-1980s, “proponents of environmental apocalypse” seemed, as 
Frederick Buell observed, like “a bunch of monotonal, gloomy, anti-human, neo-
Malthusian purveyors of doom.”103  Part of this caricature was sketched by conservative 
anti-environmentalists, but there were concrete reasons that limits-to-growth wore out its 
welcome.  First, an acknowledgement of the limits to continued growth demanded 
radical, expensive changes to American life that would need to be centrally planned.  
While young Americans may have been open to (and indeed embraced) these kinds of 
changes, other groups, such as most politicians, corporations and businesspeople, were 
not quite as open to transforming capitalism.  In comparison, other environmental 
paradigms, such as “ecological modernism” and “sustainable development,’” maintained 
that environmental protection might be perfectly consistent with sustained economic 
growth and were thus far more appealing to most vested interests. 
Second, a number of environmentalists who believed that humanity was nearing 
its limits of growth voiced support for measures that verged on authoritarianism, or even 
racism.  Paul Ehrlich and other environmentalists sometimes focused their concerns about 
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overpopulation on “Third World” nations with high birth rates, especially India, and The 
Population Bomb seemed to blame some of the urban uprisings of the late 1960s on 
overpopulation.  At times, these supporters even suggested that forced sterilization might 
become necessary.  Third, while authors such as Ehrlich and Donella Meadows (of Limits 
to Growth) intended their predictions as catalysts for social reform and policy 
modifications, their critics in the mid and late 1970s focused on whether individual, 
short-term predictions came true.  When they did not, this approach lost credibility.104  As 
Thomas Robertson put it, the “supercharged” rhetoric of limits-to-growth “sold books 
and spurred people to action, but also opened environmentalists to claims of being 
‘chicken littles’ and misanthropic, even racist, authoritarians.”105  
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 signaled the end of any discourse of 
limits.  In the 1960s and early 1970s Reagan, as the governor of one of the country’s 
most environmentally sensitive states, preached concern for the environment, even 
organizing a Governor’s Conference on California’s Changing Environment in 1969.  But 
by 1980 he and perhaps the general public had changed their tune.  After a decade of 
being reminded of limits—to growth, to personal consumption, to military influence, and 
to national power—many Americans embraced Reagan’s optimistic proclamation of a 
new “morning in America.”  Arguing that predictions of doom were often wrong, he 
mocked the Carter administration’s discourse of limits during the 1980 campaign, and 
promised in his inaugural speech that “we’re not, as some would have us believe, doomed 
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to an inevitable decline.”106  Upon his inauguration, he ordered the immediate removal of 
the photovoltaic cells Carter had installed on the White House roof and proceeded to strip 
all federal environmental initiatives of power, funding, or both.107   
 Faced with an administration and a general public with less interest in green 
issues, environmentalists replaced the limits to growth perspective with a less dramatic 
paradigm of change, known as ‘global environmental change.’  In the wake of erroneous 
Malthusian predictions, environmental groups and environmental-minded academics and 
authors were now more dependent on scientific justifications for actions, and in the 1980s 
scientists point to the destructive human impact on the natural environment, such as water 
contamination, acid rain, ozone depletion, and deforestation.108  By the mid-1980s, then, 
environmentalists were again highlighting what “humans were doing to the environment, 
as was true when environmental quality emerged as a social problem in the late sixties,” 
although the apocalyptic weight of the limits-to-growth paradigm had added a global 
imperative to these issues.109 
In this global environmental change paradigm, energy issues surfaced mostly in 
the case of toxic spills, such as the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989.  With the exception of the 
Gulf War, energy issues faded from the public eye in the 1980s and 1990s.  Once again, 
the price of oil was a weathervane: between 1979 and 2000, the average national price of 
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a gallon of gas hovered between $0.94 and $1.40 (adjusted for inflation), with a small 
jump in 1990-1991 during the Gulf War.110  The unpredictable and high prices of the 
1970s created an incentive to search for new fields and develop new drilling and refining 
technologies.111  This period of stability was due to the diversification of imported oil 
enabled by new sources, especially from Mexico, the North Sea (England, Norway, 
Denmark and Germany) and, in the 1990s, Russia. The geopolitical importance of oil 
surfaced during the Gulf War, however, when some Americans questioned their 
country’s benevolence.112  Iraq’s invasion in of Kuwait in August of 1990 in order to 
control Kuwait’s largely untapped oil fields, and the U.S.-led international defense of a 
sovereign nation was certainly justified under international (and moral) law.  However, 
there were any number of similar regional conflicts in other locations that the U.S. 
ignored, which suggested to some critics that one of President H.W. Bush’s motives was 
to assert American power in the oil-rich Middle East.113   
By the 1990s, gas prices were once again low and stable, the United States firmly 
in control of global political hegemony and far removed from fears of scarcity.  
Abundance and optimism were once again the order of the day.  Behind the neoliberal 
stewardship of the Clinton administration and the financialization of the U.S. economy, 
the expectation of continued economic growth now assumed the form of collective 
investment in the stock market.  By this time, few questioned the alchemy of 
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growthmanship, and so relatively few wondered whether the continuing rise of Internet 
and technology stocks and home prices could continue to rise indefinitely, and at what 
cost.  (Larry Summers, then serving as Clinton’s secretary of the treasury before 
becoming Barack Obama’s chief economic advisor, declared emphatically that the 
Clinton administration would not “accept any ‘speed limit’ on American economic 
growth.”114)  The motivation industry described in the last chapter, buoyed by the new 
school of positive psychology, became a cultural force, with many corporations training 
their workers to be positive team players.  Techno-optimists argued that computer 
technologies had created an American “productivity miracle,” and predicted this trend to 
continue deep into the “roaring 2000s.” 
This historical context, with its ebb and flow of abundance and scarcity, helps us 
understand the reactions to that many peakists provoked in the last chapter.  Concerns 
over limits to economic growth, capitalism and American power seemed to have 
disappeared from the national discourse in the early 1980s, but they reappeared in the 
mid-2000s in the discourses of peak oil and climate change.  As a peakist in her late 
fifties said, “I started trying in ’74 to talk to people about resource depletion, and people 
thought I was out of my mind, so I quit discussing [it] until 2005, when it became 
acceptable in some circles.”115   
 
Crying Wolf: The Legacy of Malthusian Environmentalism 
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 By 2002, when ExxonMobil commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of Limits to 
Growth in a print advertisement, their rejection of the idea that “our current lifestyles and 
use of raw materials are unsustainable” and assertion that the Club of Rome was “wrong” 
would have been accepted by most Americans.116  By the 1990s, these and other 
Malthusian environmental concerns were considered, in hindsight, to be distant historical 
events worthy of a smirk, if not cynical attempts to impose some kind of environmental 
autocracy.  If my students are at all typical, most Americans born since the early 1980s 
are not even aware of this Malthusian moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s, so 
thoroughly was the doctrine of economic growth reasserted and accepted in the 1980s by 
liberals and conservatives alike. 
Nonetheless, this historical moment and its seemingly failed predictions were 
hardly forgotten.  Instead, the Malthusian moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
constitutes the backdrop for understanding the failure of environmental actors to 
convince Americans to respond to warnings about climate change as well as resource 
depletion, and their attendant lessons about recognizing and heeding limits.  The 
stereotype of the environmental apocalyptic prophesying the end of the world (figure 2.6) 
has become a cultural archetype, and as such implicitly argues against heeding the most 
recent warnings.  So it is that one legacy of America’s “Malthusian moment” was 
widespread environmental skepticism, which conservatives and anti-environmentalists 
have exploited at every opportunity.  In a 2001 Wall Street Journal op-ed, for example, 
Philip Stott could argue that global warming was merely a “new myth [that] was seen to 
encapsulate a whole range of other myths and attitudes that had developed in the 1960s 
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and 1970s, including ‘limits to growth,’ sustainability, neo-Malthusian fears of a 
population time bomb, pollution… and an Al Gore-like analysis of human greed 
disturbing the ecological harmony and balance of the earth.”117 
 
Fig. 2.6: A cartoon in the Washington Times mocks Al Gore’s September 2011 24-hour webcast, “24 
Hours of Climate Reality,” which highlighted the global consequences of anthropogenic climate 
change.118 
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A22. 
118 Alexander Hunter, The Washington Times, September 16, 2011, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/16/gores-bore-a-thon/#ixzz2TlVdELcK.  Accessed May 
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 A discourse of “limits,” closely tied to the contemporary fossil fuel energy 
regime, returned to the mainstream in the 2000s.  Although most advocates of peak oil 
tended to stress oil depletion above all other issues, a surprising number of mainstream 
environmentalists subscribed to peakism.  For example, in Eaarth: Making a Life On a 
Tough New Planet (2010), Bill McKibben quotes liberally from peakist author Richard 
Heinberg; describes the long decline of energy-returned-on-energy-invested (EROI) for 
global oil production; quotes James Schlesinger as saying that “the battle is over, the oil 
peakists have won”; and suggests, along with most peakists, that one cause of declining 
home prices in suburbia is the rising cost of gasoline.119  In a discussion of how the 
petroleum industry is responsible for one quarter of leaked toxic materials in the United 
States, the 2010 second edition of Sandra Steingraber’s classic Living Downstream: An 
Ecologist’s Personal Investigation of Cancer and the Environment (1997) claims that 
global oil production “has peaked, or is peaking, or will peak soon.”120  In 2007, James 
Hansen, one of the most influential and well-known climatologists in the world, co-
authored an article on the potential impact of peak oil scenarios on future climate 
change.121 
                                                                                                                                            
19, 2013.  The accompanying article concludes that “the more Mr. Gore speaks, the more the public 
realizes the only thing warming up is the hot air surrounding the climate change issue,” and the cartoon 
identifies him in the tradition of the sidewalk apocalyptic, whose predictions have always failed to 
materialize, and thus always will.  The connection with a Ron Paul figure in the bottom show that 
environmental claims are merely another form of bogus apocalypticism. 
119 Bill McKibben, Eaarth: Making a Life On a Tough New Planet (New York: Henry Holt, 2010), 27-33. 
120 Sandra Steingraber, Living Downstream: An Ecologist’s Personal Investigation of Cancer and the 
Environment (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2010), 117. 
121 Kharecha A. Pushker and James E. Hansen, “Implications of ‘Peak Oil’ for Atmospheric CO2 and 
Climate,” Cornell University Library (Open Access), NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and 
Columbia University Earth Institute. 
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 More importantly, mainstream environmentalists began returning to a discourse of 
limits in the mid-2000s, especially in describing climate change.  Desperately seeking a 
way to communicate the gravity of the climate change crisis, which already produces, 
according to Christian Parenti, an estimated 300,000 deaths every year, environmentalists 
have turned to limits and depletion as one strategy.122  In this conceptualization, the limit 
to growth—or even survival—is not an energy source but an energy sink.  Carbon sinks, 
such as oceans, forests, and soil sequester the carbon dioxide emitted fossil fuel 
consumption, and thus provide a crucial buffer against even more rapid climate change.  
Previously not widely understood, scientists and environmentalists are now warning that 
the ability of carbon sinks around the world to store carbon dioxide might be declining.123 
 By 2012, the gravity of climate change motivated mainstream environmentalists 
to return full circle to the mathematical predictions of Limits to Growth.  Bill McKibben 
and his organization 350.org kick-started his “Do the Math” campaign with a widely read 
article in Rolling Stone.  Since “pictures of those towering wildfires in Colorado” and 
“the size of your AC bill” hadn’t convinced the average reader of the urgency of action, 
McKibben delivered “three simple numbers that add up to global catastrophe,” along 
with the kind of specific predictions that environmentalists had eschewed since the 
1970s.  Arguing that if oil companies go on to extract and sell their 2,795 gigatons of 
“proven” oil and gas reserves, worth $27 trillion at today’s market value, the resulting 
                                                
122 Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence (New York: 
Nation Books, 2011), 7. 
123 See, for example, A. P. Ballantyne,  C. B. Alden,  J. B. Miller,  P. P. Tans and J. W. C. White, “Increase 
in Observed Net Carbon Dioxide Uptake by Land and Oceans During the Past 50 Years,” 
Nature 488, 70-72; M. I Saunders, Leon, J., Phinn, S. R., Callaghan, D. P., O'Brien, K. R., Roelfsema, C. 
M., Lovelock, C. E., Lyons, M. B. and Mumby, P. J., “Coastal Retreat and Improved Water Quality 
Mitigate Losses of Seagrass from Sea Level Rise,” Global Change Biology, 2013, 10.1111/gcb.12218. 
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warming would exceed what scientists (at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009) 
consider the bottom line of global warming, 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), 
by a factor of five.124 
 The purpose of engaging this limits discourse was to erase the frustrating 
requirement of emphasizing likelihood and probability—risk, above all—instead of 
certainty in predicting the effects of our actions from environmental communication.  
“Before we knew these numbers,” McKibben wrote, “our fate had been likely.  Now, 
barring some massive intervention, it seems certain.”  His clarion call was cogent, 
persuasive, and moving, relying on scientific consensus to deliver an emotional appeal 
for action, just as The Population Bomb and Limits to Growth had in their time.  However 
those earlier jeremiads, or rather the popular misunderstandings of their messages, had 
damaged the credibility of environmentalists.  McKibben, Gore, and other scientists and 
environmentalists were simply slotted into the long line of sidewalk prophets with failed 
predictions. 
 
Limits, Regulations, and Markets 
If historical connotations have tarnished the discourse of limits in the United 
States, we should remember that limits themselves are fundamental to any environmental 
perspective.  As Richard McNeil Douglas put it, “while environmentalism means 
different things to different people, almost all its forms are united by a central core 
                                                
124 McKibben, “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” Rolling Stone, July 19, 2012, 1. 
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premise: that nature imposes physical limits to human consumption.”125  In the 1980s and 
1990s, environmentalists continued to push for limits, but they shifted their rhetoric to 
one of “regulation” and “protection.”  As our historical perspective on abundance and 
scarcity in twentieth century American history shows, an opposition to “limits” is 
partially psychological.  An opposition to “regulation” or “environmental protection,” as 
environmentalism was often framed in the 1980s, is another matter. 
The connections between abundance and scarcity, on one hand, and regulation 
and free market neoliberalism, on the other, are not hard to tease out.  In response to the 
new wave of regulation in the 1960s and early 1970s, such as the creation of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, corporations began to systematically organize and lobby against regulatory 
expansion.  They did so primarily by borrowing arguments advanced by emerging 
libertarian think tanks about the magic of the free market, which would, in their perfect 
state of affairs, require no regulation whatsoever.  But while true market fundamentalists 
might argue that the free market can account for scarce resources better than any 
government regulator, this claim does not carry the same weight for the average 
American.  Crucial resources that are also scarce seem to demand government 
intervention of some sort.  Resources that are available without limit, however, require 
none. 
The tension between environmental awareness, which by necessity recognizes and 
respects the limits of the planet, and a belief in “America unlimited” is not a historical or 
                                                
125 Richard McNeill Douglas, “The Ultimate Paradigm Shift: Environmentalism as Antithesis to the 
Modern Paradigm of Progress,” in Stefan Skrimshire, ed., Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic 
Imagination (London: Continuum: 2010), 200. 
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hypothetical question, but a factor in our lack of response to contemporary environmental 
challenges, including climate change.  If this balance seemed to be moving one way in 
the “Malthusian moment” of the early 1970s, by the 1980s the scale had been pushed in 
the opposite direction by the heavy finger of a previously-fringe, now-ascendant political 
philosophy of libertarianism.  With wealthy backers and a champion in Ronald Reagan, 
corporate interests, libertarians, and neoliberals promoted a resurgent vision of an 
America without limits, and thus without any need for regulation. 
As we will see in the next chapter, by the mid-2000s, when the peak oil 
movement formed around a vision of impending scarcity, libertarian influence, filtered 
through decades of talking points about the inefficiency of “big government” as well as 
the “cyber-libertarianism” of the Internet, would have an influence far beyond political 
philosophers, think tanks and policy-makers. 
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Chapter 3: Alone Together: The Libertarian Shift and the Network Effect 
What depresses me about peak oil is … the individualistic survivalist 
streak in it. (Australian male, 36-40) 
 
I tried talking with my husband. He got angry and accused me of being 
negative and said we're too old to change and we might as well curl up and 
die… I just keep looking for community—mostly on line.  (White female, 
politically “progressive,” Minnesota, 56-60) 
 
This is a time for individuals and their networks, not for groups. (Barry 
Wellman)1 
 
In this chapter, I provide two interconnected explanations for the individualism of 
peak oil believers described in chapter 1.  I view their response to the threat of 
environmental crises in the context of a major transformation in American political 
culture over the last three decades that has not received sufficient attention: the spread of 
libertarian ideals.  Increasingly, Americans of all parties and persuasions conceive of 
themselves and their citizenship in distinctly libertarian terms—individualistic and 
private—and this has had a major impact on politics and social life in the United States.  
By examining the history of libertarian thought alongside the growth of the Internet over 
the last thirty years, this chapter argues that this shift has been accelerated by the use of 
Internet technology, and that the peak oil phenomenon, as a primarily virtual movement, 
demonstrates the tendency of the Internet to foster a culture of what sociologist Barry 
Wellman has called “networked individualism.”  As a result of these two currents, the 
peak oil movement developed in the mid-2000s not as a collective social or political 
movement, but as a group of like-minded but isolated individuals.  Peakists formed an 
                                                
1 Respondents 9576274 and 9601959.  Barry Wellman, “Little Boxes, Glocalization, and Networked 
Individualism,” in Mokato Tanabe, Peter van den Besselaar and Toru Ishida, eds., Digital Cities II: 
Computational and Sociological Approaches (Berlin: Springer, 2002), 334. 
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impressive virtual community of believers, but most felt, in the words of Internet scholar 
Sherry Turkle, “alone together.”2 
 In June 2009, I drove to Sandpoint, Idaho to visit the Sandpoint Transition 
Initiative (STI).  The second Transition Town in the United States, Sandpoint had been 
held up as a model of the Transition Initiative, a collective response to peak oil and 
climate change, by a number of survey respondents.  It had even received national press.  
In a New York Times feature in 2008, it was portrayed as a promising, bustling coalition 
of energy-inspired communards.  Author Jon Mooallem described the opening event of 
STI, its “Great Unleashing,” and a color photograph depicted thirty dedicated activists 
meeting on the stage of the baroque Panida Theater.  A “new chapter of a worldwide 
environmental movement” was apparently at hand.3 
 
Collective and Individual Responses 
On the website of Transition U.S., the coordinating body for the American 
Transition movement in the United States, one views a crowded map of official 
Transition Towns.  As of this writing, there were 139 Transition Towns and another 294 
groups that were officially “mulling” the proposition.4  However, the site does not clarify 
exactly what it meant to be designated a “Transition Town,” beyond having a few 
committed activists.  The phrase suggests the physical construction of separatist 
communities, the transformation of urban areas, or even both.  Indeed, the Transition 
                                                
2 Wellman 2002.  Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less from 
Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 
3 Jon Mooallem, “The End Is Near! (Yay!),” New York Times, April 16, 2009, 28. 
4 “Transition US,” http://www.transitionus.org/transition-towns.  Accessed May 19, 2013. 
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Initiative’s original endeavor, in Totnes, England, seemed to be well on its way to 
creating parallel structures that could challenge, supplement, or supersede petroleum-
dependent institutions, going so far as to print its own currency.5  While a number of 
scholars in the field of geography had picked up on the Transition movement, they had 
primarily analyzed its British incarnations, and few paid any attention to its low 
participation in the context of the broader peak oil movement.6   
 The Sandpoint Transition Initiative (STI) was not quite at Totnes’ stage of 
development.  According to one participant, there were only six people still involved with 
the central STI body just three years after its founding.  They met once a month, each 
subcommittee involved in its own projects.  The group’s greatest accomplishment was a 
community garden that rented beds to forty different people, but most gardeners weren’t 
even aware this was an STI project.  Gaea Swinford, an STI activist and board member of 
Transition U.S., noted that Sandpoint’s history as a town with a vibrant hippie subculture 
and strong community involvement meant that “a lot of this work has been going on for 
years and years, it just doesn’t call itself ‘Transition.’”7 
In the U.S., as Mooallem himself noted, “the American arm of the movement 
[was] expanding far faster than it is accomplishing anything.”  While an impressive 12-
                                                
5 “Towns Banking Their Own Currency,” BBC News, April 2, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/south_west/7326212.stm.  Accessed May 15, 2012. 
6 These articles have received special attention in British scholarship.  See, for example, Peter North, “Eco-
localisation As a Progressive Response to Peak Oil and Climate Change: A Sympathetic Critique,” 
Geoforum 41, no. 4 (2010): 585–594; Ian Bailey, Rob Hopkins, Geoff Wilson, “Some Things Old, Some 
Things New: The Spatial Representations and Politics of Change of the Peak Oil Relocalisation 
Movement,” Geoforum 41, no. 4 (2010): 595-605; J.P. Evans, “Resilience, ecology and adaptation in the 
experimental city,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36, no. 2 (2011): 223-237; Amanda 
Smith, “The Transition Town Network: A Review of Current Evolutions and  Renaissance,” Social 
Movement Studies 10, no. 1 (2011): 99-105. 
7 Interview with Gaea Swinford, June 6, 2011. 
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22% of my respondents had been active in Transition Towns, most added that they had 
actually only been to one or two meetings.  An Illinois man, for example, said, “I did go 
to the kickoff (er, ‘Great Unveiling’) of our local Transition Town group, but haven't 
really been involved with it,” while a Colorado woman “attended one local meeting last 
summer.  The group did not seem very stable.”  A Wisconsin woman who had “moved to 
[a] smaller area than where [she] used to live” so as to drive less said, “I have recently 
joined a peak oil group, but do not attend meetings.  I enjoy the listserv and discussions, 
though,” and a Texan reported that he had attended a Transition meeting only “once.  I 
was impressed with the purposelessness of the exercise, other than emotional catharsis.”8 
One observer who had been active in or visited Transition Towns dismissed the 
movement (off the record) as mere “window dressing,” and others seemed to second this 
analysis.9 
 The vast majority of participants in the peak oil movement were well-aware that 
individualistic responses to impending (and current) environmental crises would be 
ineffective.  As Richard Heinberg put it in The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of 
Industrial Societies (which three out of four peakists had read), “the strategy of 
individualist survivalism will likely offer only temporary and uncertain refuge during the 
energy downslope.  True individual and family security will come only with community 
solidarity and interdependence.”  Or, as a teenager from Kentucky put it, “we need to 
stick to community in order to prosper” during the expected peak oil crisis,” instead of 
                                                
8 Respondents 9590659, 9591372, 9584855, 9602174.   
9 This analysis is not intended to detract from the Transition Initiative movement, which is certainly vibrant 
in some areas, but to point out that in the United States it can function as a Potemkin village for 
communitarian-minded observers. 
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becoming “insular individuals.”  However, a number of respondents noted that the 
rhetoric of community response was quite different from what they themselves had 
witnessed.  One frustrated man, an Illinois resident in his early 50s who thought the peak 
oil phenomenon most closely resembled a “group of unrelated individuals following their 
own goals,” asked, “pray tell, where are there any real transition towns or sustainable 
communities?  Amish is about all I've ever seen.”  A socialist from Oregon complained 
that “the ‘community’ talk is not matched yet by” concrete actions.  While almost all 
respondents pointed to the need for a collective response to ecological crisis, few had 
real-world experience to speak of. 10 
 The lack of collective action becomes apparent when we consider the number of 
peakists who had never physically met another believer but made significant changes to 
their lives, such as the following: 
I moved out to my land in the country, grow a garden, planted fruit trees, keeping 
the old car, added insulation to the house, planted shade trees. etc. 
Personal preparations -- food storage, gardening skills, tree planting. 
I've terminated my studies and developed skills to allow me to be self-employed 
in a profession that I enjoy and which stimulates me.  I've decided against 
having children… It has affected what I look for in a partner (peak awareness). 
I moved 6 years ago, researched cities with the best water quality and furthest 
from nuclear reactors and not on the ocean.  I now own a very efficient organic 
farm, and have hybrid vehicles, soon to be totally electric.   I have been 
converting to wood, installing solar panels, not purchasing gasoline appliances. 
                                                
10 Heinberg, 214.  Respondents 9567268, 9567956 and 9592645. 
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 [Planted a] garden, root cellar soon, small wood lot, improving home insulation, 
just installed wood stove… building wood gassifiers [sic] for transport/backup 
power/homestead chores. 
I gave up my car and ride a bike everywhere now. I installed a little solar and i 
take steps to try to prepare for the coming squeeze. 
Downsized, moved closer to urban area, bought a home with solar panels, set up 
food storage, kitchen garden, raising rabbits for food. Looking at farmland. 
Invested in physical gold and silver.  Left the stock market. 
Learned a traditional trade. Started a kitchen garden; learned gardening. Learned 
permaculture, put it in practice.11 
These significant yet solitary preparations were not anomalies.  For the most part, 
peakists “prepped” alone: almost three quarters had begun stockpiling food, over a third 
had purchased a more energy-efficient car, one out of four had moved to a smaller or 
more energy-efficient home, and one out of five had changed their occupation. 
While comparing different historical periods is a hazardous enterprise, we should 
remember that considerations similar to “peak everything” have sparked a number of 
collective responses or political movements in recent American history.  For example, 
activism around environmental and population concerns, another “limit to growth” that is 
often cited by peakists, were major factors in the development of many communes and 
utopian communities in the 1960s.  Environmental historian Adam Rome noted that 
“especially in the countryside… many of the hippies were not just seeking to commune 
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with nature. They also were motivated by apocalyptic visions of the collapse of industrial 
civilization.”12 
In the 1970s and 1980s, fears about a different energy source, nuclear power, led 
tens of millions of Americans to participate in protests against the nuclear power plant 
industry.  Apocalyptic environmentalism and a similar belief in the inability of traditional 
politics to achieve an ecological transformation have also motivated a number of radical 
environmental groups, such as Earth First!.  One survey respondent drew these 
comparisons explicitly, noting that “the problem of peak oil, like overpopulation and 
nuclear proliferation, is about collective action and long term planning.  The problem is 
not a shortage of hydrocarbons but a shortage of wisdom.”13  
These very different responses to similar fears in recent American history suggest 
the different routes that peakist concerns in the 2000s might have taken.  Most peakist 
responses can be considered individualistic according to a definition of “individualism” 
that stresses “personalism,” which Paul Lichterman defined as away of thinking that 
“upholds a personal self that lives with ambivalence towards, and often in tension with, 
the institutional or communal standards that surround it.”14  Personalism is differentiated 
from narcissism or selfishness in that the personalist individual does not necessarily 
participate any less in social life or community activities, but “favors and conducts a 
                                                
12 Adam Rome, “‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties, The Journal of 
American History 90, no. 2 (2003), 544. 
13 See Martha F. Lee, Earth First!: Environmental Apocalypse (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1995).  Respondent 9686274. 
14 Paul Lichterman, The Search for Political Community: American Activists Reinventing Commitment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6. 
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fundamentally individualized relationship to any such community.”15  (Personalist 
individualism also draws a sharp line around the “nuclear” family, and reflects, as I 
discuss in chapter 5, a conception of the individual buttressed by conservative, race-based 
notions of masculinity.)  Although this type of individualism may appear to be “simple 
human nature” to some Americans, cross-cultural studies make clear that “the emphasis 
on personal development and personalized initiative” is not shared equally by all 
cultures.16  Communitarian authors such as Amitai Etzioni argue that this type of 
individualism, more conducive to therapy or personal support groups than political 
engagement, has been on the rise since the 1970s.  
 
The Libertarian Shift 
Scholars such as Robert Bellah and Robert Putnam have discussed the rise of 
individualism over the last three decades in great detail (see Introduction), but my study 
of the peak oil movement suggests that there is a largely ignored political dimension to 
the changes they observed.  To understand the personalist individualism of peakists and 
other virtual communities, we need to explore the rise of libertarian political ideals in the 
United States.  While most Americans publicly identify as “conservative” or “liberal,” 
recent polls show that the number of Americans who would identify as “libertarian” has 
been growing steadily over the last two decades.  According to a 2009 poll, for example, 
59 percent of Americans described themselves as “fiscally conservative and socially 
                                                
15 Felicia Wu Song, Virtual Communities: Bowling Alone, Online Together (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 
115. 
16 Lichterman, 6, 19.  See, for example, Sulamith H. Potter, “The Cultural Construction of Emotion in 
Rural Chinese Social Life,” Ethos 16, no. 2 (1988): 181-208. 
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liberal,” which only drops to 44 percent if the position is described as “fiscally 
conservative and socially liberal, also known as libertarian.”17  Another survey showed 
that from 2001 to 2009, the number of Americans who want less “government 
intervention” and less “promotion of social values from the government” had increased 
by roughly 35%.  In 2011, the New York Times created a “libertarian index” that 
measures social liberalism and economic conservatism, and showed a nearly 30% 
increase since 1993 in this libertarian nexus.18 
A discussion of libertarianism requires a brief definition and a short historical 
detour. The core political value for libertarians is the liberty of the individual, who should 
be free to live his life any way he chooses, as long as he does not violate the equal rights 
of others.  Private property is considered sacrosanct, and government’s only 
responsibility is to protect it, prevent fraud, and ensure the successful function of free 
markets.  Government should never impinge on the rights of the individual, especially in 
the removal of private property—some libertarians consider taxes that fund anything 
except national defense to be a form of theft.19 
While conservatism has received a great deal of attention in recent scholarship, the 
focus on the conservative movement can potentially obscure the extent to which their 
                                                
17 David Kirby and David Boaz, “The Libertarian Vote in the Age of Obama,” Cato Institute Policy 
Analysis No. 658, January 21, 2010.  Although the Cato Institute, as a libertarian think tank, does have a 
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18 Nate Silver, “Poll Finds a Shift Toward More Libertarian Views,” New York Times, June 20, 2011, 
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ideas have moved beyond self-identified conservatives.  This rich history of 
conservatism, detailed in nearly one hundred monographs and counting, paints a now-
familiar picture of grass roots, white, conservative activists mobilizing in the 1950s 
against desegregation and communism in groups like the John Birch Society.20  In the 
1960s, their concerns shifted to opposition to liberal Great Society programs and leftist 
movements, and the locus of the movement moved to the South, the Sunbelt, and 
suburbia.21  In the 1970s, they assumed control of the Republican Party, merged with 
Christian evangelicals, and first grabbed national power with the election of their 
standard-bearer in 1980.22 
 The writing of history is often motivated by a desire to better understand the 
present, and this is especially the case with histories of conservatism.  As Whitney Strub 
observed, this subject currently offers “perhaps the most fertile analytical ground 
available for scholars seeking to understand the contemporary United States in all its 
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circumlocutory political perversity.”23  The flood of histories of conservatism were 
motivated by the desire of mostly liberal social historians to understand the “puzzle” of 
how conservatives came to power and unexpectedly interrupted the tide of progress and 
equality that some had expected in the wake of the “rights revolutions” of the 1960s and 
1970s.24  A second wave of scholarship is rightly beginning to question why 
conservatives failed to achieve many of their objectives, such as rolling back New Deal 
and Great Society programs.  
 While acknowledging that the Right had limited power to govern as it might have 
wished, we should not forget that conservatives came to possess something approaching 
intellectual hegemony in the early twenty-first century United States, and we might begin 
to turn our attention from the various causes of the rise of conservatism to its effects.  
Assessing the impact of “conservative” ideals requires that we define them, of course.  
Although the concerns of conservatism, rhetorical and substantive, public and private, 
have changed over time, there are a number of core aspects of conservatism that have 
remained relatively consistent for nearly half a century.25  They include anti-communism, 
opposition to movements for racial and gender equality, a commitment to “traditional” 
                                                
23 Whitney Strub, “Further Into the Right: The Ever-Expanding Historiography of the U.S. New Right,” 
Journal of Social History 42, no. 1 (2008), 193. 
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While I second this caution against essentializing, I believe that the Right has had a number of core 
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sexual norms, and a libertarian (free market) approach to economics.26  Of these core 
principles, historians have paid the most attention to the role of “social issues”—
perspectives on race, gender, sexuality, and so-called “family values.”27  However, these 
are issues on which Americans have been actively fighting “culture wars” for over two 
decades, battles in which conservatives have not, on the whole, gained much ground.28 
Conservative principles of individual choice, reliance on the free market, and the 
need for a smaller state, are now central subjects of debate in mainstream political 
discourse, however.  These positions have (recently) been more frequently described by 
scholars as “neoliberal” than “libertarian.”  Libertarianism and neoliberalism share the 
same intellectual roots in Austrian economics, both have limitless faith in markets, and 
both conceive of society as a collection of rational, independent, self-interested actors.  
On certain issues they might be understood as two sides of the same coin: while one 
emphasizes market fundamentalism, the other presents a philosophy of conservative 
individualism that is often only implied by neoliberal policies.  The two ideas do have 
                                                
26 Although opposition to “big government” has often been claimed as a central tenet of conservatism, 
numerous critics have pointed out that when in control, few conservatives have (until recently, perhaps) 
truly attempted to dismantle the welfare state, and that therefore the “liberal-conservative divide is not so 
much over whether or not to limit government, but in what ways to limit government—liberals favor 
expansion of the welfare state, and conservatives favor expansion of the military-morality state” (Lewis, 
34). 
27 See, for example, Ronald P. Formisano, Boston against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1991); Catherine E. Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and 
Conservatism from Suffrage to the New Right (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2006); Joseph Crespino, In Search 
of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 2007); Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005); Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the 
Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism (New Haven, 2008).  For a trenchant historical critique of the 
myth of traditional American “family values,” see Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American 
Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 2000), as well as Matthew D. Lassiter, 
“Inventing Family Values,” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making 
American Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
28 See Zelizer, 380.
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significant differences, however.  On questions of foreign policy, for example, 
libertarians tend toward isolationism, neoliberals toward internationalism.  Even on 
economic issues, there are major differences.  While economic neoliberalism claims that 
free market capitalism can provide growth, efficiency, and even prosperity for all, it 
recognizes that any market must be created and enforced by federal governments and 
international treaties.  Neoliberalism therefore departs from libertarian orthodoxy, which 
views government interference in the market as fundamentally problematic—in the 
perfect libertarian world, free markets would simply occur naturally and require no 
regulation.29  Whereas scholars have described the influence of “neoliberalism” around 
the globe, “libertarianism” as a political and personal philosophy is an especially strong 
current in American political culture.30  This should not surprise us, since, as Seymour 
Lipset put it in his analysis of American exceptionalism, “viewed cross-nationally, 
Americans are the most antistastist… population among the democratic nations.”31 
Even so, the libertarian conception of the individual as autonomous and detached 
was unpopular in the United States for much of the twentieth century, from the Great 
Depression until the 1970s.  At mid-century, the dominant, consensus view among 
academics and politicians of all stripes was that the welfare state that emerged with the 
New Deal was a permanent improvement on the capitalist economic model, since it 
                                                
29 While this broad definition of “neoliberalism” would be accepted by most scholars, there is a great deal 
of disagreement about exactly how to define it.  For a diversity of perspectives, see Philip Mirowski and 
Dieter Plehwe, eds., The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
30 Libertarian ideas go under different names outside the U.S.—they are generally called “liberal”—but the 
difference here is not solely in terms of language.  I explore the exceptional popularity of libertarian ideas 
in the United States over the next few pages. 
31 Seymour Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996), 46. 
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softened capitalism’s negative consequences, such as poverty and environmental 
degradation.  In 1971, after taking the United States off the gold standard, President 
Nixon famously announced that he too was “a Keynesian.”  During the 1960s, however, 
conservative activists began to evangelize a libertarian vision of minimal government.  
Milton Friedman promoted libertarian ideas in best-selling books and a weekly 
Newsweek column, translating philosophy into practical policies such as school vouchers 
and the privatization of Social Security.  These ideas moved into mainstream politics with 
the 1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater, who inspired activists and politicians 
such as Ronald Reagan.  Well-heeled think tanks such as the Cato Institute, the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution and the Tax Foundation began 
churning out policy papers legitimizing what had previously been considered a fringe 
perspective. 
Libertarianism is often considered a conservative political philosophy, but its 
emphasis on the First Amendment and the “civil liberties” of the individual makes it a 
combination of economic conservatism and aspects of social liberalism.  Thus, specific 
libertarian ideas have intermittently appealed to leftists also.  For example, in the 1970s, 
the counterculture adopted the libertarian rhetoric of individual free choice.  The idea that 
social and cultural rebellion could be achieved by simply exerting individual autonomy in 
social matters, such as sexual identity and lifestyle (consumer) choices, paralleled the 
arguments that conservatives were making about economic matters.  William E. Hudson 
observed that “while the counterculture had a strong communitarian strain” that tends to 
dominate the public memory of the era, its “broadest political impact was more 
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libertarian.  The individualist, more libertarian, motto to ‘do your own thing’ had the 
strongest resonance among the young.”32  In this way, libertarian thought moved closer to 
the vital center throughout the “Me Decade” of the 1970s.   
 As historians such as Daniel T. Rodgers have noted, viewing the rise of libertarian 
ideals in the late twentieth century as merely a triumph for the conservative movement 
“harbors only half the truth.”33  Part of the remaining half, then, is that some libertarian 
policies were suggested first by liberals—deregulation in the late 1970s is a prime 
example.  But, perhaps more importantly, seemingly unrelated trends in American 
politics and culture dovetailed with a libertarian view of society.  The public scandal of 
Watergate and Richard Nixon’s eventual resignation, for example, may have benefitted 
Democrats in the short-term, but over the long haul it set the stage for the precipitous 
decline of the public’s trust in government at all levels, which buoyed libertarian calls for 
smaller government.  Meanwhile, the rise of what has been termed “identity politics” on 
the left in the 1970s and 1980s functioned to imaginatively divide “the nation” or 
“society” into what Rodgers called “little platoons of society,” where “the social contract 
shrank imaginatively into smaller, more partial contracts: visions of smaller communities 
of virtue and engagement—if not communities composed simply of one rights-holding 
self.”34  In this context, a government that had less of the people’s trust, now faced with 
the difficulty of satisfying a heterogeneous nation with conflicting demands, lost the 
public battle for intellectual hegemony against a mechanism that promised a simpler, 
cleaner, more efficient, and less political solution to social problems: the market. 
                                                
32 Hudson, 24-5. 
33 Daniel Rodgers, The Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8. 
34 Rodgers, 198. 
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 Although Ronald Reagan was not the libertarian that recent conservatives make 
him out to be (especially in foreign policy), he rhetorically promoted a libertarian agenda 
of individualism, deregulation and faith in the free market. Despite the very public 
failures of the first wave of deregulation in the 1980s—such as escalating air travel fares 
and the Savings and Loan crisis—Congress continued to drop regulatory restrictions left 
and right, including limits on credit card interest, restrictions on interstate banking, 
oversight of mortgage lending, and Glass-Steagall restrictions on commercial bank 
involvement in investment banking and stock brokerage.  By the 1990s, the national 
discourse was not over the embrace of the market, which was a fait accompli, but over 
social issues and culture wars.  But as scholars such as Steven Teles and Daniel A. 
Kenney, social conservatism remained isolated to the U.S. while libertarian think tanks 
“created outposts throughout the world,” advocating for neoliberal solutions under the 
guise of apolitical technocratic management.35 
The wave of deregulation continued under President Bill Clinton, an exemplar of 
neoliberalism, who famously claimed in 1992 that “the era of big government is over.”  
In the 2000s, the Tea Party succeeded in pushing libertarian ideas, such as the intention to 
“starve the beast” of government programs by decreasing revenue, into the American 
mainstream.  George W. Bush relentlessly introduced the market as a central metaphor 
for his presidency, striving to create an “ownership society,” which portrayed each 
American as a Chief Executive Officer, with their very lives as investment decisions. 
Reagan once called Social Security the “third rail” of American politics, but the 
                                                
35 Steven Teles and Daniel A. Kenney, “Spreading the Word: The Diffusion of American Conservatism in 
Europe and Beyond,” in Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo, eds., Growing Apart? America and Europe in 
the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 168. 
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campaign to privatize Social Security accounts became, in the 2010s, a public goal for 
Republicans.  While the Occupy Wall Street movement represented one reaction to the 
economic recession of 2008, the Tea Party and the Republican Party have called for what 
most scholars would recognize as austerity measures, including increases in tax cuts, 
privatization, and reduction in governmental services.  Although the comparison is 
infrequently drawn in these terms, the contrast between the U.S. and similar 
industrialized nations has rarely been so stark: while European governments attempt to 
implement austerity measures in spite of massive protests against them, the U.S. 
generated populist calls for increased austerity during the economic recession.36 
The libertarian shift has influenced American political culture, visions of the 
future, and conceptions of community, citizenship, and the self.  In the last decade, a 
wide group of scholars have examined the relationship between “neoliberalism and 
everyday life,” as the title of one collection put it.37  Neoliberalism and libertarianism 
have a similar footprint on social worlds—the libertarian conception of society as merely 
a collection of individuals might just as well describe the assumptions behind and 
consequences of many neoliberal policies.  Although scholars have not performed a 
similar exploration of the libertarian influence on the social realm, this is potentially rich 
                                                
36 These calls for austerity have come primarily from Tea Party conservatives.  While they may not be 
“popular” in that they do not have the broad support of most Americans, they are indeed “populist,” coming 
from not only political pundits or the moneyed elite but many average Americans.  See Vanessa 
Williamson, Theda Skocpol and John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican 
Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), especially chapter 2; and Binyamin Appelbaum 
and Robert Gebeloff, “Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It,” New York Times, February 
12, 2012, A1. 
37 See, for example, Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the 
Attack on Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) and Susan Braedley and Meg Luxton, eds., 
Neoliberalism and Everyday Life (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010). 
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vein of criticism, especially in the U.S., where the tradition of individualism has led to an 
easy acceptance of libertarian ideas. 
 
Libertarianism in the Peak Oil Movement 
In his influential 1985 book Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his co-authors 
argued that American culture had succumbed to a therapeutically self-centered narcissism 
that had stripped public life of its vibrancy and political possibilities.  They noted that the 
tendency to think of the individual as outside of the framework of social institutions 
leaves people “without a collective context in which one might act as a participant to 
change the institutional structures that frustrate and limit.”38  As we shall see in the next 
chapter, American peakists believed that the political will or ability to change the world 
did not exist in the U.S.  In this context, the Peak Shrink’s claim that “Economic and 
Planetary Collapse” is actually a “Therapeutic Issue”—as opposed to a “social issue” or 
“political issue”—takes on a new resonance, reflecting the rise of a therapeutic culture 
that is certainly consonant with libertarian individualism.  As political scientist Carl 
Boggs noted in his turn-of-the-millennium analysis of depoliticization, “whereas popular 
movements (civil rights, feminism, ecology, and so on) generally affirm collective values 
and action, the therapeutic shift tends to focus on the self in a way that detaches 
individuals from their social context” and thus leaves them powerless.39  In such a 
position, all the individual citizen can do is alter his or her perspective, and address 
                                                
38 Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton, Habits of 
the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), 127. 
39 Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power ad the Decline of the Public Sphere (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 2000), 178. 
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collective problems with psychology instead of politics.  Indeed, the Peak Shrink 
informed her readers that it is “not your job to fight [the “Panglossian disorder”].  You 
cannot… Maybe this year, maybe next, you may be thought of as the sane one after 
all.”40 
The personalist individualism that is characteristic of the libertarian shift in the 
United States was evident in my surveys.  American peakists displayed a consistently 
more individualistic outlook than adherents from other countries.  When asked about 
political or other affiliations, respondents often described themselves as individuals in 
flux, moving between different religious, political, local, or virtual communities, while 
never being fully committed to any of them.  Unlike participants in other “movements,” 
peakists seemed to view themselves as merely a collection of like-minded individuals. 
Even so, the political skepticism of peakists, which is of a piece with skepticism 
among most Americans, is uncommon.  Although one of the typical characteristics of 
Americans on the left is faith in the ability of the federal government to solve social 
problems, peakists betrayed the anti-statist foundation of contemporary American politics 
in their distrust of the government.  In April 2010, 21% of Americans said that most 
members of Congress deserved re-election; responding less than a year later to the same 
question, the number for peakists was 3%.41  This degree of skepticism of the ability of 
the federal government to manage major societal issues—whether ecological crises, 
healthcare, or desegregation—is considered one of the characteristics of conservatives, 
not what one expects from a group composed of self-identified “progressives” and 
                                                
40 “Do You Have a Panglossian Disorder? or Economic and Planetary Collapse: Is it a Therapeutic Issue?” 
Peak Oil Blues, http://www.peakoilblues.org/blog/?p=132.  Accessed May 19, 2013. 
41 Gallup, “Voters Issue Strong Rebuke of Incumbents in Congress,” April 7, 2010. 
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“socialists.”  It is indicative of a tectonic realignment in American political culture that 
transcends party politics. 
 
Liberal Survivalism 
The individualism of peak oil believers combined two beliefs that have 
infrequently intersected in recent American history: survivalism and liberalism.  Since the 
1980s, the term “survivalist” has generally referred to groups of conservative, 
“marginalized, poorly-educated, lower-class white males” that had retreated from the 
public sphere, such as militias, the Aryan Nation and the Posse Comitatus.42  Although 
the peakist demographic was quite different, the two assemblages have their similarities.  
Many of the claims that sociologist Richard J. Mitchell made about survivalists in the 
1990s would hold true for peakists in the 2000s.  Survivalism, he wrote, “finds its niche 
in dramatic doubt, in a rhetoric of radical skepticism toward the prospects of 
contemporary institutional orders.”  Believers create “discourses of pending need, 
speculative circumstances of crisis and concern wherein major social institutions face 
imminent serious erosion or total dissolution and in which survivalists themselves play 
central roles in reprioritized revisioning, recovery, and renewal.”43  Recognizing these 
similarities, 38% of peakists agreed with the statement, “most responses to peak oil are a 
form of survivalism,” but took went to great lengths to differentiate themselves from “the 
                                                
42 Carl Boggs, “Warrior Nightmares: American Reactionary Populism at the Millennium,” Socialist 
Register 36 (2000), 247. 
43 Richard J. Mitchell, Jr., Dancing at Armageddon: Survivalism and Chaos in Modern Times (Chicago: 
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guns-and-ammo survivalists that you usually think of.”44  In my surveys, there was some 
truth to the claim that survivalism was practiced more by those on the right—while most 
American peakists practiced some level of survival preparation, self-identified 
conservatives were more likely to have stockpiled food and other supplies than liberals.45 
The closest corollary to the peakist combination of liberalism and survivalism in 
recent American history is the “back-to-the-land” movement.  Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, almost one million urban Americans relocated to rural homesteads to practice self-
sufficiency.46  Like peakists, most were white liberals who adopted a voluntary simplicity 
as a result of their radical beliefs.  Back-to-the-landers even had similar motivations to 
twenty-first century peakists, with many citing environmental issues and overpopulation 
as a major factor in their decision to relocate; in one survey, 38% claimed that one of the 
reasons they had moved was that they “feared an economic collapse.”47  However, back-
to-the-landers were not motivated by a vision of secular apocalypse, and unlike most 
“survivalists” and peakists they were not “prepping” to survive an imminent crisis.  As 
Jeffrey Jacob noted, “the back-to-the-land movement was, in its own quiet way, a broad-
based protest against what the spirit of the sixties saw as the irrational materialism of 
urban life.”48  They also tended to view their actions in a political light, even if they were 
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only setting an example for others and not actively engaging in political action 
themselves.   
The peak oil movement, like the back-to-the-land movement, is a reflection of its 
historical moment.  The back-to-the-land movement demonstrated the breadth of 
environmental politics that grew throughout the 1970s.  Not only were Americans 
engaged en masse in activist groups such as Greenpeace, but, in keeping with the maxim 
that “the personal is political,” they transformed their personal lives to express their 
political and environmental beliefs.  Similarly, the advent of liberal survivalism in the 
2000s required two ingredients: perceived apocalyptic threats, such as resource depletion 
and climate change; and an individualism characteristic of conservative survivalists to 
become widespread enough for those on the left to turn to solitary survivalism.  This 
individualism was partially diffused, oddly enough, through the primary social 
technology of our age: the Internet. 
 
Networked Individualism 
 If one factor in the individualism of the peak oil phenomenon was the broad-
based libertarian shift, the second, interrelated factor is just as far-reaching: the effect of 
Internet technology on participants in what was primarily a virtual movement.  To 
explore the influence of the Internet on the peak oil movement, I take a brief detour 
through the libertarian origins of the Internet before discussing the “network effect,” the 
influence of Internet technology on its users. 
The history of the Internet plainly reveals its connection to libertarian ideals.  The 
interconnected network of global computers that became known as the Internet was 
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developed in the 1960s and 1970s by U.S. army engineers as an open, minimalist, 
neutral, and decentralized system.  This was partially because it was designed to survive a 
possible nuclear strike by the Soviet Union that might destroy major military bases, but 
this original architecture also picked up the traces of the libertarian leanings of many 
early computer programmers.  These architects and early users “envisioned cyberspace as 
a new, libertarian post-national social order,” and they created a network that would 
enable local control over the medium, instead of a centrally-organized, government-run 
network.49  This openness allowed each user to alter the network itself, which was a 
revolutionary idea at that time.  In this way, as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu put it, one 
can find “strains of American libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism” in “the universal 
language of the Internet.”50  As one influential early designer put it, “We reject: kings, 
presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code.”51  Although 
much of this architecture has changed, the techno-libertarian influence of these 
programmers still inheres in the Internet that peakists used in 2000s. 
 A second convergence between computer technologies and emerging libertarian 
ideals occurred in the 1980s, the “information revolution” of personal computers and 
other communication technologies enjoyed a synergistic relationship with the libertarian 
rhetoric of President Reagan and other movement conservatives.  As historian Philip 
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Jenkins noted, “the flourishing technology industries—especially computing—looked 
like wonderful commercials for decentralization and deregulation, entrepreneurship and 
risk taking, heroic private enterprise and free trade.”52  Economic libertarians could point 
to companies such as Apple and Microsoft as evidence that their policies were spurring 
innovation and economic growth.  The influence of libertarian-tinged computer culture 
was widespread—for example, only in the context of what observers began to call 
“cyber-libertarianism” could computer hackers be seen not as high-tech criminals but 
heroic individuals standing up to an overbearing state.53  Although “not everyone who 
bought a computer came to believe in the free market,” of course, the libertarian 
mythology of the personal computer could serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy of the 
“network effect.”  As Thomas Streeter observed, 
The experience of reading about, buying, and using microcomputers created a kind 
of congruence between an everyday life experience and the neoclassical economic 
vision—the vision of a world of isolated individuals operating apart, without 
dependence on others, individuals in a condition of self-mastery, rationally 
calculating prices and technology.54 
In the 1980s, this romantic vision of the liberatory potential of personal computing was 
articulated to the ascendant philosophy of libertarian individualism. 
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 By the time the Internet as we know it fully emerged in the late 1990s, it had also 
been burnished in the fire of ascendant neoliberalism.  In the ‘90s, the Internet faced 
competition from an alternative, proprietary mode of connection that is now often 
forgotten.  Companies such as America On Line, Prodigy, and Compuserve provided 
access to the World Wide Web but did not interconnect, and a user on one service could 
not contact someone on another.  They offered a very different experience: in contrast to 
the open content of the Internet, each decided what they would filter or what sort of chat 
rooms they would allow.  Users had only partial anonymity, and much less control over 
each network.  The proprietary model was eventually overwhelmed by the Internet, a 
civil libertarian’s dream with almost no filters for content or values.  Thus, the libertarian 
direction of the online experience, which now seems completely “natural” and removed 
from politics, reflected the neoliberal zeitgeist of the 1990s.  The Clinton administration 
ensured that the Internet would remain mostly unregulated by deregulating 
telecommunications services and information technology products.  For example, in 1997 
the United States signed three major agreements with the World Trade Organization that 
limited regulation of the Internet.  On nearly all sides of the debates on the direction of 
Internet communications in the early 1990s, the rhetoric of free markets held sway.  For 
politicians, the exciting new technology “was all about unleashing entrepreneurs” and 
“promoting innovation.”55  In 1997, when the Clinton administration released its 
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Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, it recommended that that “the Internet 
should develop as a market driven arena” instead of “a regulated industry.”56   
The tech industry, with its continuing libertarian streak, recognized that Internet 
policies of openness, decentralization, and individualism could be slotted into neoliberal 
policies.  Its primary mouthpiece, Wired, the major computer culture magazine of the 
1990s, promoted an ideology that Paulina Borsook has described as “technolibertarian,” 
even featuring Newt Gingrich on its cover.57  Software mogul Bill Gates, in his 
influential 1996 book The Road Ahead, predicted that the Internet would finally deliver 
on the promise of “friction-free capitalism,” and a 1995 essay by Christopher Anderson 
claimed that “the growth of the Net is not a fluke or a fad, but the consequence of 
unleashing the power of individual creativity.  If it were an economy, it would be the 
triumph of the free market over central planning.”58 The notable lack of debate about the 
direction of the Internet at a crucial moment in its development was rightly attributed by 
John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney to “the digital revolution exploding at 
precisely the moment that neoliberalism was in ascendance, its flowery rhetoric 
concerning ‘free markets’ most redolent.”59  
 
The Network Effect 
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 That the Internet would have an influence on its users—which would soon include 
most Americans—was assumed by techno-enthusiasts such as Gates and Anderson, as 
well as early scholars of the technology.  In the first wave of scholarship in the 1990s, a 
number of prominent authors, such as Sherry Turkle, Robert Putnam and Robert Kraut 
argued  that time spent online might isolate users from the “real world” and thereby 
weaken commitments to civic, political, and public life.  The Internet, some feared, 
would encourage social isolation and lead to the further decline of communities of 
place.60 
 The second wave, which lasted until the late 2000s, overturned this initial concern. 
Most twenty-first century media commentary and scholarship about the Internet has been 
characterized by a well-deserved fascination with Web 2.0 technologies, such as social 
media and blogs, and the changes to work, politics, and social life they have effected.  In 
a 2009 meta-analysis of cross-disciplinary answers to the question of the network effect 
on political and civic engagement, Shelley Boulianne found that 33 of the 38 studies 
examined reported “positive” effects of the Internet on its users.61  Although the Internet 
was commonly blamed for a decline in attention span and provoked an intermittent moral 
panic around sexual predation and cyber-bullying, the media has, for the most part, 
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“herald[ed] a new golden age of access and participation” via each new network 
development,” such as high-speed Internet, WiFi, Facebook, Twitter and smartphones.62  
At the same time, scholars in sociology and related disciplines pushed back at 
attempts to measure the network effect at all by emphasizing the role of “social shaping” 
in the study of technology.63  Social shaping theory claims that technologies do not in 
themselves have any effects on their users; instead, scholars should investigate the way 
that technologies are shaped by gender, race, class, culture, and other factors.  Although 
social shaping was an important and generative concept when it first appeared in the mid 
1980s, by the 2000s the concept was often being used to foreclose on scholarship.64  
Some social shaping scholars caricatured their opponents as “technological determinists” 
who believed that technology was the only cause of historical change.  By the mid 2000s, 
as Robert Hassan noted, “technological determinism” was considered “something 
unmentionable, a kind of proscribed thought crime, a dark and hidden ‘undercurrent’ that 
occasionally ‘betrays’ itself in the careless writings of some social theorists.”65  
As such, scholarship was actually lagging behind common sense recognition of 
the Internet’s influence, because, as Hassan himself pointed out, “at the intuitive level at 
least, we recognize that our becoming as one with the network society is occurring 
rapidly. We are everyday being offered (and are greedily accepting) deepening 
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connections with a shrinking networked world.”66  This seemingly unquestioned 
acceptance of new technologies, which quickly become expected of every functioning 
member of society, has been labeled “technological somnambulism.”67  Paradoxically, 
then, as the Internet became deeply embedded in almost every aspect of American 
culture, it became more difficult for scholars to write about.  This is in part because many 
scholars fail to identify the Internet in its proper historical context—not as a series of 
individual new media (e.g. Facebook as a stand-alone subject) but as a system, a network 
of technologies that includes personal computing, the World Wide Web, social media and 
smartphones.68  These are important not as isolated developments but aspects of a meta-
technology that has created its own context, a system that now comprises, as sociologist 
Manuel Castells put it, “the social morphology of our societies.”69  
The answer to the question of the Internet’s political and social influence surely 
lies somewhere in between the poles of “social shaping” and “technological 
determinism,” of course.  One must acknowledge the central roles of innovators, website 
developers, forum moderators, and individual users.  But, as Evgeny Morozov has 
argued, “if technological determinism is dangerous, so is its opposite: a bland refusal to 
see that certain technologies, by their very constitution, are more likely to produce certain 
social and political outcomes than other technologies, once embedded into enabling 
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the risk of over-generalizing, have at times produced more insightful analyses of the network as a general 
phenomenon. 
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social environments.”70  Although its potential for group activity has been highly touted, 
we should recall that the Internet is a fundamentally individualistic medium.  The 
conceptual stalemate between “technological determinism” and “social shaping” can be 
fruitfully sidestepped by applying the concept of “social affordances,” which is used by 
scholars of technology to indicate the preferred or intended use of technologies, often 
reflecting the forgotten intentions of their designers.  For example, while a bench can be 
used for a variety of purposes, it has an affordance for sitting.71  The basic physical act of 
accessing the Internet is worth mentioning here: alone at her computer, “it is the 
individual, and not the household or the group, that is the primary unit of connectivity.”72  
Since personal computers and the Internet are used and accessed alone, by a solitary 
individual, they have an affordance for individualism, although they can and are used for 
a variety of purposes. 
 This affordance can be highlighted by comparing the Internet with two other 
twentieth-century technologies that have also had powerful impacts on their users, 
television and radio.  Both can and are often experienced by groups of people 
simultaneously, such as the family in its living room experiencing the same show.  In this 
way, they have a very different social affordance.  These technologies do not have the 
same potential for self-expression as the Internet, since they construct identity vertically, 
from one (the TV show’s creators) to many (the audience).  As such, they are indeed 
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“mass media capable of constructing mass audiences and mass consciousness.”73  As Ima 
Tubella has argued, the Internet is fundamentally different from these technologies, and 
instead of a mass or collective identity, it “influences the construction of individual 
identity, as individuals increasingly rely on their own resources to construct a coherent 
identity for themselves in an open process of self formation,” by choosing their 
applications, unique browsing path, and creating or altering web pages.74  
The basic fact of the Internet’s social affordance for networked individualism, 
rarely acknowledged by scholars wary of being labeled technological determinists, was 
recognized at some level by my respondents, who cited the movement’s reliance on the 
network as the most frequent explanation for its lack of collective identity.  An Alabama 
man in his forties said that the peak oil movement must move “beyond an electronic 
medium and a few meetings one every blue moon,” while an Ohio civil service employee 
claimed that that “the nature of the Internet” means that the virtual peak oil movement is 
“not ‘real.’”  Another respondent, in his early 30s, simply noted that “community means 
something different on the Internet,” while an educator in his 50s specified that the 
reason peakists have not formed a community is because they are “conditioned by the 
greater culture to behave as autonomous individuals.”75  While the Internet can be and is 
used to create and enhance communities, its very design creates a social affordance for 
personalist individualism. 
 
                                                
73 Darin Barney, The Network Society (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 172. 
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Peak Oil Online 
 As documented in the last chapter, the Internet enabled the very existence of peak 
oil as a mass phenomenon, but it also shaped the ways that believers conceived of and 
acted on their newfound ideology.  While the Internet has been praised for its ability to 
create new communities and enable political action, the example of the peak oil 
movement shows that in some cases this new medium serves to nudge its users in an 
individualistic direction, reflecting the libertarian origins and design of the technology 
itself.  On the Internet, we are not humans or citizens but “users,” increasing the tendency 
to imagine society as made up of abstract individuals pursuing their rational interests in a 
marketplace.  Participants in the peakist virtual community formed strong but often short-
lived ties to each other, and the paucity of face-to-face meetings had a powerful effect on 
this group’s struggle to form a sense of collective identity. 
For the most part, the peak oil movement functioned as a virtual community, 
which can be defined as a group of “people with shared interests or goals for whom 
electronic communication is a primary form of interaction.”76  While some peakists 
congregated at conferences and lectures, most communicated primarily, if not solely, 
through the Internet.  Online, they created the rich virtual subculture described in chapter 
1, with websites, blogs, Podcasts, YouTube channels, graphic novels, video games, 
musicals, and online forums dedicated to resource depletion, climate change and collapse.  
Although some of these artifacts were intended to evangelize the peak oil theory to the 
uninitiated, they had the most influence on hard-core believers.  As Kris Can said of her 
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video blog, which included entries like “Postcard from the Future” and “Inserting Peak 
Oil into the Conversation,” “lots of people e-mail me about my show and discuss the 
different topics that I bring up.  I originally thought, wow, what am I doing, I’m just 
preaching to the choir.  And then someone said, the choir needs community too, and I 
thought, yes, absolutely.”77 
Most scholars have looked at virtual communities that are formed and maintained 
on a single website, in part because this is simply easier to do, but we have seen that the 
peakist community is spread over a network of locations.78  70% of American peakists 
regularly visited at least three peak oil websites, and 29% regularly checked at least five.  
Some of these have been mentioned earlier in this dissertation, but there were dozens of 
others that respondents brought to my attention, such as “The Oil Age,” Michael 
Ruppert’s “Collapse Network,” “The Archdruid Report” (“Druid perspectives on nature, 
culture, and the future of industrial society”), “Peak Oil Crisis,” “Decline of the Empire,” 
“The Post-Carbon Institute” (“Leading the transition to a resilient world”), “Malthusia,” 
“Silent Country,” “Peak Moment Television” (“Locally reliant living for challenging 
times”), “Early Warning: Risks to Global Civilization,” and “Climate Progress.”79 
To explore the kinds of discussion and community that these sites provide, we can 
look at “Peak Oil News & Message Boards” (www.peakoil.com).  In its first eight years 
                                                
77 Interview with Kris Can.  Denver, CO, November 12, 2009. 
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online (2004-2011), Peak Oil News’ 30,000 members made over 950,000 posts on 26,000 
different topics.  Over 2,000 members contributed at least twenty posts to the site.  
Peakists tended to see the primary goal of their participation as information-gathering, 
and the busiest forums reflected their interest in facts and figures: “Economics and 
Finance” had over 2,700 subtopics and 100,000 posts, with “Energy Technology,” 
“Environment” and “Planning For the Future” close behind.  Common subjects in these 
respective fora were the impact of resource depletion on the global economy, 
technological developments in renewable energy efficiency, climate change, and practical 
steps to prepare for the coming collapse.  Scattered throughout the site are frequent 
threads on the health and tenor of Peak Oil News itself, reflecting a general interest in the 
state of the virtual commons. 
The popularity of the “Open Topic Discussion,” with over 9,000 subtopics and 
270,000 total posts, shows that adherents were not solely interested in gathering 
information, but sought guidance from and provided advice to strangers with whom they 
shared a deep connection.  Friendships were formed—one out of three adherents who 
regularly checked at least three peakist websites reported having gained friends as a result 
of their activities online. The popularity of the  “Medical Issues Forum,” which also dealt 
with psychological issues, reflects the affective investment of many believers in the 
virtual community.  The most popular thread here, with over 45,000 comments, was “My 
Doom-O-Meter is jittering towards max,” in which posters discussed the common 
experience of depression and even suicidal ideation that, they said, they were often afraid 
to confess to their friends and family.  (Because of the emotional impact of peakism, this 
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subject is so common that site administrators created a separate thread, “Don’t Do It,” 
reminding members to “Refrain from endorsing suicide.  Its explicitly against the [Code 
of Conduct].”80)  55% of survey respondents reported that one of the benefits of visiting 
peak oil websites was the emotional “comfort of knowing that other people have the same 
thoughts.”  This fellowship was evident throughout the online forums, although it was 
typically expressed indirectly, in gallows humor.  In the “Doom-O-Meter” thread, for 
example, one commenter responded to a particularly apocalyptic series of comments by 
writing, “I know I can always count on you all to cheer me up,” and then added, “hoping 
I’ve got 2-3 years… Stay calm & collected.  Navigate.  Trust in your preparations.  Have 
faith.  If you don’t despair, you’ll make it.”  The original poster, “Heineken,” wrote back, 
“just terrific comments from a terrific bunch of people I sure as hell wish were my 
neighbors.”81 
Unfortunately for “Heineken,” who had recently moved to rural Virginia, they 
were not his neighbors.  Unlike traditional communities of place, such as neighborhood 
organizations or sites of worship, peakists who connected online were usually 
geographically distant from one another.  Many were thus unable to meet other believers 
and create the collective or communitarian response to the perceived challenges of peak 
oil that they desired.  A survey respondent in his late forties in Arizona wrote, with some 
despair, that he lived in a “flyover town” in “the middle of nowhere,” while a “liberal” 
septuagenarian complained that since “too few people are aware of peak oil” in his small 
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town, so that “the only place we meet is on the net,” and many others lamented that there 
were no local groups in their area.82  Although scholars continue to debate the emotional, 
psychological, and political importance of communities formed over the Internet, the 
difficulty of transitioning to “real world” meetings that result in stronger, longer-lasting 
ties is widely agreed upon.83  In this literature, the strength or weakness of a connection 
(tie) is defined as a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confiding) and reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”84  While 
the peak oil online community provided ties that were quite strong, they were generally 
fleeting, and rarely transitioned into real-world friendships.   
Although most of my respondents participated in online forums, not one reported 
having met their interlocutors in person.  This is primarily because of two central features 
of virtual communities: voluntary participation and anonymity.  Friendships or 
connections developed online are dependent on each participant voluntary returning to 
the same forum and publicly participating.  Anonymity, which provides a sense of 
security and freedom of debate, also makes it difficult for members to continue their 
connections offline unless they have specifically indicated such a desire and shared 
contact information, which appeared to be rare.  For example, in 2008 one heavy 
commenter, “PenultimateManStanding,” created a thread called “I’d Like to Meet All of 
You,” in which he expressed his desire to do just that.  After a series of responses 
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expressed some fear that forum participants would be different in ‘real life’ from their 
online personas, he responded in exasperation, “Well, if nobody takes this seriously, 
that's understandable. But I'm not kidding, I'd buy a ticket to meet many of you.”85  Such 
a meeting does not seem to have occurred, and “PenultimateManStanding” soon stopped 
posting entirely.  Like many others, this virtual community provided conditional ties of 
short durations.86  Daniel T. Rodgers described the libertarian vision of society that 
emerged in the 1980s as “more voluntaristic, fractured, easier to exit, and more guarded 
from others,” but it is only in virtual communities that this vision came to its full 
fruition.87    
 Although a number of scholars have argued that virtual communities can revive or 
even replace communities of place, they often analyze virtual communities that are 
actually grounded in existing, real-world connections and/or geographical proximity, 
such as Facebook.88  Peakists themselves, when asked to define the peak oil phenomenon, 
had no trouble distinguishing it from traditional communities of place.  Only twelve 
percent of respondents considered “community” an appropriate term for the movement, 
while fifty percent thought of peak oil as an “information hub,” and twenty percent 
considered it to be merely “a group of unrelated individuals following their own goals.”  
Only nine percent considered the peak oil phenomenon a “movement” at all, reflecting a 
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traditional conception of the term, based on examples such as the civil rights movement. 
Some reasoned that peak oil lacked “leaders,” although there were in fact a number of 
well-known, influential writers and speakers, such as Kunstler, Colin Campbell, Matthew 
Simmons and Richard Heinberg.  Others pointed to the lack of a political lobby that often 
defines a “movement.” One commenter on Peak Oil News, responding to a 2011 thread 
titled “What happened to the Peak Oil Movement,” asked rhetorically, “How can Peak 
Oil be a movement without marches & protests?”89 
 This is a generative question, although perhaps not in the way that its author 
intended.  More vital to a social movement than hierarchies, formal structure or political 
lobby is the collective identity and sense of empowerment that often results from large 
group meetings, whether they are simple gatherings or political events.   Scholars of 
social movements and crowd psychology alike have found that social movements often 
begin when people physically meet and see themselves as a collective, with shared 
interests and the potential to effect change.  For example, one protester contacted by Jon 
Drury reflected on the experience of empowerment at an anti-war protest in 2001: “I 
think because of the amount of people there that certainly had a psychological effect and 
you think yeah, you know, this is going somewhere this is this is moving and this is going 
to build up momentum and get larger and larger, and because of that this is going to turn 
into something really positive.”  Another protester, at an environmental action in the 
1990s, reflected on his experience in a similar way: “It was empowering in the sense that 
after that I had a lot of energy and, you know, the feeling after that ‘Wow, you know, we 
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can do anything.”90 Historians of social movements have noted, time and time again, that 
collective actions—whether they are meetings, protests, or even riots—can have powerful 
effects on participants’ sense of collective identity, empowerment, and political outlook. 
 
Individualism Online 
However, this process is rarely achieved on even the busiest Internet forums.  
Although scholars of social movements recognize the importance of collective, physical 
meetings, those who study online communities have failed to appreciate the significance 
of their absence on Internet groups and virtual communities.  Various aspects of the 
online experience have been compared to a crowd (e.g. “crowdsourcing” and 
“crowdfunding”), but the experience of surfing the Internet and participating in a physical 
crowd have very different psychological and emotional effects on their participants.  
Indeed, as social psychologist Tom Postmes put it, “on a continuum of social contexts 
ranging from individualistic to collectivistic, the Internet and the crowd are somewhere at 
the extremes.”91 
Even when websites such as Peak Oil News publicize their membership statistics, 
they usually list this information in small type, hidden at the bottom of the page.  If 
collective events such as protests provide a heightened sense of collective identification, 
Internet forums can have the opposite effect, partially because the only people whose 
presence is noted are those that actively post—so-called “lurkers,” who visit membership 
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sites but do not post and are thus not visible, make up as much as 90% of traffic on some 
membership websites.92  This dwarfing effect was reflected in the number of survey 
respondents who seemed to believe that only a handful of people were interested in the 
issue of oil depletion.  For example, a man from Iowa said there was “only a small group 
of believers,” while a Minnesota woman in her late fifties said that “Peak Oilers are too 
scattered to be a real community and too few to be a movement.”93  Others suggested that 
there were only a few hundred people interested in the subject.  The sense of collective 
identity that can be advanced by physical, face-to-face meetings is thus never achieved 
for participants of this virtual community.  Indeed, the potential impact of such meetings 
was the subject of a number of comments by first-time attendees to the 2008 ASPO-USA 
conference I attended in Denver. 
 The lack of “real world” meetings thus led to a misperception of the number of 
participants, which is directly tied to the sense of political fatalism described in the 
Introduction and explored in greater detail in the next chapter.  Each individual decision 
to forego political action was based, one could argue, on a rational calculation of the 
unpopularity of the concept of peak oil, the obstinacy of a culture of optimism and the 
failure of recent environmental initiatives in the United States, but many social 
movements begin by introducing ideas that are unknown or unpopular. As Steve Reicher 
and John Drury have argued, political “action depends upon a calculation that one is able 
to overcome the forces that protect the status quo,” and one of “the factors going into 
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such a calculation include the size” of the group itself.94  If one has the sense that the 
group is composed of a few hundred people, instead of a few hundred thousand, one will 
severely underestimate the group's potential “collective self-efficacy.”95  As a result of 
their participation in Internet forums, instead of more traditional group events, such as 
mass meetings, rallies, or marches, peakists underestimated the size of their constituency, 
which added to their sense of political inefficacy and fatalism. 
 
Collective Challenges, Individual Solutions 
On this subject, scholars of Internet psychology and recent American politics are 
having similar conversations, but few have connected the Internet’s potential to be 
“individuating and atomizing” to the depoliticizing tendency of increasing individualism, 
which has been the subject of a great deal of work by scholars of neoliberalism.96  By 
ascribing to the individual “relations of obligation, solidarity and concern that were once 
considered part of the common good,” libertarian philosophy and policies, whether 
packaged as neoliberalism or Tea Party Republicanism, view the collective as merely a 
collection of individuals.  The purest distillation of this view was Robert Nozick’s claim 
that “there are only individual people, different individual people, with their own 
individual lives… Nothing more,” which Margaret Thatcher famously articulated as, 
“There is no society, there are individual men and women.”97  According to libertarian 
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and neoliberal theories, societal problems are best solved by individual action in the 
private sphere, not governmental initiatives.  In the United States, this perspective found 
a historical foothold in the tradition and mythology of rugged individualism and self-
sufficiency. 
However, the trend tend towards smaller government and privatization tends to 
de-politicize important social, political and environmental issues, which in the 
contemporary globalized, interdependent world are often too large in scope to actually be 
dealt with by individuals.  As Henry A. Giroux has argued, “as the social became 
individualized” in the 1980s and 1990s, “uncertainty and fear worked to depoliticize a 
population that is educated to believe that social problems can only be addressed through 
private solutions. Within such a climate, shared responsibilities gave way to shared 
trepidation.”98  The only way that global problems such as resource depletion and climate 
change can conceivably be addressed is through national or international bodies, not by 
isolated individuals.  By moving the locus of responsibility from government to the 
individual, the shift toward libertarian ideals effectively de-politicizes major social 
problems, and potentially cripples our ability to address them successfully.   
Tracing the parallel and interrelated histories of libertarian thought and Internet 
effects helps us understand how the Internet has helped create the society that libertarian 
theorists had previously only imagined.  While one might analyze the personalist 
individualism of the peak oil phenomenon in the context of either the libertarian shift or 
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the influence of Internet technology, these two developments are best understood as 
having a synergistic relationship.  Although the Internet has a social affordance for 
individualism, the cyber-libertarian conception of Internet crowds as merely a collection 
of rational, isolated individuals is particularly powerful when political theorists and 
politicians are describing society in this same vein, in the “enabling discourse” of 
libertarian ideals.  
 Without the Internet, the peak oil phenomenon would not have occurred.  The 
possibility of impending resource depletion would probably have remained where it was 
in the 1990s, when only a few geologists and environmentalists were concerned about 
these questions.  But without the Internet, concerns about oil depletion might have taken a 
very different form, by sparking a social movement demanding that the United States 
transition away from reliance on nonrenewable energy sources, for example, instead of 
the mostly individualistic responses that we saw in chapter 1.  This is a counterfactual 
speculation, but one worth considering.  As a result of the libertarian shift in American 
political culture and the atomizing impact of the Internet, peakists primarily responded to 
the threat of environmental crisis as isolated individuals, even as they acknowledged that 
a collective response to these environmental issues was needed.  Even if we do not 
happen to agree with fears of imminent energy depletion, these interrelated trends have 
consequences beyond the peak oil movements, as I explore in the conclusion.  First, in 
the next chapter, I further examine the political inaction of peakists by investigating the 
relationship between apocalyptic popular culture and political fatalism. 
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Chapter 4: Apocalyptic Popular Culture and Political Quiescence 
  
Some say it's all going to be The Road. Or Mad Max. Or World Made by 
Hand (white female, editor of a Transition Voice magazine, Virginia, 41-
45) 
  
Just because [peakists] have been influenced by fictional portrayals doesn't 
mean those scenarios are unlikely (white female, “prepper,” California, 
51-55) 
 
I think our American way of life is coming to an end (white male, 
Virginia, 51-55)1 
 
 This chapter situates the peak oil phenomenon in the context of the American 
apocalyptic and explores the relationship between environmental political engagement 
and narratives of regeneration through crisis in fiction and the political imaginary.  As 
described in chapter 2, the coalescence of the peak oil movement in the mid-2000s was a 
mass response to American foreign policy (namely the occupation of Iraq), the rise of oil 
and gas prices and the growing awareness of anthropogenic climate change, among other 
factors, but it also fit into the long history of apocalyptic ideation in American history.  
Millennial ideologies and groups are remarkably popular in the United States, and 
apocalypticism has also been a major theme in popular culture.  I document the growth of 
one form of apocalyptic popular culture, eco-apocalyptic disaster movies in the 1990s 
and 2000s, and describe their influence on peak oil believers by analyzing popular peak 
oil novels. 
  My survey respondents attested to the influence of apocalyptic popular culture on 
their conception of the future, and their prophecies bear a great deal of similarities to 
                                                
1 Respondents 9592381, 9577250 and 9569301. 
   175 
Hollywood films such as The Postman (1997) and The Day After Tomorrow (2004).2  
However, disaster films and peak oil fiction serve fundamentally different purposes for 
their viewers and readers.  While blockbuster films offer spectacular scenes of 
destruction, they demonstrate a symbolic national unification through the transcendence 
of persistent divisions of race, gender, class, religion and politics.  At a historical moment 
when radical change through social movements or electoral politics seems unlikely to 
many Americans, the apocalyptic imagination of national regeneration through crisis 
provides a means of imagining a significantly different world.  This is not necessarily a 
utopian future, but one in which Americans are shown to hold true to the ideals of their 
mythology: hard-working, egalitarian, communitarian, and inclusive.  However, in peak 
oil fiction, such as James Howard Kunstler’s widely-read novel World Made By Hand 
(2008), this national mythology is challenged and rejected.  Peakists see oil depletion as a 
historical event that may finally bring about a revolutionary transformation and put an 
end to American imperialism and even capitalism.  This change will be achieved not by a 
social movement, but by the petroleum-powered ‘American way of life’ tripping over its 
ecological limits.  Motivated by anti-capitalist politics, the peakist vision of the future 
depicts an apocalyptic reckoning with revolutionary consequences, but, paradoxically, 
contributes to the political quiescence described in the last chapter.   
 
The Apocalypse in American History 
 The apocalypse, which folklorist Daniel Wojcik defines as “the catastrophic 
destruction of the world or current society, whether attributed to supernatural forces, 
                                                
2 The Postman, Kevin Costner, 1997; They Day After Tomorrow, Roland Emmerich, 2004. 
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natural forces, or human actions,” has been an important theme throughout American 
history.3  While peakism may seem like an unusual belief-system to some readers, the 
peak oil movement does not seem quite as “fringe” when situated in the context of 
American apocalypticism.  In 1999, for example, 36 percent of Americans admitted to 
planning to “stockpile food and water” in preparation for the fallout of the “Y2K” 
computer bug, while a 2006 poll found that a quarter of Americans believed that Jesus 
Christ would return to the Earth the following year.4  Connecting contemporary events to 
millennial prophecies is also not uncommon—in 2002, for example, one in four 
Americans claimed that the Bible had predicted the September 11th attacks.5  While a 
fascination with the end times may be universal, my surveys of peakists confirmed the 
particular prominence of apocalyptic belief and action in the United States.  Among 
socio-economically similar respondents from the United States and comparably 
industrialized nations (Canada and Western Europe), American peakists were much more 
likely to have stockpiled food and other supplies.6  
Indeed, apocalypticism has a long historical tradition in the United States.  Early 
European explorers and the Puritans often cast the United States as a “new Eden” 
burdened with millennial expectations, and the Shakers, Millerites, Mormons, Jehovah’s 
                                                
3 Daniel Wojcik, The End of the World As We Know It: Faith, Fatalism and Apocalypse in America (New 
York: NYU Press, 1999), 12. 
4 “Public Sees a Future Full of Promise and Peril,” 2010.  Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 
June 22, 2010, http://www.people-press.org/2010/06/22/public-sees-a-future-full-of-promise-and-peril. 
Accessed January 7, 2012.  Gallup Poll. “Y2K Millennium Bug – Wave 3,” questions qn8 and qn6BB. 
Associated Press-AOL News Poll, conducted by Ipsos, December 12-14, 2006.  
5 Nancy Gibbs, “Apocalypse now,” Time 160, no. 1: 38-46. 
6 72% of American respondents had “prepared food or other supplies for yourself and your family” as “a 
result of your knowledge of peak oil,” compared to 60% of Canadians and Western Europeans. 
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Witnesses and other groups developed millennial Christian theologies.7  While 
apocalypticism has typically been the purview of religion, belief in the end of the world 
constituted an increasingly important aspect of American secular culture during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Millennial ideas have been instrumental in American 
military conflicts (such as the Civil War), social movements (such as abolitionism, the 
temperance movement and the Ghost Dance movement) and some of the core elements of 
national mythology, including American exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny.8  During 
the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear holocaust influenced any number of political and 
social developments, including, as we saw in chapter 2, the rise of modern 
environmentalism.9   
 The apocalyptic currents in American religion became more conspicuous in the 
second half of the twentieth century, as the membership rolls of evangelical Christian 
denominations swelled.  Premillennial dispensationalism, a theology of biblical literalism 
that sees the return of Christ and the millennium as imminent events, moved from the 
fringe of American Christianity to the mainstream.10  This shift was highlighted by the 
visibility of premillennial evangelists such as Billy Graham, Jerry Falwell and Pat 
                                                
7 See, for example, Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
8 See, for example, James H. Moorhead, American Apocalypse: Yankee Protestants and the Civil War, 
1860-1869 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Merton L. Dillon, “The Failure of the American 
Abolitionists,” The Journal of Southern History 25, no. 2: 159-177; Joel W. Martin, “Before and Beyond 
the Sioux Ghost Dance: Native American Prophetic Movements and the Study of Religion,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 59, no. 4: 677- 701; Daniel Wojcik, The End of the World As We Know It: 
Faith, Fatalism, and Apocalypse in America (New York: NYU Press, 1997), chapter 2.  
9 See, for example, Adam Rome, “Give Earth a Chance”: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” 
The Journal of American History 90, no. 2: 525-554; Paul Boyer, By The Bomb’s Early Light (New York: 
Pantheon, 1985); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New 
York: Basic Books, 1990). 
10 Mark Hulsether, Religion, Culture and Politics in the Twentieth-Century United States (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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Robertson and the public religiosity of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.11  Beyond 
Christianity, apocalypticism was a core element of scores of new religious movements 
that appeared in the post-WWII period, including various New Age groups. 
The peak oil movement has been placed in this tradition by a number of 
observers, described as the “liberal Left Behind” by some and derided as a “cult” by 
others.12  As the narratives of conversion recounted in chapter 1 suggest, peak oil 
certainly bears a family resemblance to proper religions.  After becoming “peak oil 
aware,” adherents share a belief in worldly destruction and a new conception of proper or 
ethical conduct; they practice rituals of prediction, prophecy and preparation; and often 
attempt to “convert” their friends and family.  Both skeptics and believers have 
considered the peak oil ideology to be similar to a religion.  While peakism lacks a 
conception of the sacred or supernatural, it certainly has religious dimensions.13  
However we categorize peakism—as an ideology, a religion, or a form of radical 
environmentalism—it’s clear that the peak oil ideology that emerged in the mid-2000s 
drew on various strands of millennial theology.  
 
The Post-Cold War Boom in Doom 
                                                
11 Michael S. Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire (London: 
SCM Press, 2007). 
12 See, for example, Vaclav Smil, “Peak Oil: A Catastrophic Cult and Complex Realities,” World Watch 
Magazine,19, no. 1 (2006); Graham Chandler, “The Cult of Peak Oil,” Alberta Oil: The Business of 
Energy, October 1, 2007, http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2007/10/the-cult-of-peak-oil/.  Accessed 
March 15, 2012. Urstadt 2006. 
13 See, for example, the spirited debate in a thread on Peak Oil News & Message Boards called “Peak oil is 
a religion,” http://peakoil.com/forums/peak-oil-is-a-religion-t52427.html.  Accessed February 20, 2013. 
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Even beyond pulpits and pews, apocalypticism maintained a prominent presence 
in American culture throughout the twentieth century.  After the end of the Cold War and 
the threat of nuclear annihilation, the background hum of apocalypticism in American 
culture only intensified and assumed new forms in the 1990s.  Some of this was due to 
the anticipation of the year 2000 itself, which generated countless History Channel 
specials on apocalyptic themes as well as genuine concerns, such as the Y2K computer 
bug.14  In the early 2000s, President George W. Bush spoke openly about his beliefs as a 
born-again evangelical, and the September 11th attacks provoked a millennial paranoia 
throughout the country.  The British Daily Mail summed up this mood on September 12th, 
2001, when it ran the headline “APOCALYPSE!” above an image of the World Trade 
Center crumbling to the ground.  Many Americans apparently agreed—in the weeks after 
9/11, sales of Christian prophecy literature increased by 71%.15  
During this period, the evangelical Left Behind series (1995-2007) continued its 
remarkable run of popularity and was suddenly given, as Douglas Kellner noted, “a new 
cultural resonance post-9/11.”16  Long a staple of science fiction, post-apocalyptic visions 
moved into the mainstream of American popular culture in the 2000s.17  Novels such as 
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003) and S.M. Stirling’s Dies the Fire (2003) 
represented the biggest wave of end times literature since the 1960s, and the genre 
                                                
14 Michael Barkun, “Millennium Culture: The Year 2000 as a Religious Event,” in Martha F. Lee (ed.) 
Millennial Visions: Essays on Twentieth-century Millenarianism, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 41-54. 
15 Kevin Sack, “Apocalyptic Theology Revived by Attacks,” New York Times, November 23, 2001, A17. 
16 Douglas Kellner, Cinema Wars: Hollywood Film and Politics in the Bush-Cheney Era (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 123.  Of the 16 Left Behind novels, written by Tim Lahaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, seven 
have reached #1 on the New York Times, USA Today, or Publishers Weekly bestseller list, and the series has 
sold over 65 million books. 
17 Mervyn F. Bendle, “The Apocalyptic Imagination and Popular Culture,” Journal of Religion and 
Popular Culture 11 (Fall 2005): 1-42. 
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received a stamp of elite literary approval in 2007, when Cormac McCarthy was awarded 
the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction for his novel The Road.  TV shows such as Battlestar 
Galactica (2004-2009), Jericho (2006-2008) and Falling Skies (2011-2012) brought the 
end of the world to the small screen, while teenagers and young adults immersed 
themselves in post-apocalyptic landscapes in video games such as the Fallout (1997-
2010) and Half Life series (2001-2004).  Zombie and vampire narratives, which often 
threatened the complete extermination of human beings, appeared in all of these formats. 
Of all media platforms and genres, Hollywood disaster films exerted perhaps the 
strongest influence on peak oil believers and Americans in general. The disaster genre 
was remarkably popular in the 1970s, with hits such as The Poseidon Adventure (1972) 
and The Towering Inferno (1974).18  These films tended to focus on relatively small-scale 
crises, often isolated to a single ship, building, or airplane, but when the genre returned to 
prominence in 1996 with Independence Day it often conceived of disaster on a global if 
not cosmic scale.  From 1995 to 1998, there were at least three major (high-grossing) 
disaster movies per year, including Independence Day (which grossed $306 million in 
U.S. theaters in 1996), Twister ($241 million in 1996), and Deep Impact ($140 million in 
1998).19  After a brief hiatus following the September 11 attacks, the genre became even 
more popular.  From 2004 to 2009, at least one disaster movie grossed over $150 million 
                                                
18 The Towering Inferno, John Guilldermin, 1974; The Poseidon Adventure, Ronald Neame, 1972. 
19 My definition of “disaster films” follows Nick Roddick’s 1980 influential definition: they have the 
following characteristics: the disasters must be central to the film, as well as “factually possible,” “largely 
indiscriminate,” “unexpected (though not necessarily unpredictable).”  Nick Roddick, “Only the Stars 
Survive: Disaster Movies in the Seventies,” in David Bradby, Louis James, and Bernard Sharratt, eds., 
Performance and Politics in Popular Drama: Aspects of Popular Entertainment in Theatre, Film and 
Television 1800-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 246. 
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in the United States each year, and in all but one year there was a second feature that 
grossed over $80 million.20 
However, box office figures do not fully represent the broad penetration of 
disaster themes into the public’s consciousness.  The majority of these films were 
summer blockbusters with large advertising campaigns that often featured central events 
of destruction, so that even those who did not watch the films got the gist of their plots.  
Many of them, such as Independence Day and The Day After Tomorrow, became staples 
of cable television.  While industry figures are not available, the ubiquity of disaster films 
on cable TV has been anecdotally noted by a number of commenters—for example, there 
is even a Facebook page called “I Always Stop If Twister or Independence Day Is On 
TV.”21  The number of witnesses who described the attacks of September 11 as 
reminiscent of a disaster movie also attested to their lasting impression.  Film historian 
Geoff King noted that “some of those who told their stories” after the attack “likened the 
experience of trying to escape the dust and debris specifically to being inside a movie 
scenario,” and Neal Gabler’s editorial in the September 16, 2001 issue of the New York 
Times summarized the shared sense of deja vu: “The explosion and ﬁreball, the 
crumbling buildings, the dazed and panicked victims, even the grim presidential address 
                                                
20 A full list of disaster films of the 2000s includes The Core ($73 million); The Day After Tomorrow ($187 
million); I, Robot ($144 million); War of the Worlds ($234 million); World Trade Center ($163 million); 
Children of Men ($35 million); Poseidon ($60 million); I Am Legend ($256 million); Sunshine ($32 
million); Cloverfield ($80 million); The Day The Earth Stood Still, ($79 million); The Happening ($31 
million); Doomsday ($11 million); 2012 ($166 million); Knowing ($80 million); Battle: Los Angeles ($212 
million); Contagion ($135 million).  This list does not include Titanic ($600 million), which has a much 
more limited scope than other disaster films of the late 1990s and 2000s, or films like The Matrix and Fight 
Club, which carry apocalyptic themes but would not be classified as ‘disaster movies.’  The genre is even 
more popular among made-for-TV films—from 2000 to 2011, over fifty disaster movies were released on 
American television networks. 
21 “I Always Stop If Twister or Independence Day Is On TV,” http://www.facebook.com/pages/I-Always-
Stop-if-Twister-or-Independence-Day-Is-on-Tv/113417768671144.  Accessed February 28, 2012. 
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assuring action would be taken — all were familiar, as if they had been lifted from some 
Hollywood blockbuster.”22 
In the 1990s and 2000s, disaster films were increasingly related to nature and the 
environment.  Developments in CGI technology, growing evidence of anthropogenic 
climate change and the end of historical antagonisms led filmmakers to cast natural 
phenomena as their villains—as Benjamin Svetkey put it,  “we have no more Russians, 
no more Germans, no more villains.  So we turn to mother nature.”23  In films such as 
Twister (1996), Volcano (1997), The Day After Tomorrow (2004), Poseidon (2006), The 
Core (2003) and The Happening (2008), nature was portrayed as a violent, destructive 
force fundamentally opposed to humankind.  In The Day After Tomorrow, a fatal sub-
zero frost chased Sam Hall (Jake Gyllenhaal) through the halls of the New York Public 
Library, while nature struck back at polluting, climate-changing humans in The 
Happening by releasing airborne neurotoxins that induced its victims to immediately (and 
quite creatively) commit suicide.  Even when the disaster was an alien attack, many films 
still contained environmental elements.  In some, aliens were seen as a part of the natural 
world—in War of the Worlds (2005), the invaders literally emerge from the Earth, where 
they have been buried for millennia.  In others, aliens were representatives of an 
otherwise mute natural world—in the 2008 remake of The Day The Earth Stood Still, for 
example, Klaatu (Keanu Reeves) declared that “if [humans] die, the Earth survives,” and 
                                                
22 Geoff King, “‘Just Like a Movie’?  9/11 and Hollywood Spectacle,” in The Spectacle Of The Real: From 
Hollywood To ‘Reality’ TV And Beyond (Portland: Intellect Ltd, 2005), 48. The Motion Picture Association 
of America also took note of the connection between disaster films and 9/11, and began to consider 
“disaster images” as a new criterion for applying a PG-13 rating.  Neal Gabler, “This Time, The Scene Was 
Real,” New York Times, September 16, 2001, Section 4, 2. 
23 Benjamin Svetkey, Entertainment Weekly, 1997, 3. 
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nearly wiped out humanity in order to save the planet.  While many Americans remained 
dubious about anthropogenic climate change, increasingly dire scientific reports clearly 
dovetailed with the eco-apocalyptic themes of these films.24 
 
Disaster Patriotism 
Most critics are in agreement that there are broad social, political, and cultural 
currents responsible for the disaster genre’s ebb and flow over time.  As Stephen Keane 
put it, “whether set in the past or extending to the future, disaster films carry the 
ideological signs of the times in which they are made.”25  For most film historians, the 
genre’s rise to fame in the 1970s was closely connected with the widespread sense of 
national disillusionment during the Nixon-Ford era.26  Especially in its most recent 
iteration, the epic scope of disaster films make them uniquely positioned to serve as 
bellwethers of the nation, since major symbols of national pride, such as the Empire State 
Building and the White House often play a symbolically crucial role in their stories.  
Since Independence Day, the wanton destruction of national landmarks has become a 
standard feature of the genre.  “The implications,” one critic noted, “are that the 
destruction of a landmark is enough to symbolize the end of a city and extending to the 
                                                
24 Ryan Gilbey, “Climate change is inspiring the ultimate scary movies,” The Guardian: January 1, 2010, 
28. 
25 Keane, 17. 
26 See, for example, J. Hoberman, “Nashville Contra Jaws: Or The Imagination of Disaster Revisited,” in 
Alexander Horwath, Thomas Elsaesser and Noel King, eds., The Last Great American Picture Show: New 
Hollywood Cinema in the 1970s (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press): 195-222; David A. Cook, Lost 
Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Vietnam, 1970-1979 (New York: Scribner, 
1999). 
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invasion/destruction of an entire country.”27  Government officials have often served as 
central characters in these films, and in the 1990s and 2000s the President himself was 
increasingly cast in the ensemble.28  In these ways, disaster movies invite an 
interpretation of their stories as national commentaries.    
 A number of critics have pointed to schadenfreude, sadistic pleasure in scenes of 
destruction, as an explanation for the popularity of disaster narratives.  Discussing 
Volcano, David Denby observed that the audience is “put in the position of wanting to 
see the people melt (otherwise there’s no movie); we root for the disaster.”29  This is 
certainly a point of interest for some audience members, but I contend that the 
longstanding appeal of disaster movies is not to be found in the scenes of destruction 
themselves, but in their characters’ heroic responses to existential threats.  Disaster films 
remain one of the most formulaic genres, and viewers can expect a prescribed sequence 
of events in which everyday life is suddenly disrupted by an unexpected event, centered 
in the United States, that will kill thousands, millions, or billions of people. 30  Characters 
from different backgrounds will be thrown together. They will not be able to prevent the 
catastrophe, but they will overcome conflicts, survive and save others.  Villains will 
perish, and some sympathetic characters will sacrifice themselves in the name of the 
greater good.  Immature husbands will be transformed into heroes, as crisis enables the 
reestablishment of proper priorities.  In contrast to action films, which also feature 
                                                
27 Keane, 101. 
28 See, for example, Independence Day (1996), Deep Impact (1998), and The Day After Tomorrow (2004). 
29 Volcano, Mick Jackson, 1997.  David Denby, “Lava Story,” New York Magazine, May 12, 1997, 58.  
Ken Feil, Dying for a Laugh: Disaster Movies and the Camp Imagination (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2006), 134. 
30 Feil, 1. 
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expensive CGI demonstrations of violence and destruction, disaster movies typically 
depict an ensemble cast of characters pulling together to affirm the importance of the 
collective.  As Keane noted, “the innocent victims in disaster movies can only find strength in group action,” 
which affirms the necessary bonds of the nation.31 
 In post-Cold War disaster movies, the ensemble cast is expected to be 
representative of America’s diversity.  Individuals of different ethnicities, races, classes, 
professions and levels of education are forced to work together, often for the first time.  
In the face of crisis, Americans find that the better angels of their nature prevail and 
previously intransigent divisions dissolve.  Race plays an especially significant role in 
this genre.  Despite recent claims that the U.S. has entered a “post-racial” era, racial 
divisions remain the most persistent fissure in an increasingly heterogeneous population.  
Compared to more complicated intersections of categories of identity, the bridging of 
racial differences is relatively easy to show on film, through scenes of interracial 
collaboration and friendship.  In the typical disaster movie Americans prove themselves 
not only tolerant and inclusive but genuinely colorblind.  This symbolic unification is 
often not particularly subtle.  In the conclusion to 1997’s Volcano, as gray volcanic ash is 
covering the citizens of Los Angeles, a city whose racial tensions and violence been the 
subject of national spotlight during and after the Rodney King verdict only a few years 
before, a small boy delivers one of the genre’s overriding messages: “Everybody looks 
exactly the same.” 
The federal government’s failure to aid black residents of New Orleans in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina might have been expected to push directors to revise or at 
                                                
31 Keane, 63. 
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least complicate the disaster formula, but post-Katrina films such as The Happening 
(2008) and 2012 (2009) portrayed a similarly unified, idealized response to 
environmental crisis.  Imagined disasters, in this sense, serve an important national 
purpose; they provide, as Despina Kakoudaki pointed out, “a major incentive for the 
revival of humanist notions of community and patriotic identification” by creating “a 
common ground, a shared national point of view.”32  With the exception of a few notable 
films, most disaster movies end on a hopeful note of lessons learned, with an expectation 
of political, cultural, and spiritual rebirth as the credits roll.  Although lives have been 
lost and national symbols destroyed, the cataclysm typically provides collective national 
regeneration through crisis.33 
 
Reading the Disaster Movie: Peakist Narratives and Popular Culture 
 Many peakists are avid fans of apocalyptic narratives across all media types, 
including disaster films. While a majority of Americans of a certain age have probably 
watched Independence Day, it is doubtful that nearly as many non-peakists have seen less 
popular films such as The Postman (which 40% of American survey respondents have 
                                                
32 Despina Kakoudaki, “Spectacles of History: Race Relations, Melodrama, and the Science 
Fiction/Disaster Film,” Camera Obscura 17, no. 2 (2002), 113. 
33 While I have focused here on disaster narratives in film, these elements hold true for the vast majority of 
secular disaster narratives in popular culture, such as television shows, video games, and the wide range of 
films that feature epic scenes of destruction but are not categorized as “disaster movies,” per se.  Despite 
their differences, what these media have in common is a narrative that ultimately views a potentially 
apocalyptic crisis as a means of national regeneration.  Of course, this does not hold true for all recent films 
that contemplate the end of the world, or feature spectacles of destruction.  The Road, both the film and 
novel is a prominent example—although it ends on a note of relative hope, it offers a bleak, depressing, and 
unredemptive vision of the future.  However, I would argue The Road, like On the Beach (also a novel and 
film) before it, stands out there pessimistic prophecy goes so strongly against the generic grain.  Most 
religious apocalyptic narratives, especially Christian (particularly evangelical) stories such as the Left 
Behind series, hold the expectation that believers (the reader) will enjoy the millennium of Christ’s reign 
after the apocalypse. 
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watched), Waterworld (65%), and Children of Men (36%) (see figure 4.1).  Films of 
disaster and destruction became popular from 1995-2010 for some of the same reasons 
that the peak oil movement coalesced, but they also seem to have affected the way that 
peakists thought about themselves, their lives, and the future.  Their readiness to discuss 
the relationship between their beliefs and these fictional narratives presents a rare 
opportunity to investigate the impact of apocalyptic popular culture on real-world 
beliefs.34  
Figure 4.1 
Film Year Box Office Gross (U.S. 
theaters only, in millions of 
dollars)35 
Percentage of 
peakists who 
have seen the 
film 
Independence Day 1996 306.1 78.5 
Mad Max 1979 8.4 75.2 
An Inconvenient Truth 2006 24.1 69.8 
Waterworld 1995 88.2 65.2 
The Day After Tomorrow 2004 186.7 57.2 
War of the Worlds 2005 234.3 53.8 
The Postman 1997 17.6 38.6 
Children of Men 2006 35.6 36.5 
Cloverfield 2008 80.0 22.1 
 
When asked to comment on their interest in the disaster genre and its potential 
connection to their belief in an imminent real-world collapse, peakists’ responses 
reflected the wide range of ways that people understand their relationship to popular 
culture.  A few admitted that they enjoyed the genre but denied that it might have any 
                                                
34 A number of pop cultural texts that were also influential to peak oil believers, including the film Mad 
Max (1979) and apocalyptic novels like Lucifer’s Hammer (Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle, Santa 
Monica: Playboy Press, 1977), are not discussed in this chapter.  Rather than explore all the pop cultural 
(and media) influences on peak oil believers, this chapter looks at one iteration of American apocalyptic 
pop culture, but it is not intended to deny the influence of others. 
35 Data provided by Box Office Mojo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com.  Accessed January 21, 2012.  
   188 
impact on their beliefs, such as the Connecticut man who insisted that “the serious peak 
oilers are serious people, not given to fantasy (as entertaining as that might be).”36  Some 
confessed that they had actively resisted allowing pop cultural narratives to influence 
their view of the future, but had been “primed” to consider scenarios from disaster 
movies by years of exposure to these narratives.37  An Ohio woman said, “I think it's hard 
not to be influenced by gloom & doom portrayals,” and an oil company worker noted that 
“it's difficult to avoid letting fictional portrayals influence your thinking about situations 
with so many variables.”  A Washington man agreed that “it's hard not to be influenced 
by pop culture images,” but did his best “to research the topic and develop a rational view 
of what is likely to happen.”38 
However, most respondents admitted that such attempts had probably failed, 
since, as a science fiction fan put it, “[human beings] are sponges, and cannot help but be 
influenced by media to which we are exposed.”  An Arizona man commented that for 
him, literature, not film, was a “huge influence on the ‘what to do about peak oil’ issue,” 
while a scientist in his fifties said he had “read so many post-apocalyptic novels and seen 
even more movies that it would be difficult to deny that there has been an influence.”39  
Indeed, studies of media effects regularly show that exposure to popular culture 
influences viewers despite their skepticism, media literacy, or cultural sophistication. For 
example, a team of British researchers found that after watching The Day After 
                                                
36 Respondent 9589640. 
37 In the study of media effects, “priming” is a process whereby viewers of media become more likely to 
think about a certain topic in a certain way due to continued exposure.  In this context, it is the continued 
popularity (quantity) of disaster films that is most relevant. 
38 Respondents 9570329; 9592954; and 9575686. 
39 Respondents 9685851; 9686672; 9686672; and 9680234. 
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Tomorrow in 2004, audiences were 50% more concerned about climate change than 
before the film.40 
When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that “fictional portrayals of 
post-apocalyptic scenarios have influenced the vision that some peak oilers have of what 
the post-peak period will be like,” 89% of respondents agreed.  Consistent with the “third 
person effect,” the tendency to think that media influence is stronger for others than it is 
for oneself, only 36% admitted that films and literature had influenced their own vision of 
the future.  Although this data is self-reported, the “social desirability” tendency—in this 
case the desire of peakists, who pride themselves on their education and disinterested 
analysis of energy futures, to be seen as disinterested rationalists and not admit that their 
deeply-held beliefs have been influenced by films such as Waterworld (1995) and 
Armageddon (1998)—suggests that the actual figure is higher.41  While countless 
scholars have discussed to the prevalence of apocalyptic narratives in contemporary 
American culture, the relationship between popular culture and end-of-the-world beliefs 
has rarely been documented directly.  These survey responses suggest that cultural 
representations of apocalyptic themes can shape the direction of deeply held beliefs.  This 
is “the end of the world as we know it” as a feedback loop, where narratives of the 
                                                
40 Andrew Balmford, Linda Birkin, Andrea Manica, Lesley Airey, Amy Oliver and Judith Schleicher, 
“Hollywood, Climate Change, and the Public,” Science 305, no. 5691 (2004): 1713-1713. 
41 “Social desirability bias” can be defined as the tendency of survey respondents to provide answers that 
“make themselves look good for the researchers” (Sparks, 68).  Despite the anonymity of my surveys, 
participants had such a strong interest in in representing peak oil believers in a positive light that a handful 
were outraged by the implication of this question.  Representative comments included, “Please, I can tell 
the difference between real and unreal” (9589640); and “most peak oilers are smarter than the average, they 
are a well-read, thoughtful group not given to hysteria (9589722).  11-15% of American peakists have a 
doctorate or other professional degree, 25% have a Master’s, and 84-85% graduated from college.  
According to the 2009 Census, these numbers are much lower for Americans in general—3%, 8%, and 
39%. 
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apocalypse—whether in film, literature, genre fiction, comic books, or video games—
intermingle with and influence the worldviews of actual people. 
In the case of the 2009 film Collapse, this media influence came full circle.  A 
documentary about peakist Michael Ruppert, author of Crossing the Rubicon: The 
Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil (2004), Collapse gives 
Ruppert ample screen time to explain the theory of peak oil, even as it suggests that his 
emotional instability may be the cause of his obsession.42  For some viewers, the film 
introduced a new idea that proved compelling.  On the blog “Inspired Ground,” for 
example, one peakist chose Collapse as the film that had most influenced her life. 43  
Another, in a review on Amazon.com, described it as “a turning point in my life: it has 
changed me forever… If you read this Mike, I want to say: thank you for your legacy, for 
changing my life for the better and preparing our own little lifeboat for my family and 
I.”44 
A number of survey respondents explained the media influence of disaster films 
by referring to the lack of competing (non-apocalyptic) visions of environmental change, 
which assured that Hollywood films would play have some measure of influence.  A 30-
year old man from California bemoaned the lack of competing, serious, and believable 
mass-culture depictions of the future, asserting that “we need artists to describe for us a 
                                                
42 Collapse, Chris Smith, 2009.  Michael Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American 
Empire at the End of the Age of Oil (New York: New Society Publishers, 2004).  Ruppert has also 
published Confronting Collapse: The Crisis of Energy and Money in a Post Peak Oil World (Chelsea 
Green Publishing, 2009), and appeared in a number of peak oil films, such as End of Suburbia. 
43 “My Movie Influence (Collapse),” by “Nostra,” on “Inspired Ground,” http://www.inspired-
ground.com/my-movie-influence-collapse-2009/.  Accessed April 17, 2012. 
44 “The movie that changed my life,” Amazon.com review of Collapse by “SnakelaD,” 
http://www.amazon.com/Collapse-Michael-Ruppert/product-reviews/B003CJXJ8Q?pageNumber=7.  
Accessed April 17, 2012. 
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positive vision of the future.”45  By “positive vision,” he was not referring to utopian 
dreams of technological salvation, but narratives of a nation or planet dealing with urgent 
ecological problems in a serious, thoughtful, and concerted way—which, as of this 
writing, seems more utopian than most science fiction.  Similarly, a white male from 
Washington, D.C., noting the connection between fictional and political narratives, 
argued that the absence of peaceful, nonviolent visions of the future was the cause of the 
peak oil movement’s apocalypticism: 
Unfortunately, because our leaders and our society have refused to conduct 
an open, honest, thorough discussion about this issue, we are left to our 
own wild imaginations and the imaginations of Hollywood marketers to 
develop images of likely futures.46 
 
The Influence of Disaster Films on Peak Oil Believers: Nature as an Agent of Change 
 
How did disaster narratives shape beliefs about peak oil? For some respondents, 
disaster movies simply dramatized and confirmed existing suspicions—a woman in her 
sixties wrote that “disaster movies have reaffirmed my beliefs,” while a man from 
Oregon claimed that “the portrayals vindicate deep-seated beliefs.”  A Californian said 
that such films “are all related to a common idea of what [the future] would be like in our 
imaginations,” so that “art is imitating life.”  Another believer, who had attended a 
number of peak oil conferences, wrote that “these visions are persuasive in part because 
they tap into human imaginative habits that are common to many persons (that's why the 
movies get made).”  Other respondents believed that disaster narratives had opened their 
                                                
45 Respondent 9591539. 
46 Respondent 9591884. 
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minds to new possibilities, which might just turn out to be true.  A Colorado man in his 
twenties noted that while “fiction can be a cathartic way to release emotion & fear around 
outcomes,” it “can also be prophetic,” while a “prepper” from California reported that his 
familiarity with disaster films had influenced the way he conceives of the future: “I 
haven't been convinced of [sic] one in particular, but they do expand the realm of 
possibilities.”  Similarly, an Oklahoma woman in her forties said that “in some ways they 
have raised fears that might not have been there,” while a Minnesotan in her early thirties 
summed up the general influence of apocalyptic popular culture: “I think it has made me 
more of a doomer.”47  Indeed, American peakists, who had watched many more 
Hollywood disaster films, were noticeably more extreme in their predictions than 
believers in other countries.  They were much more likely to see “resource wars” and an 
apocalyptic scenario (including a global “die-off” and collapse) as probable future events 
than their Canadian or European counterparts, for example.48   
                                                
47 Respondents 9566782, 9695012, 9567344, 9584720, 9685028, 9595099, 9689841 and 9685028. 
48 In response to the question, “Given the peak oil crisis, which of the following do you see as most likely 
for the country you currently reside in?” American peakists averaged 6.4 out of 10 for the option 
“apocalyptic scenario (i.e. violence, epidemics, die-off),” while Canadians and Western Europeans 
averaged 5.6.  There are many potential explanations for this difference, of course, but the long tradition of 
American apocalypticism is certainly relevant, and was frequently cited by respondents themselves.  A 
genre as consistently popular as the disaster film succeeds because of its polyvalence.  Some viewers enjoy 
the use of CGI technology’s ability to create spectacular scenes, and others the unity, resolve, and heroism 
that most characters display in response to an imagined crisis. When scholars discuss an oppositional 
reading of popular culture, they often portray audiences engaged in ‘decoding’ in an oppositional (or 
negotiated) way that is not intended by the author, director or artist.  However, an oppositional reading can 
also represent a literal understanding of the material.  For example, while Jaws (1975) has been interpreted 
as a film about submarines, patriarchy, and the alliance between the forces of law and order and 
corporatism, for the minority of viewers suffering from selachophobia its primary lesson was about shark 
attacks.48  Similarly, while the dominant reading of disaster films may have little to do with alien attacks or 
falling meteors, for viewers who were immersed in peak oil culture or deeply concerned about 
environmental issues, the influence may have been quite literal.  While familiar categories of identity, such 
as race, class, gender, religion, and politics certainly influence audience interpretation, social or 
psychological factors—beliefs about sharks, for example, or the likelihood of an imminent ecological 
crisis—can be just as significant. 
   193 
In most disaster films, nature is portrayed as an agent of change.  A tornado, tidal 
wave, or alien attack is the prime mover of each narrative, compelling humans to unite 
across political, racial, and socio-economic boundaries.  For peakists, oil depletion, a 
natural “limit,” is the agent of change.  Although many believers see the consequences of 
peak oil as a slow, “long emergency,” some speak of the peaking of global petroleum 
production as an event with destructive capabilities, akin to a tornado or earthquake.49  
For example, one respondent wrote that “peak oil will have a permanent and measurable 
effect on my day to day living,” and another claimed that “peak oil will drag down any 
economic systems that remain dependent on fossil fuels.”50  Whereas most 
environmentalists now see resource scarcity as tightly bound to economic and social 
issues that are highly variable, peakists tend to hold fast to a simplistic version of the  
limits-to-growth environmental paradigm discussed in chapter 2, where economic and 
social issues are at the mercy of ecological limits.  The relationship between the natural 
environment and human civilizations in both disaster and peak oil narratives could be 
summarized by an old adage: “Nature bats last.” 
 
Peak Oil Fatalism 
In disaster films, nature is a primal power that threatens to destroy lives and 
nations alike.  In response, humans are forced to pull together across divisions of race, 
gender, class, religion, politics and nationality, and ultimately this unification is more 
important than the material losses.  Disaster forces survivors to recognize their true 
                                                
49 Kunstler 2005. 
50 Respondents 9568275 and 9568924. 
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priorities in life and thereby provides a means of regeneration through crisis—under 
attack from nature, old friends become lovers, workaholic fathers become dedicated 
parents, and families pull together. Even darker films, such as The Core (2003) and The 
Knowing (2009), conclude by focusing not on death and destruction, but highlighting the 
lessons learned and the strength of the survivors, as the soundtrack swells. 
Peakism revises this formula by making disaster itself, and not the human reaction 
to it, the engine of transformation.  What, then, is the peakist vision of the future?  On 
peak oil Internet forums there is a great deal of speculation, prediction, and prophecy 
about the future—the “Planning for the Future” section of one website alone contains 
nearly 3,000 separate threads, some of which have been viewed over 300,000 times.51  As 
Daniel Wojcik observed, “the privatization of apocalyptic beliefs” in recent decades 
means that “the consumers of [mass-marketed items of apocalyptic prophecy] may never 
come into direct contact with one another but instead may construct a personal vision of 
apocalypse gleaned from a diversity of sources.”52  By “privatization,” we should 
understand individualization—as is evident from speculation on peak oil websites, 
apocalyptic beliefs, especially in the Internet age, are highly personal and often 
idiosyncratic.  This variance can make it difficult to speak with any accuracy of a general 
“peak oil vision.”  However, as peakism has grown in popularity, a number of adherents 
have written speculative novels about the future, some which have proven influential 
                                                
51 As of March 3, 2012, the  “Planning for the Future Thread” of Peak Oil News contained 2,695 topics.  
The most popular, “Today I made / bought / learn… (for a post oil world),” contained 1,936 posts and had 
been viewed 305,880 times.  “Planning for the Future,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, 
http://peakoil.com/forums/planning-for-the-future-f8.html.  Accessed March 3, 2012. 
52 Wojcik, 16. 
   195 
within the subculture.  Nestled within the literary genre of science fiction, peak oil fiction 
sheds light on the peakists’ imagination and actions. 
 
Petrofiction and the Great American Oil Novel 
 Author and literary critic Amitav Ghosh noted in 1992 that despite the ubiquity 
and importance of oil in the contemporary world, petroleum was conspicuously absent in 
fiction.  In claiming that “the Oil Encounter… has produced scarcely a single work of 
note,” Ghosh was referring to the transnational exchange between Middle Eastern 
producers and Western consumers, but he pointed out that even within the West there is a 
noteworthy absence of “petrofiction,” let alone a “Great American Oil Novel.”53  Two 
decades (and over 500 billion barrels of oil consumed globally) after that proclamation, a 
genre of “petrofiction” has emerged from the American peak oil community.54   Novels 
such as After the Crash: An Essay-Novel of the Post-Hydrocarbon Age (2005) and Oil 
Dusk: A Peak Oil Story (2009), which place petroleum scarcity at the center of their 
secular apocalypse and post-peak worlds, speak directly to Ghosh’s question.  By 
demonstrating the collapse that results from the cessation of the transnational flow of oil, 
they provide an implicit critique of American petro-dependence.  As of this writing, over 
a dozen peak oil novels have been published in English.55  They were written by 
                                                
53 Amitav Ghosh, “Petrofiction: The Oil Encounter and the Novel,” The New Republic, March 2, 1992: 29-
34.  
54 Global oil consumption from 1992 to 2012 calculated using figures from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis “International Petroleum (Oil) Consumption Tables 
(Thousand Barrels per Day),” http://www.eia.gov/emeu/international/oilconsumption.html.  Accessed 
March 1, 2012. 
55 Jim Booth, Boil Over: The Day the Oil Ran Out (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2010); John M. Cape and 
Laura Buckner Oil Dusk: A Peak Oil Story (Humble, TX: Singing Bowl Pub, 2009); Kurt Cobb, Prelude 
(Pittsburgh: Public Interest Communications, 2010); Douglas Coupland, Player One: What Is To Become of 
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dedicated peakists, marketed as “peak oil novels” and recognized as such on peak oil 
forums.56 
As in disaster films, novels such as Last Light (2007), Boil Over: The Day the Oil 
Ran Out (2010), and Shut Down: A Story of Economic Collapse and Hope (2011) focus 
on an ensemble of diverse characters as they respond to the unexpected—but 
predictable!—collapse of the world around them.  In peak oil fiction, however, narrative 
takes a backseat to ideology.  The narrator intermittently breaks from the plot to educate 
the reader about the process by which energy depletion precipitated the disruption of the 
status quo, a scramble for survival, and ultimately the collapse of civilization.  Given 
their similarities, these novels are best categorized by where they locate themselves on 
this fixed timeline.  Although most are written after the crash, a few, such as Prelude 
(2010), portray the period just before the expected oil crash, and document the 
transformative process of becoming “peak oil aware.”   
Prelude was written by Kurt Cobb, a frequent contributor to websites The Oil 
Drum and Energy Bulletin and a founding member of the American chapter of the 
Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO).  Dedicated “to the peak oil community,” it 
contains a number of scenes that peakists would find familiar, such as local meetings of 
                                                                                                                                            
Us (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2010); William Flynn, Shut Down: A Story of Economic Collapse and 
Hope (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2011); Caryl Johnson, After the Crash: An Essay-Novel of the Post-
Hydrocarbon Age (Self-published, 2005); James Howard Kunstler, World Made By Hand (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008) and The Witch of Hebron (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2010); Sam 
Penny, Was A Time When (Sacramento: TwoPenny, 2012); Amy Rogers, Petroplague (New York: 
Diversion Books, 2011); Alex Scarrow, Last Light (London: Orion, 2007) and Afterlight (London: Orion, 
2010); Dave Spicer, Deadly Freedom (New York and Toronto: Cambridge House Press, 2008).  For an 
example of their marketing within the peakist community, see “First Peak Oil Novel Published in U.S.,” 
Energy Bulletin, August 15, 2005, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/7921.  Accessed March 16, 2012. 
56 See, for example, Frank Kaminski, “The post-oil novel: a celebration!” Seattle Peak Oil Awareness, May 
11, 2008, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/44031. Accessed March 1, 2012. 
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energy study groups and even a national conference (presumably ASPO).  Prelude might 
be subtitled “a peak oil education,” since the primary narrative is the conversion of its 
protagonist, Cassie, a naïve upstart at an energy consulting firm, from a “cornucopian” to 
a true believer.  As if to answer Ghosh’s challenge, peak oil novels attempt to reorient the 
reader’s understanding of the world, so that all that is solid melts into energy: 
The products in the store windows she was passing had arrived by truck, train and ship.  
The camera shop, the electronics place, the women’s clothing store, the pharmacy, 
and the video store she passed, none of them would be operating without oil.  Many 
of the products and even their packaging were made using materials based on 
petrochemicals, materials like plastic and synthetic rubber.  Even the perfume that 
was emanating from the woman walking in front of her was probably partly derived 
from oil.  And the cars and trucks and buses coursing through the street beside her all 
ran on some form of oil… Suddenly for Cassie the whole world had now become one 
big manifestation of energy, much of it in the form of oil.57 
By highlighting the hidden petroleum that lubricates and enables our modern lives, 
Prelude achieves a cosmological reorientation that places energy at the center of 
contemporary life.  Cassie notes, “this was the world that oil built,” and wonders, “how 
long will it last?”58  Her personal struggle is intended to spark and mirror a similar 
process of discovery and education in the reader.  As if in preparation, the novel 
describes the sense of conversion and emotional turmoil that we witnessed in chapter 1.  
                                                
57 Cobb, 153. 
58 Cobb, 147. 
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 Novels such as Boil Over: The Day the Oil Ran Out (2010), Deadly Freedom 
(2008) and Oil Dusk: A Peak Oil Story (2009) occur in the midst of the collapse, and, like 
disaster films, expend little effort on character development.  Last Light, published by 
British author Alex Scarrow in 2007, is the most well-known of these works.59  Scarrow’s 
Sunderland family experiences a familiar series of events: the collapse of the state, 
sudden militarization, the formation of militias, and finally an unfamiliar, isolating 
localization.  Patriarch Andy Sutherland is a savior—resourceful, clever, and strong, with 
military training as an engineer in Iraq that serves the family well.  Last Light ends on an 
uncharacteristically optimistic note: in a scene that echoes the denouement of the 2005 
remake of War of the Worlds, the Sutherland family reunites in their suburban home with 
a glimmer of hope that although “the oil age is over… things will eventually knit 
themselves back together again.”60  
Andy Sutherland is also, significantly, a peak oil prophet.  Each peakist novel 
contains at least one character that predicted (and sometimes prepared for) the coming oil 
crisis and is now in a better position to survive.  This is a key aspect of many apocalyptic 
texts that has been ignored by most scholars—the prophet serves as a model for the 
reader, who can now imagine himself as more prepared for these events. 61  In an 
Author’s Note, Scarrow makes this function explicit: 
                                                
59 I rely here on the hundreds of reviews and virtual discussions of Last Night on peak oil websites and 
blogs.  Also see Brendan Barrett, “Reality of peak oil enters our fiction,” OurWorld 2.0, January 21, 2011, 
http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/reality-of-peak-oil-enters-our-fiction.  Accessed March 15, 2012. 
60 Scarrow 2007, 398. 
61 For two of the few critics that have highlighted this aspect of apocalyptic texts, see George Slusser, 
“Pocket Apocalyse: American Survivalist Fictions from Walden to The Incredible Shrinking Man,” in 
David Seed, ed., Imagining Apocalypse: Studies in Cultural Crisis, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); 
and Claire P. Curtis, Postapocalyptic Fiction and the Social Contract (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2012), 5. 
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I’d like to think that a whiff of Last Light will remain with you once you snap the 
cover shut.  I’m hoping Andy Sutherland achieved something; that the world 
looks slightly different to you now—more fragile, more vulnerable.  After all, to 
be aware is to be better prepared.62 
The author’s direct identification with his protagonist here constructs a connection 
between prophecy and fulfillment that reflects a desire for crisis amongst many peakists.  
As participants become more identified with the peak oil theory—discussing it with 
friends, family, and co-workers, speaking with other peakists on the Internet, and 
immersing themselves in subcultural books and films—the peak oil crisis becomes a 
longed-for event.63  At least one believer noticed this tendency, writing on Peak Oil News 
that “most of the ardent followers seem to really hope it will happen, either cause they 
despise the political/economic status quo or they've put so much time and energy into the 
issue that they feel the need to be proven right.”64  If it occurs, they are prophets and 
potential saviors; if it does not, they are merely “kooks” and “crackpots” who fell for a 
“fringe internet-based theory,” as my respondents themselves put it.65   
 
After Oil, A World Made By Hand 
                                                
62 Scarrow 2007, 402.  Emphasis supplied. 
63 Psychologists and sociologists have noted that this tendency explains why many apocalypticists double 
down on their belief when predicted events do not come to pass.  See, for example, the classic study of 
failed predictions, Leon Festinger’s When Prophecy Fails (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1956). 
64 “How many people here are rooting for peak oil?” Peak Oil News, http://peakoil.com/forums/how-
many-people-here-are-rooting-for-peak-oil-t20704.html.  Accessed September 5, 2012.   
65 Respondents 9559210, 9561426, 9561825, 9563057.  On this subject, Daniel Wojcik has noted that “the 
appeal of apocalypticism may also be attributable to the fact that such beliefs enhance the self-esteem of 
believers.  Revelation of the secret order of events in the midst of seeming chaos makes devotees privy to 
arcane knowledge of the meaning of history” (143-144). 
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For the best exposition of the peakist ideology and reflection of the way that peak 
oil narratives differ from secular apocalyptic representations in popular culture, we 
should turn to the major peak oil novel, James Howard Kunstler’s World Made By Hand.  
As a result of Kunstler’s notoriety it was widely reviewed in 2008—in the New Yorker, 
the New York Times, and the digital Salon, for example—and catapulted its author to a 
new echelon of celebrity.  Kunstler was even interviewed on Comedy Central’s The 
Colbert Report, where he gamely explained to the host’s conservative alter-ego why 
“we’re not going to run Walt Disney World, Walmart, and the interstate highway system 
on any combination of solar, wind, nuclear, ethanol, biodiesel, or French fried potato 
oil.”66  Along with Kunstler’s The Long Emergency and Richard Heinberg’s The Party’s 
Over, World Made By Hand is one of the most influential peak oil work, and was read by 
78% of my respondents.  Readers found the novel to be not only “seriously addictive” but 
prophetic—many used the words “real” or “realistic” in their comments.  A peakist from 
Pennsylvania, for example, argued that “‘World Made by Hand’ gives quite a probable 
glimpse of what the post Peak Oil world could be like later this century.”67  
 World Made By Hand is set in the mid-2020s, a decade and a half after the “long 
emergency” caused by peak oil: gas shortages that led to resource wars, starvation, and 
lethal epidemics.  Its primary location is Union Grove, an Upstate New York town whose 
quaint downtown is now inhabited by a few score of aging townspeople living 
hardscrabble lives without petroleum and electricity.  Its protagonist and narrator is 
                                                
66 Paul Greenberg, “Recipes for Disaster,” New York Times, April 20, 2008, 27.  Ben McGrath, “The 
Dystopians,” New Yorker, January 26, 2009.  Rebecca Onion, “Envirogeddon! Is it time to start wishing for 
the end of the world?” Slate, April 21, 2008, http://www.unz.org/Pub/Slate-2008apr-00291.  Accessed May 
22, 2013.  The Colbert Report, Comedy Central, May 1, 2008. 
67 Respondent 9581634. 
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Robert Earle, a middle-aged, white, liberal male,  the “former CEO of a technology 
company” (and peak oil prophet) who now works as a carpenter.  Outside the town are 
three alternative living arrangements: Stephen Bullock’s farm, a plantation; Karptown, 
where a band of neo-primitive roughnecks live in shanties and trailers; and a religious 
cult, the New Faith Congregation.68  The narrative center of World is a trip that Earle and 
group of New Faithers make (by horseback and foot) to nearby Albany, which is 
controlled by a vicious strongman.  The trip brings into relief the benefits of Union 
Grove, which has not suffered from war, nuclear attacks nor political corruption.  The 
reader can be expected to use his foreknowledge to end up in Union Grove instead of 
Bullock’s Farm, Karptown or Albany. 
While the novel has a number of similarities to disaster films, its differences 
underscore the ways that the peak oil movement departs from standard American 
apocalyptic narratives.  I previously highlighted the symbolic importance of race in many 
disaster movies, and Kunstler also uses race as a symbol of the nation’s direction.  In 
World Made By Hand, a ragtag band of multicultural Americans do not come together to 
reaffirm the country’s greatness in the face of disaster.  While there no people of color in 
the novel, Earle and others repeatedly refer to race wars in other locations.  When the 
leader of the New Faith Congregation is asked why they abandoned their previous 
location, he responds that “the white against black and so forth was filling over from 
Philly, too, and we had trouble with it… things are rough from sea to shining sea. From 
Texas clear to Florida, there’s folks shooting each other and trouble between the races 
and all like that.”  Later, another New Faither says that the reason was 
                                                
68 Kunstler, 220. 
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Race trouble, to be honest… A lot of people cut loose when Washington got hit 
[by a terrorist attack], you know. They left there with nothing but the clothes on 
their backs and some firearms. You had civil disorders in Philadelphia and 
Baltimore, refugees fleeing, what you folks call pickers, bandit gangs. 
Pennsylvania became a desperate place. After a while, it was like cowboys and 
Indians.69 
In this narrative, a terrorist attack does not unite the nation, as typically occurs in disaster 
movies, but instead brings longstanding divisions to the fore.  The comparison of future 
racial violence as akin to “cowboys and Indians,” a children’s game dramatizing 
genocide, is a particularly pessimistic comment about the future of the republic. 
 This seemingly reactionary perspective on the persistence of racial constructs and 
race relations in a dystopian future should be situated within the context of the novel’s 
readership.  As Democrats, progressives and anarchists, most peakists hold views on race 
that are markedly liberal.  For example, in response to the question, “In recent years, has 
too much been made of the problems facing black people?” only ten percent of peakists 
answered “too much,” while over a third answered “too little”—in 2010 pollsters asked 
the same question of a representative sample of all Americans, and 28% answered “too 
much,” while only 16 percent answered “too little.”  While peakists’ prophecies may bear 
some similarities to racialized survivalist fantasies that are produced by conservative 
authors (such as William Luther Pierce), they should be understood differently.70  Rather 
                                                
69 Kunstler, 76; 5; 148. 
70 “Polling the Tea Party,” New York Times/CBS News poll, April 5-12 2010.  This poll was used to 
measure the “racial attitudes” of Tea Party supporters, who, while being very similar to peakists in terms of 
race, age, education, and wealth, are diametrically opposed on this and other political issues.  In this poll, 
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than a white supremacist fantasy, the post-peak world portrayed in World Made By Hand 
is a referendum on the nation’s failure to achieve its founding promise of equality, which 
Kunstler suggests by juxtaposing “trouble between the races” with “from sea to shining 
sea” in the above passage. 
 Almost all peak oil novels focus on the United States.  For decades, Americans 
have conceived of oil as a distinctively American commodity—even when located below 
other countries—because of its role in facilitating the “American way of life” from the 
post-WWII period to the present.  Geographer Matthew T. Huber has argued that “this 
entitlement is negotiated through a kind of livelihood discourse—or mobilizing a cultural 
claim to resources as crucial in sustaining a morally righteous way of life.”71 The deep 
connection between oil and American identity is reaffirmed and represented in the regular 
consumption of gasoline in stations with names such as “Liberty,” “Freedom” and 
“SuperAmerica,” often festooned with national flags, “a concrete, everyday practice 
through which Americans imagine their own national community.”72  Gas stations are 
part and parcel of the “American way of life,” which is characterized by movement, open 
roads, and the freedom of physical and social mobility.   
The sedentary post-peak world, Kunstler suggests, is not only post-American, it is 
distinctly un-American.  This is most evident in the setting of the novel, claustrophobic in 
                                                                                                                                            
for example, 52% of Tea Party supporters answered that “too much” had “been made of the problems 
facing black people.”  View data on “Racial Attitudes” at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/14/us/politics/20100414-tea-party-poll-
graphic.html?ref=politics#tab=5.  Accessed February 18, 2012.  William Luther Pierce is author of The 
Turner Diaries (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1978), an anti-Semitic post-apocalyptic novel 
that became, according to the FBI, “the Bible of the racist right,” and inspired quasi-survivalists such as 
Timothy McVeigh. 
71 Matthew T. Huber, “The Use of Gasoline: Value, Oil, and the ‘American way of life,’” Antipode 41, no. 
3 (2009), 469. 
72 Huber, 476. 
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its localism.  Disaster movies, as well as classic disaster novels such as Lucifer’s 
Hammer (1977), try to convey their national or global scope by incorporating scenes 
from as many different locations as possible, but World Made By Hand is, like its 
characters, unable to escape Upstate New York.73  Without petroleum for transportation, 
let alone electricity for the Internet, Earle and other survivors experience the paralysis of 
geographical isolation.  Information about the U.S. government—the identity of the 
President, news of the nation, and whether it even exists—is conveyed through the radio, 
which requires electricity.  This is the nation as a truly “imagined community,” and when 
Earle mentions at the end of the novel that “the electricity stayed off, without even a few 
more additional spasms,” we’re left to assume that the United States has completely 
collapsed.74 
 
Post-Apocalyptic Romanticism 
Is this a crisis, or an opportunity?  Although most reviewers described World 
Made By Hand as a dystopia, its post-peak world is actually superior to the present in 
many ways.  This is no anomaly—one out of three survey respondents admitted to feeling 
“excitement” about the post-peak world, while an independent survey of peak oil 
believers found that 37% were more “excited” than “worried” about the “post-peak 
                                                
73 As Imre Szeman put it, the filmic technique of presenting “multiple storylines which take place in 
numerous locations” is “a now common, overly literal attempt to represent the new reality of globalization” 
and the interconnectedness of different nations and regions.  Szeman, “The Cultural Politics of Oil: On 
Lessons of Darkness and Black Sea Files,” Polygraph 22, 813. 
74 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1983).  
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years,” and 50% saw peak oil as an “opportunity,” not a “problem.”75 In World Made By 
Hand, the trip to Albany brings into relief the benefits of Union Grove, which has not 
suffered from war, nuclear attacks or political corruption.  Survivors have forged a 
genuine community, founded on mutual aid.  The crash of the oil economy has finally 
caused the fall of capitalism itself, and residents tend their gardens and employ a pre-
capitalist credit economy, simple but fair. The government’s absence has forced most 
survivors to embrace a Jeffersonian self-reliance, and they have gained the dignity of 
working freely for themselves.  By necessity they have become renaissance people, 
producing not only their own food and housing but their own alcohol, drugs and 
entertainment—Earle is in Union Grove’s bluegrass band, which covers golden oldies 
such as Nirvana’s “Smells Like Teen Spirit.”  The survivors, as one character puts it, “eat 
real food instead of processed crap full of chemicals.  We’re not jacked up on coffee and 
television and sexy advertising all the time.  No more anxiety about credit card bills.”76  
To emphasize that post-apocalyptic cuisine is actually superior to our own—no fast food, 
no chemicals, no trans fats—the narrator lingers on every culinary description—one 
reviewer observed that “you can practically taste the corn bread and the fish that choke 
this world's now-unpolluted rivers and streams, another upside to that whole end-of-
civilization thing.”77 
                                                
75 James L. Howard, “Global Peak Oil Survey 2009,” 
http://www.powerswitch.org.uk/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2971&Itemid=77.  
Accessed March 15, 2012.  This was an online survey of nearly 300 peakists.  While Howard’s population 
and my survey respondents could be slightly different, the survey’s demographics (on age, gender, country 
of origin, and a number of other factors) indicate it is a nearly perfect match with my own survey 
population. 
76 Kunstler, 38. 
77 Reihan Salam, “Heralding the End Times,” New York Sun, March 5, 2008, Arts & Letters, 15. 
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Post-apocalyptic fantasies often engage in what Leo Marx called the American 
pastoral ideal, the “urge to idealize a simple, rural environment.”78  Henry Nash Smith, 
writing in 1950, noted the powerful influence that the dream of an “agrarian utopia of 
hardy and virtuous yeomen” had exerted throughout American history.79  He summarized 
the ideology inherent in agrarian utopianism in ways that are still relevant to 
contemporary post-apocalyptic fiction: “That agriculture is the only source of real wealth; 
that every man has a natural right to land; that constant contact with nature in the course 
of his labors make him virtuous and happy” and “that government should be dedicated to 
the interests of the freehold farmer.80  With World Made By Hand, James Howard 
Kunstler situates his post-American novel within an American tradition.  Robert Earle 
tells us, for example, that “the freehold farmer”—a central figure in a mythologized 
version of American history—“was the new chief executive.”81  Kunstler’s knowing nod 
to pastoral idealism is a complicated gesture, invoking American mythos while 
prophesying the decline of the nation.  If disaster movies and peak oil visions both 
provide a means of environmental and social regeneration through crisis, they part ways 
on the role of the nation.  In the former, the nation plays a central reconstructive role in 
the post-apocalyptic world; in the latter, the U.S. government disappears, but its absence 
does not seem to trouble anyone.  Borrowing a motif from disaster films, one character 
mentions that “New York City is finished,” a post-apocalyptic wasteland where “the 
                                                
78 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), 5. 
79 Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West As Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1950), 170. 
80 Smith, 126. 
81 Kunstler 2008, 32. 
   207 
immense over–burden of skyscrapers in Manhattan had… proved unusable without 
reliable electric service.”82   
Just as the pastoral ideal has served as a motivation for generations of 
environmentalists, many peakists believe that the post-peak world will be more 
environmentally balanced.  In Kunstler’s vision, post-carbon survivors are able to enjoy a 
renewed sensitivity to and connection with the natural world.  One character notes with 
pride, “we follow the natural cycles,” and Earle praises the quiet life: “I enjoyed the 
peacefulness and easy pace of the walk.  In a car, I remembered, you generally noticed 
only what was in your head or on the radio, while the landscape seemed dead.”83  
Kunstler deploys the pastoral ideal in his lyrical descriptions of natural landscapes.  
When Earle comes upon Britney, one of his lovers, gutting a fish: 
She reached in and removed its guts and flung the guts out in the current. Then 
she ran her thumb down along the spine inside of the rib cavity to get out the 
congealed blood there that can make the meat taste off if you leave it in, 
especially on a hot day. Finally, inside she slipped the fish the creel and washed 
the spine and blood off her fingers in the current. I clapped my hands in 
appreciation. Hearing that, she finally turned around. What a sight she was in a 
wet cotton drafts. I kicked off my boots and waded out in the water, scooped her 
into my arms and carried her back to the gravel bank.84 
As this cinematic passage shows, the consequences of the peak oil crisis gives Earle the 
opportunity to (quite literally) adopt a classically masculine pose.  Here and elsewhere, 
                                                
82 Ibid, 142; 58. 
83 Ibid, 5. 
84 Ibid, 309. 
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Kunstler adopts a century-old trope about a crisis of American masculinity caused by 
stultifying modernization, which I explore in the next chapter.  A return to a pioneer 
lifestlye provides a welcome change for the former CEO—and might for you too, it is 
implied, if you only read the signs and prepare for what is to come.85   
 
Post-Peak Anti-Capitalism 
 A few scholars have discussed World Made By Hand, but they have treated it 
primarily as work of fiction.86  As a novel, it is a curiosity; as a work of prophecy, which 
tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of Americans subscribed to, it takes on a greater 
significance.  In the context of real-world believers, this vision of the future is most 
revealing when we consider the primary trait that sets most peakists apart from a 
hypothetically average American: their politics.  The peak oil movement has been 
characterized by journalists as the “liberal apocalypse” for good reason: 56% of 
American peakists described themselves as “liberal” or “very liberal,” compared to only 
21% of all Americans in a national poll conducted at the same time.  Given a wider range 
of categories, approximately 7-9% would themselves “anarchist,” 10-11% “socialist,” 
20% “progressive,” 14-15% “liberal,” and only 4-6% “conservative.” 87  Beyond labels, 
their values put them far to the left of most Americans.  81% thought that gays and 
lesbians should be able to legally marry (with 11% having no opinion), for example, and 
                                                
85 The historiography on crises of masculinity in the United States is long and varied.  See, for example, 
John F. Kasson, Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of 
Modernity in America (New York: MacMillan, 2002). 
86 See Curtis 2012, chapter 1; Peter Hitchcock, “Oil in an American Imaginary,” New Formations 69, no. 1 
(2010):  81-97; Stephanie LeMenager, “The Aesthetics of Petroleum, After Oil!” American Literary 
History 24, no. 1: 59-86; Mary Manjikian, Apocalypse and Post-Politics: The Romance of the End 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012). 
87 Lydia Saad, “Conservatives Remain the Largest Ideological Group in U.S.,”  Gallup, January 12, 2012. 
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82% agreed with the statement “we don’t give everyone an equal chance in this 
country.”88   
In interviews, surveys and online forums, many peakists advance a leftist critique 
of American imperialism as well as capitalism.  They view patriotic American platitudes 
as a mix of misinformation and outright falsehoods.  Judging from representative 
comments on virtual forums, many believe that “the American Dream is just propaganda 
used to justify selfish materialism” and “the sad reality of the matter is that ‘the American 
Dream’ is dying.  Every month more American families are slipping out of the middle 
class and into poverty.”89  One peakist scoffed, in a thread on the subject of “American 
exceptionalism,” “we have been the best colonialists in the world.  We sucked the world 
dry, taking a full quarter of its resources for ourselves even though we only made up 5% 
of the population. And only a smidgen of that 5% actually got any of it.” 90  Distrust of 
the U.S. government extended to foreign policy, which most peakists considered to be 
motivated not by noble intentions but short-sighted energy imperialism. 
                                                
88 In a Washington Post-ABC poll taken two months before this survey, 53% of Americans agreed that 
same-sex marriage should be legal, with 44% against.  Sandhya Somashekhar and Peyton Craighill, “Slim 
majority back gay marriage, Post-ABC poll says,” March 18, 2011, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-03-18/politics/35207422_1_gay-marriage-pro-gay-marriage-
group-anti-gay-marriage.  Accessed June 3, 2013. The polling statement “we don’t give everyone an equal 
chance in this country” has been used by researchers to measure sensitivity to (and resentment of) minority 
groups.  In a 2010 survey, the University of Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race and 
Sexuality found that only 55% of white Americans agreed with this statement.  Christopher Parker, 
“Attitudes on limits to liberty, equality, and Pres. Obama traits by Tea Party Approval,” 
http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/Tea%20Party%20Chart%20%5Bpdf%5D-1.pdf. Accessed September 
1, 2012. 
89 “The American Dream?”  Peak Oil News, http://peakoil.com/forums/the-american-dream-t61397.html.  
Accessed May 1, 2012.  “16 Reasons to Feel Really Depressed About the Direction That the Economy Is 
Heading,” Peak Oil News, July 7, 2011, http://peakoil.com/business/16-reasons-to-feel-really-depressed-
about-the-direction-that-the-economy-is-headed/.  Accessed May 1, 2012. 
90 “Breaking: US AAA credit rating downgraded,” Peak Oil News, http://peakoil.com/forums/breaking-us-
aaa-credit-rating-downgraded-t62368-105.html.  Accessed March 15, 2012. 
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 The number of survey respondents that described the United States as an empire 
was telling.  A few representative commenters considered oil depletion to be part of “the 
impending fall of the U.S. empire,” caused by “Western Civilization's hubristic blindness 
and imperialistic self-destructive tendency,” which would lead to “the end of US 
imperialism.”91  Even more—over ten percent of respondents to one survey—cited the 
imminent peak oil collapse as the death knell of capitalism.  A New York man in his 
fifties noted that “capitalism requires constant *growth* [sic] for it to remain viable as an 
economic system, but that continuous growth may well no longer be possible due to peak 
oil,” while a peakist in her early forties observed that “capitalism as we know it has 
grown on the back of cheap energy, particularly oil.”92  As a commenter on Peak Oil 
News put it, “five dollar gasoline is great for mother earth,” not because it will stimulate 
the development of alternative energy sources, but because “it means the end of 
capitalism.”93  These predictions are represented in peak oil fiction, where most authors 
foresee local systems of mutual exchange replacing neoliberal capitalism.  As cultural 
theorist Imre Szeman asked, “Is the end of oil a disaster?  This depends, of course, on the 
perspective one has on the system in danger of collapse: capitalism.”94 
Peakists’ politics should alter our evaluation of their vision of the future.  While 
they do not present the radical racial reconstruction of an Octavia Butler or the nuanced 
gender critique of an Ursula K. LeGuin, these Americans are engaged in their own radical 
                                                
91 Respondents 9589678, 9697109, and 9589863. 
92 Respondents 9571401 and 9590289. 
93 “How reliable are U.S. Department of Energy oil production forecasts?” Peak Oil News, 
http://peakoil.com/production/how-reliable-are-u-s-department-of-energy-oil-production-forecasts.  
Accessed May 19, 2013. 
94 Imre Szeman, “System Failure: Oil, Futurity, and the Anticipation of Disaster,” South Atlantic Quarterly 
106, no. 4 (2007): 805-823. 
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cultural project of imagining a post-American, post-capitalist space.95  It would be an 
overstatement to paint all believers as conscious anti-imperialists or anti-capitalists, but 
the close connection that most draw between imperialism, capitalism, and petroleum 
shows that they view the consequences of peak oil as America’s proverbial chickens 
coming home to roost.  One article by a reformed peakist claimed, with some 
exaggeration, that “loathing for the United States is a virtual prerequisite for becoming a 
peak oil acolyte.”96  Like many others, the Virginia man who predicted that “our 
American way of life is coming to an end” seemed to view the “end of the oil age” as the 
end of the American empire and capitalism itself: a crisis, of course, but also an 
opportunity for something better.   
 
From Politics to Prophecy: Political Quiescence Among Peak Oil Believers 
While beliefs about inevitable futures have often inspired action, they can also 
lead to political quiescence.  Instead of becoming more engaged in radical or 
environmental politics, the average peak oil believer became less politically active.  
Although they followed national and environmental news more closely after becoming 
“peak oil aware,” they became less likely to vote or attend marches, rallies, or protests.97  
What’s most striking about this group of leftists, then, is their tendency to see even 
                                                
95 See, for example, Octavia Butler, Parable of the Sower (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993) 
and Ursula K. LeGuin, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
96 Mike Bendzela, “The End of the End: How the Peak Oil Movement Failed,” January 2, 2011, 
http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-End-of-The-End--How-t-by-Mike-Bendzela-110102-802.html. 
Accessed May 10, 2012. 
97 In response to the question, “Have you been more or less engaged in the following activities since 
learning about peak oil?  Please put on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for much less engaged, 3 for no change, 
and 5 for much less engaged,” American peakists averaged 2.79 for the option “attending rallies, marches 
or protests.” 
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radical politics as unable to solve environmental problems.  Anxieties about energy 
motivated a number of political campaigns in recent American history, such as the anti-
nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s, but peakists almost completely ignored 
electoral politics as an avenue to address their concerns.  One representative respondent 
described himself as “cynical and disassociated.  Our government is unresponsive, in 
denial, and ineffectual,” while a Colorado man asserted that “politics is a supreme waste 
of time,” and an Oregon man complained that “our political system and institutions are 
dysfunctional to the point of being irrelevant—the emperor has no clothes.”98   
For many people, their new ecological identity occasioned a retreat from politics.  
A Texas man “briefly got into politics,” voting in primaries and attending county 
caucuses and conventions, but then “realized that the system didn’t want to change, and 
was not likely to change from within, but” required “some external crisis.”99  “Oily 
Cassandra,” who we met in the introduction, had previously been active in leftist politics, 
such as protesting the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, but reported in 2007 that there was 
no place for her concerns in mainstream American politics.100  James Howard Kunstler 
regularly critiqued American politics on his blog, but he did so from an outsider’s 
perspective, claiming that political action was ineffective given the “self-righteous 
cluelessness in every band of the American political spectrum.”101  Peak Shrink Kathy 
McMahon had been active in the civil rights movement, but “Peak Oil Blues” did not 
advocate political actions.  She viewed the problems of petroleum dependency as far too 
                                                
98 Respondent 9591897. 
99 Respondent 9596038. 
100 Personal communication with “Oily Cassandra.”  February 1, 2010. 
101 “We Were Lied To,” Clusterfuck Nation, http://kunstler.com/mags_diary24.html. Accessed November 
10, 2011. 
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engrained for contemporary politicians to address, and informed her readers that it is “not 
your job to fight [the Panglossian disorder].  You cannot… Maybe this year, maybe next, 
you may be thought of as the sane one after all.”102  
 As these comments suggest, peakists were even more skeptical than average 
Americans of elected politicians—only 3% of respondents said that most members of 
Congress deserve re-election, compared to 21% of Americans at the time of the survey.103  
This skepticism is reflective, in many ways, of the “sense of alienation” that a recent CBS 
poll found “had ticked up in recent years… most Americans feel alienated from their 
political leaders and dissatisfied or angry with Washington.”104   When historian Timothy 
P. Weber pointed out that “advocates of apocalypticism” have typically been “outsiders, 
alienated and disinherited from the privileged and powerful” who “looked for their future 
redemption from beyond the clouds precisely because they had no recourse in the 
present,” he was discussing how marginalized groups embrace extreme religious ideas, 
but we might very well apply his insight to our (more) secular subject.105  A core aspect 
of American political culture in the twenty-first century is a general feeling of political 
alienation—in a 2011 poll, 73% of respondents agreed with the claim, “the people 
running the country don’t really care what happens to you” and 66% agreed that “what 
                                                
102 “Do You Have a Panglossian Disorder? or Economic and Planetary Collapse: Is It a Theraeutic Issue?” 
Peak Oil Blues, http://www.peakoilblues.org/blog/?p=132.  Accessed November 30, 2012. 
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you think doesn’t count very much anymore.”106  In a different poll, Americans placed 
more faith in telemarketers than elected Congresspeople.107  This sense of alienation has 
long been reflected in the U.S.’s low voter turnout compared to other industrialized 
democracies.108  
Peakists’ surprising alienation—their belief in the futility of politics—was 
motivated by an awareness of the need for radical changes in environmental policy 
combined with a relatively sober calculation of the limitations of contemporary American 
environmental politics.  As the United States underwent the sharp turn to the right over 
the last three decades described in the last chapter, leftists—progressives, socialists, 
anarchists, anti-capitalists and others—have become even more politically marginalized.  
Even with the emergence of the Occupy movement in 2011 and the re-election of a 
Democratic president, most leftist political goals remain beyond the pale of mainstream 
American political culture. 
This is especially true of environmental initiatives.  Although they may be 
overestimating the consequences of petroleum depletion, peakists’ sense of an imminent 
ecological crisis is certainly justified—one could point, as they do, to the grave threats 
posed by climate change, topsoil erosion, ocean acidification, deforestation, and 
                                                
106 Regina A. Corso, 2011.  Harris Poll #97, September 13, 2011.  New York: Harris Poll. 
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environmental toxification.  Their evaluation of the state of American environmental 
politics, while perhaps overly defeatist, is not out of touch with the candid assessments of 
many mainstream scientists and environmentalists.  Indeed, Sarah Amsler noted, “there 
are two prominent narratives of crisis in contemporary environmental politics.  One is 
rooted in fears of ecological catastrophe, and the other in a sort of anthropological 
pessimism that human beings lack the will or capacity to prevent it.”109  Most peakists 
argue that the U.S. is simply unable to solve the major problems that the country and 
planet face, which they identify as peak oil, climate change, and capitalism’s demand for 
infinite growth in a finite world.  This belief was summarized by a Nebraska man in his 
thirties, who believed that political action on these fronts was futile, since the “social, 
political, and media systems required to make meaningful headway are dysfunctional.  
Appropriate responses require a level of discussion that is beyond the capacities of the 
present system” in the United States. As these Americans “peer into the uncertain future,” 
as one member of Peak Oil News put it, “they find it easier to believe in the complete 
disintegration of America and its culture than in the possibility of an American society 
which has adapted to changed circumstances and innovated new solutions.”110  Given the 
preponderance of apocalyptic narratives in American culture—and the absence of 
alternate visions of environmental and social change—perhaps this stance should come as 
little surprise. 
                                                
109 Sarah Amsler, “Bringing Hope ‘To Crisis’: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action and Social Change,” in 
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Since fossil fuels are finite resources and the United States is unlikely to suddenly 
transition away from its petroleum economy, the thinking goes, might oil depletion not 
deliver a solution to (or salvation from) climate change and ecological crisis?  If this 
seems to like mere wishful or magical thinking, we might ask ourselves which scenario, 
in 2013, seems more likely: that American politicians, including the House of 
Representatives, along with leaders from other populous and high-energy consuming 
countries, will collectively decide to drastically reduce their energy usage and convince 
or require oil companies and petro-states to forego burning every barrel of petroleum, at 
great economic loss, or that they are forced to do so only when they finally run out of 
cheap oil?111  This line of argumentation is many things—pessimistic, defeatist, 
disheartening—but it is neither uninformed nor unrealistic.  In fact, it resembles the 
claims made by advocates of climate adaptation and geoengineering.112 
For those who hope that the United States will take a more active role in 
addressing pressing ecological issues such as our dependence on fossil fuels, the fatalism 
and political quiescence expressed by peakists is troubling.  As a group of educated, 
middle-class leftists who have based their very identities on the threat of environmental 
destruction and resource depletion, we might expect peak oil believers to be at the 
forefront of demands for changes in environmental policy.  Instead, they have become 
more fatalistic, less politically active, and more quiescent.  They note, with a touch of 
black humor, that peak oil will provide a solution to anthropogenic climate change.  In 
                                                
111 As Bill McKibben noted in a recent Rolling Stone article, the value of all of the announced reserves of 
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some ways, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy: if the most environmentally aware and 
concerned citizens retreat from the public sphere into individualistic “prepping,” or even 
into collective groups such as Transition Towns, the public pressure for political action 
will only diminish.   
Many scholars have viewed narratives of ecological apocalypse in opposition to 
radical politics, but my research shows that the relationship is more complicated.113  
Claims that eco-apocalyptic attitudes leads to political passivity may be true—peakists 
are indeed slightly less likely to vote and attend protests after becoming “peak oil 
aware”—but we might also view the peak oil movement as the sublimation of a political 
vision into a prophecy, or a new configuration of radical political beliefs that reflects our 
privatized, neoliberal age.  From this perspective, we can better understand the 
phenomenon’s concentration in the United States, where the government has been much 
less willing to even acknowledge the reality of one ecological crisis (anthropogenic 
climate change) and pay more than lip service to its reliance on petroleum.  Peakist 
fatalism is disquieting not because it is puzzling, but because it is so recognizable—from 
their political alienation, to the influence of apocalyptic popular culture, to their 
suspicions about the futility of politics.  Scholars such as Constance Penley have noted 
that the popularity of science fiction (such as World Made By Hand) is directly related to 
our ability to imagine meaningful social change.  She argues that popular narratives often 
embrace messiahs or disasters as agents of change because “we can imagine the future, 
                                                
113 See, for example, Michael Hardt, “Two Faces of Apocalypse: A Letter from Copenhagen,” Polygraph 
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but we cannot conceive of the kind of collective political strategies necessary to change 
or ensure that future.”114  Most peakists, and perhaps even most Americans, would agree. 
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Chapter 5: White Masculinity and Post-Apocalyptic Retrosexuality 
 
Compared to my great grandmother, I marvel at the life I have had… I have 
roamed North America at will from Ixtapa to Halifax.  I eat like a king.  I want for 
nothing.  I know that my ancestors were more connected to nature, that they were 
survivors, but I am wealthy and soft.  (White male, Oregon, 36-40) 
 
This isn't like sharing chores. It's a matter of life and death. Political correctness 
goes out the window and he (or she) who demonstrates better competence as a 
warrior gets dibs. What that means is Ripley [from the film Alien] comes before 
[Steve] [U]rkel, [the iconic nerd from the TV show Family Matters] and Rambo 
[from the Rambo films] comes before Paris Hilton. 
 
What if “peak oil” isn’t really about the powerlessness people fear in any near 
future, but is actually about the powerlessness they feel today?1 
 
 In statements like the first two above, the “excitement” that some peakists felt 
about the post-apocalyptic future certainly appears to have a lot to do with gender.  In my 
surveys, between three quarters and four fifths of all peakists were men, and almost every 
peakist author I have mentioned is a white male.  Indeed, one well-known author reported 
that “the attempt to find a female speaker at a peak-oil conference is a disaster. I tried 
hard with ASPO-5 [in 2011], but no luck.”2  Why was this the case? 
 On the comment board of a “Transition Culture” blog post on gender in the peak 
oil movement, peakists themselves offered a number of potential explanations.  A mother 
in her mid-30s cited the gendered division of labor, noting that “time is… a very real 
issue for every woman I know.  Working, taking care of children, trying to build 
community, attending to all the details of daily life—this is exhausting.  Women do a 
                                                
1 Respondent 9591897.  “Mos6507,” “The Return of Patriarchy,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, 
http://peakoil.com/forums/the-return-of-patriarchy-t57793-40.html.  Accessed May 14, 2013.  “Is Peak Oil 
Pessimism a Generation of Men Coming to Realise How Useless They Are,” Transition Culture, 
http://transitionculture.org/2006/12/04/is-peak-oil-pessimism-a-generation-of-men-coming-to-realise-how-
useless-they-are/.  Accessed May 11, 2013. 
2 “Is Peak Oil Pessimism a Generation of Men Coming to Realise How Useless They Are,” Transition 
Culture, http://transitionculture.org/2006/12/04/is-peak-oil-pessimism-a-generation-of-men-coming-to-
realise-how-useless-they-are/.  Comment by “Ugo” Bardi, former president of ASPO. 
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huge amount of necessary work in this world.”  “ChristineL” agreed, citing the “old 
feminist slogan” which states, “I wanted to go out and change the world, but I couldn’t 
find a babysitter.”  “Greg” cited differential gender “socialization” as a factor, arguing 
that “women are generally awarded for being team players” and “following the herd,” but 
communicating about or preparing for peak oil “asks that we go against the flow and do 
the hard thing.  Men are generally more willing to do that.”  Matt Savinar, then the 
webmaster of the popular site Life After The Oil Crash, offered a sociobiological 
argument.  He commented that status may have something to do with men’s willingness 
to speak out, since “men are a bit more outspoken and like to post all the great stuff they 
are doing on web blogs to get attention... Tribesman [sic] in New Guinea have their penis 
sheaths. We have our Peak Oil blogs.”  Kurt Cobb, in a 2007 blog post entitled, “Is Peak 
Oil a Guy Thing?”, concluded that the dearth of female peakists is the consequence of 
“the peak oil movement draw[ing] many of its members from the oil industry,” which is 
“a highly technical subject which attracts minds from the hard sciences, engineering, 
mathematics, and the high technology world, all of which continue to be dominated by 
males.”3 
 While gender socialization and practical considerations may have contributed to 
the discrepancy in participation in the peak oil movement, many collective fantasies of 
post-apocalyptic life, as depicted in peakist fiction and discussions on virtual forums, 
suggest that the real answer is psychological, and has much more to do with men than 
women.  As “Odograph” asked, “What if ‘peak oil’ isn’t really about the powerlessness 
                                                
3 Kurt Cobb, “Is Peak Oil A Guy Thing?” September 16 2007.  
http://resourceinsights.blogspot.com/2007/09/is-peak-oil-guy-thing.html.  Accessed June 3, 2013. 
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people fear in any near future, but is actually about the powerlessness they feel today?”4  
In this chapter, I argue that for some participants, the peak oil movement and similar 
survivalist fantasies provide a means of re-inscribing “traditional” (1950s) gender roles 
and revivifying white masculinity.  After exploring the depictions of and tensions around 
masculinist post-peak fantasies within the peakist community, I explore similar 
survivalist fantasies in twenty-first century American culture, such as the television show 
Revolution (2012-present).  I situate these concerns over white masculinity in the context 
of shifts in political economy, gender and racial scapegoating in the twenty-first century.  
Because peakists rarely speak openly about the racial and gender implications of their 
visions of the future, and because this analysis only applies to a subset of peak oil 
believers, this chapter is slightly more exploratory. 
 As noted in the last chapter, people of color are entirely absent in World Made By 
Hand, but masculinity is a central concern.  Robert Earle, its narrator and protagonist, is a 
former white-collar worker who finds a renaissance masculinity in the post-apocalypse.  
Throughout the course of the novel he inhabits a number of models of twenty-first 
century masculinity.  When he saves a young widow and a child from a fire, Earle is a 
fireman; when he toils as a carpenter, he’s a blue-collar worker; when he is voted mayor 
(and sheriff), he’s an authority figure; when he makes a trip to Albany and kills a man in 
a daring escape, he’s a soldier and action hero; when the town celebrates, he’s a musician 
(if not quite a rock star).  In his late fifties or sixties, Earle also enjoys a striking amount 
of sexual freedom.  As the novel begins, he is spending his nights with Jane Ann, whose 
                                                
4 “Odograph,” “Is Peak Oil Pessimism a Generation of Men Coming to Realise How Useless They Are,” 
Transition Culture, http://transitionculture.org/2006/12/04/is-peak-oil-pessimism-a-generation-of-men-
coming-to-realise-how-useless-they-are/.  Accessed May 11, 2013. 
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husband Loren is impotent.  After a young man in town perishes in a fire, Earle 
reluctantly accepts the attractive young widow Britney into his home.  This is described 
as a selfless act of generosity—post-peak Union Grove is simply no place for a single 
woman, of course. 
 Female characters do not enjoy the same opportunities, and the novel’s gender 
politics provoked an uproar within the peakist community.  None of its main characters 
are women, and the novel would surely fail the “Bechdel test” that identifies gender 
biases in works of fiction.5  The two primary female characters (Jane Ann and Britney) 
seem to exist, as peak oil feminist Sharon Astyk put it, to “a. compete to have sex with 
the narrator and b. suffer and c. serve meals.”6  Kunstler’s narrator justifies these 
regressive gender roles matter-of-factly: “as the world changed, we reverted to social 
divisions that were thought to be long obsolete.  The egalitarian pretenses of the high-
octane decades had dissolved and nobody even debated it anymore, including the women 
of our town.”7  A number of female peakists objected to this prophecy, noting that the 
gains of feminism were not likely to be undone within a decade: “I very much doubt 
women will lose political representation and be forced into awkward, bulky dresses a 
mere two decades or so after collapse.”8  One blogger commented that “what creeped me 
                                                
5 First applied to films, the “Bechdel test” identifies implicit sexism in media by whether a portrayal has “at 
least two women in it… who talk to each other… about something besides a man.”  Allison Bechdel, “The 
Rule,” Dykes to Watch Out For, 1985. 
6 Sharon Astyk, “Why Are the Mean Girls Picking On World Made By Hand?” The Chatelaine’s Keys, 
May 4, 2008, http://sharonastyk.com/2008/05/04/kunstler-gets-defensive-meanderings-on-_world-made-
by-hand_/.  Accessed February 22, 2012.  On peak oil feminism, see Astyk, “Peak Oil Is Still a Women’s 
Issue and Other Reflections on Sex, Gender and the Long Emergency,” Casaubon’s Blog, 
http://scienceblogs.com/casaubonsbook/2010/01/31/peak-oil-is-still-a-womens-iss/.  Accessed June 11, 
2013. 
7 Kunstler 2008, 101. 
8 “Book Review – World Made By Hand,” “Sublime Oblivion,” http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2009/ 
04/10/notes-kunstler-fiction/.  Accessed February 20, 2012. 
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out about the book was that [Kunstler] seemed to romanticize the vulnerable status of 
women in his post-[peak] world as part of a project of re-heroizing ‘good men.’ It felt 
paternal, vaguely Humbertish.”9  Another put it more plainly:  “For god’s sake can’t we 
just come right out and say it? Kunstler is sexist pure and simple,” and his novel is “an 
utterly ridiculous demonstration of old-white-guy fantasies gone wild.”10 
 Predictions of a post-apocalypse that is also post-feminist were common on 
peakism’s online forums, blogs, and comments sections.  Almost paraphrasing Earle, 
“Cashmere” wrote that “post peak will be a reversion to conventional norms, like 'em or 
not.”11  Others, behind the cloak of anonymity, were far less reserved about their views 
on shifting gender roles. “Bshirt,” for example, predicted that “all those braindead female 
public school teachers making their 50 - 70 thousand dollars a year teaching seven year 
old kids to count to ten will be… damn glad to be in a kitchen with a roof and food in it. 
But with their attitude… it's highly doubtful the majority will be wanted by anybody.”12  
“Mos6507” noted that post-apocalyptic survival won’t be “like sharing chores. It's a 
matter of life and death. Political correctness goes out the window and he (or she) who 
demonstrates better competence as a warrior gets dibs. What that means is Ripley [from 
the film Alien] comes before [Steve] [U]rkel [the iconic nerd from the TV show Family 
                                                
9 Janet McAdams, April 15, 2011 letter to Karla Armbuster in response to blog post on World Made By 
Hand, http://www.interversity.org/lists/asle/archives/Apr2011/msg00074.html.  Accessed February 23, 
2012. 
10 Sharon Astyk, “Why Are the Mean Girls Picking On World Made By Hand?” The Chatelaine’s Keys, 
May 4, 2008, http://sharonastyk.com/2008/05/04/kunstler-gets-defensive-meanderings-on-_world-made-
by-hand_/.  Accessed February 22, 2012. 
11 “Re:What WON’T you miss,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, http://www.peakoil.com/forums/ 
viewtopic.php?p=732750&highlight=.  Accessed May 14, 2013. 
12 “The Return of Patriarchy,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, http://peakoil.com/forums/the-return-of-
patriarchy-t57793-20.html.  Accessed May 14, 2013.  
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Matters] and Rambo [from the Rambo films] comes before Paris Hilton.”13  “Novus” 
attempted to add some historical context to these claims: “feminism was a failed 
experiment partly enabled by cheap energy and a society with excess wealth. The reality 
we inherit contains neither cheap energy or excess wealth among other factors which will 
lead to a return to patriarchy.”14 
 Some female peakists agreed that gender roles could change.  Gail Tverberg, who 
authored a column as “Gail the Actuary” on “The Oil Drum,” granted that “to the extent 
that physical labor becomes more highly valued,” in a somatic energy regime, “women 
may see their status go down.”15  “Ayame” predicted that “there will be a return to 
moderate patriarchy out of necessity to protect the family and clan group,” and “as a 
women [sic] I would actually welcome the protection of a male clique in return for doing 
monotonous tasks. Generally men are better genetically adapted to violence both 
physically and psychologically. Sure women might not have all the opportunities they 
used to but when the group is threatened the men will [be] the ones going out and 
sacrificing their lives for their families.”16 
 While the lack of women in the peak oil movement was a regular topic of 
conversation, the absence of people of color was rarely debated.  89% to 91% of my 
survey respondents self-identified as “white” or “Caucasian,” while only 72.4% of 
                                                
13 “The Return of Patriarchy,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, http://peakoil.com/forums/the-return-of-
patriarchy-t57793-40.html.  Accessed May 14, 2013. 
14 “The Return of Patriarchy,” Peak Oil News & Message Boards, http://peakoil.com/forums/the-return-of-
patriarchy-t57793-20.html.  Accessed May 13, 2013. 
15 Gail Tverberg (posting as “Gail the Actuary”), “The Oil Drum: Campfire | Men's Response to Shifting 
Roles after Peak Oil,” The Oil Drum, http://campfire.theoildrum.com/node/6171.  Accessed May 7, 2013. 
16 Ibid. 
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Americans identified themselves as such.17   If anything, my informal canvasses of 
audiences at peak oil conferences and lectures have shown fewer, not more, people of 
color.  Potential explanations for this absence might begin not just with the open 
historical exclusion of people of color from participating in public activism 
(environmentalism or other) before the civil rights movement, but with the long history of 
exclusion of the concerns of people of color from traditional environmental movements.  
Environmental damage that disproportionately affected people of color in the United 
States, such as waste siting, lead poisoning, and general toxification, were, until recently, 
considered “urban” and not “environmental” issues.  This has been addressed and 
ameliorated by activists and scholars (such as Dorceta E. Taylor, David N. Pellow and 
Andrew Hurley) working on environmental justice in recent years, but many 
environmental issues are still framed as “universal” problems that affect all Americans 
(or humans) equally, without regard to the dimensions of race, class, and gender that 
often leave disadvantaged groups to bear the worst burdens.18  While the whiteness of 
environmentalism has certainly changed in the last two decades, and environmentalists 
and scholars now recognize the concerns and campaigns of people of color as 
“environmental” even if they are not publicly framed as such, this history of exclusion 
undoubtedly leads some people of color to avoid explicitly “environmental” concerns and 
actions. 
                                                
17 U.S. Census, 2010. 
18 See, for example, Dorceta E. Taylor, Race, Class, Gender and American Environmentalism (U.S. 
Department of Agruculture, 2002); David N. Pellow, Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental 
Justice in Chicago (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, 
Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1995). 
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 Instead of wondering why people of color have not subscribed to peakism, we 
might ask why so many middle-aged white Americans have.  Although race was rarely 
even mentioned on peakist forums, due perhaps to the possible presence of peakists of 
color and a liberal disapproval of open racism, many visions of the post-peak world 
clearly tie the revitalization of masculinity to whiteness.  In World Made By Hand, for 
example, characters of color are invisible, an absent presence involved in spatio-
temporally distant “race wars.”  Since there are no such conflicts in Union Grove, we are 
left to conclude that they must be at least partially responsible for them. 
 In other peakist speculations, the connection between whiteness and masculinity is 
far more explicit.  In W.R. Flynn’s Shut Down: A Story of Economic Collapse and Hope, 
the peaceful white community that assembles in Corbett, Oregon, after the peak oil 
collapse survive only by defending itself in a race war against marauding gangs of 
African-Americans and Latinos from urban Portland.  These gangs, “dressed similarly in 
oversized t-shirts and low-hung baggy pants,” rage through the city while “armed, drunk, 
stoned,” committing acts of torture, theft, and sexual violence.  The novel’s protagonists 
join a group of peace-loving whites such as the blue-collar “Big Don, an energetic, 
charismatic and strapping 6’1”, 190 lb, 72-year old, and tough as nails retired railroad 
worker,” who wears “faded jeans and a long-sleeved flannel shirt.”  As I noted in the last 
chapter, mainstream post-apocalyptic fantasies generally present a vision of multicultural 
harmony, but Flynn’s does not.  Even “migrant” Latinos, despite having “worked [in 
Corbett] on the same farms for years” and thus potentially having useful knowledge 
about local agriculture, are said to “pose an unacceptable level of resource burden and 
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were being told to leave or turned away if they were encountered by a patrol.”19 
The regressive gender and racial perspectives of some peak oil visions, and their 
articulation to a socially conservative message, will be familiar to devoted consumers of 
post-apocalyptic popular culture.  To recall the political connotations of the pop cultural 
post-oil dystopia, we might analyze two non-disaster films that had a significant impact 
on peakists and peak oil authors, Mad Max (1979) and Mad Max 2: Road Warrior 
(1981).20  Over three quarters of all respondents had seen each film, and peakists referred 
to them regularly in their responses.  A female adherent, for example, said that “the Mad 
Max scenario always springs to mind” when she thinks of the future, while a Connecticut 
man noted that “some people wish they lived in a mad max world.”21 
Released in 1979 and 1981 in Australia and soon thereafter in the U.S., the Mad 
Max films caused a sensation stateside.  Although their landscape and playful absurdity 
were quintessentially Australian, director George Miller seamlessly adopted elements of 
the Hollywood Western genre.  Set in the near future, Mad Max presents a post-nuclear, 
deserted, Hobbesian landscape where society’s institutions are rapidly disappearing.  
Only the heroic actions of “the Bronze,” leather-clad policemen such as protagonist Max 
(Mel Gibson), prevent gangs of drug-addled motorcycle outlaws from committing even 
more thefts, rapes and murders.  In the second film, set some years in the distant future, a 
now solitary Max—his wife and child murdered in the first film— helps a small 
community (a “civilized society”) struggling to guard their oil rig compound and treasure 
                                                
19 Flynn 2011, 73, 234, 127, 205.  This aspect of the novel shows that the mindset that leads to the kind of 
problematic connections that Malthusian environmentalists made between population control and the global 
South in the 1960s and 1970s is still present, to some extent.  
20 Mad Max, George Miller, 1979; Mad Max 2: Road Warrior, George Miller, 1981. 
21 Respondents 9599590 and 9597368. 
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trove of petroleum against a depraved band of desperate outsiders.  Here he is the 
stranger come to town, described as the “Man With No Name” in an explicit reference to 
spaghetti Westerns. 
The Mad Max films struck a chord with American viewers for a number of 
reasons.  As we saw in chapter 2, oil scarcity and energy independence were a regular 
concern for Americans in the 1970s.  Remarking on the connection between Mad Max 
and petroleum dependency, screenplay co-writer James McCausland wrote in 2006 that 
“George [Miller] and I wrote the script based on the thesis that people would do almost 
anything to keep vehicles moving and the assumption that nations would not consider the 
huge costs of providing infrastructure for alternative energy until it was too late.”22  This 
suggests that the series was intended as a liberal cautionary tale against fossil fuel 
dependency, but in the early 1980s the Mad Max vision also mirrored the law-and-order 
politics of conservatives such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.23  In the first film, 
Max arrests a marauder and brings him to court, only to find that the witnesses are too 
intimidated to testify.  Liberal law enforcement solutions fail to bring the killer to justice, 
and he walks free.  Like the heroes of similar action films of the era, such as the Dirty 
Harry (1971-1988) and Death Wish (1974-1994) series, the white male hero can only 
enact justice by stepping outside the law.24  And in World Made By Hand, the post-
                                                
22 James McCausland, “Scientists' warnings unheeded” The Courier-Mail, December 4, 2006, 
http://www.couriermail.com.au/business/scientists-warnings-unheeded/story-e6freqmx-
1111112631991. Accessed April 26, 2010. 
23 J. Emmett Winn, “Mad Max, Reaganism and the Road Warrior,” Kinema: A Journal for Film 
and Audiovisual Media 23 (2009): 57-75. 
24 The Dirty Harry series is Dirty Harry, Don Siegel, 1971; Magnum Force, Ted post, 1973; The Enforcer, 
James Fargo, 1976; Sudden Impact, Clint Eastwood, 1983; and The Dead Pool, Buddy Van Horn, 1988. 
The Death Wish series is Death Wish, Michael Winner, 1974; Death Wish II, Michael Winner, 1982, Death 
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apocalyptic crisis brings about a return to traditional, patriarchal gender roles, consistent 
with Reagan’s “family values” rhetoric and evocation of the citizen as a solitary, 
disembodied actor in a free marketplace. 
These conservative tropes are emphasized by the threat of the outsiders in both 
films.  In the 1980s, Reagan and other conservatives regularly asserted that various 
minority groups (such as African-Americans, leftists, and homosexuals) posed a threat to 
the “traditional” American social order.25  In Mad Max and some peakist fantasies, 
villains are coded to embody the threats posed by each of these groups.  Their primary 
aesthetic is punk, complete with leather clothes, tattoos, earrings, and mohawks.  
Although punks are not necessarily leftists, they represent the threat of youthful rebellion 
that has been associated with the left since the 1960s.  Especially in The Road Warrior, 
the villains also represent the threat of sexual deviancy.  Humungus, their leader, is 
nearly naked, with a body-builder physique, criss-crossing leather straps, and an S&M 
hockey mask.  Two male followers form a gay couple: Wez, who sports a pink Mohawk 
and wears feathers around his neck, and Golden Boy, with long blonde hair and a black 
leather top with nipple cut-outs.  In both films, the threat of deviant sexuality is not 
merely hypothetical, since the outsiders are sadists who gang-rape their victims. 
At the same time, Humungus and his followers signify the racial other via the 
film’s connection to the “savages” in many Hollywood Westerns, Native Americans.  
They are adorned with feathers, face paint, and mohawks, and they circle the “fort” of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Wish 3, Michael Winner, 1985; Death Wish 4: The Crackdown, J. Lee Thompson, 1987; and Death Wish 
V: The Face of Death, Allan A. Goldstein, 1994. 
25 See Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237-243; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-
2008 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 180-187; and Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home; the American 
Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2007), 227-244. 
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community’s oil rig in souped-up motorcycles. Similarly, in World Made By Hand, 
Wayne Karp and his gang are sexually deviant, racialized outsiders who are “less like 
less like their own parents and forbears and more like the Iroquois who had inhabited the 
same area four hundred years earlier,” sport a Mad Max punk aesthetic, and brutally 
sodomize the town preacher when they take him captive.26  In Shut Down, the black and 
Latino gangs of “sadists” pose a more familiar (if equally phantasmagoric) sexual threat 
to heterosexual whites, declaring that their march to Corbett will provide “cracka’ hoe’s 
fo all a bro’s” as they dance “in the middle of the street inches away” from one another, 
“eagerly bumping and grinding away on each other.”27   In these ways, recent post-peak 
visions, while anti-capitalist and even anti-American, were clearly following the social 
conservatism of yesterday’s post-apocalyptic fantasies. 
 
White American Masculinity in the Twenty-First Century 
The similar articulations between whiteness, masculinity, and heteronormativity 
in Mad Max, which found a cult audience in the United States in the 1980s, and peakists’ 
predictions in the mid-2000s might suggest that little had changed in the intervening three 
decades.  But while peak oil visions of a reinvigorated white masculinity clearly drew on 
Mad Max and other sources, we should see them as a response to the particular concerns 
and anxieties around white masculinity in the twenty-first century.  To explore this 
dynamic, I focus on the relationship between changes in American political economy, the 
anti-immigrant “Latino threat” narrative, gender equality and mainstream conceptions of 
                                                
26 Kunstler 2008, 267. 
27 Flynn, 239, 257. 
   231 
American manhood.28 
 While a “crisis in masculinity” is seemingly always at hand, there have been 
significant changes in labor and political economy over the last half-century that 
transformed life for many American males.  Deindustrialization has been underway since 
the early 1970s, but the decline in manufacturing employment as a percentage of total 
work has been particularly sharp over the last decade.  While the total number of 
manufacturing jobs in the U.S. has remained relatively stable for the last forty years, the 
nation’s population has increased, so that manufacturing workers now make up less than 
10% of all workers, down from 20% in 1980 and nearly 30% in 1960.29  Whereas blue-
collar jobs once promised a middle-class salary and benefits—as a result of hard-fought 
union victories in the early and mid-twentieth century—that is less and less the case.  
Shifting patterns in employment and politics led to the transfer of large numbers of jobs 
from union-heavy Northeast and Mideast states to right-to-work states in the Southeast 
and Southwest, while changes in labor law have made unionization more difficult.  
Furthermore, the actual work of blue-collar employment is not what it once was.  Jobs 
that are considered “manufacturing” are now often quite similar to what we usually think 
of as “white-collar” enterprises.  Due to technological changes that have increased 
productivity (and made many workers redundant), “factories” are now as likely to be 
called “Technology Distribution Centers” and require workers that are well-educated and 
                                                
28 This analysis assumes that masculinity is a social construct.  While we should always be aware that there 
is never such a thing as a monolithic model of masculinity—different groups perform different 
masculinities based on race, ethnicity, class, education, gender, sexual orientation and other factors—I hold 
that mainstream popular culture plays a powerful role in forging hegemonic (or, as I put it in this chapter,  
“mainstream”) gender expectations, which are sometimes enforced by social, cultural and economic 
actions.  See R.W. Connell, “The Social Organization of Masculinity,” in Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank 
J. Barrett, eds., The Masculinities Reader (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001): 30-50. 
29 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
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computer-literate.30  According to one analysis, three out of ten of American jobs counted 
as “manufacturing” are “things that would look to most people like white-collar service 
jobs: Sales, engineering, design, that sort of thing.”31 
 The psychological influence of the shift from “blue-collar” to “white-collar” work 
was a frequent topic of conversation in the late 1990s.  Groups like the Promise Keepers, 
a Christian men’s organization, and events like the Million Man March sought to redefine 
masculinity.  In popular culture, where dominant gender roles and expectations are often 
expressed or forged, a slate of films, such as In the Company of Men (1997), American 
Beauty (1999), Office Space (1999), and especially Fight Club (1999) dramatized the 
alienation and repressed anger that heterosexual white men were said to be suffering as a 
result of the cubicles and corporate culture of white-collar work.32  In her influential book 
Stiffed (1999), Susan Faludi observed that the nation’s “pulse takers,” including 
“newspaper editors, TV pundits, fundamentalist preachers, marketeers, legislators” 
agreed that “American manhood was under siege” in the 1990s.33  As Fight Club’s Tyler 
Durden (Brad Pitt) put it, some (white) American men saw themselves as “an entire 
generation pumping gas, waiting tables; slaves with white collars… No purpose or place. 
                                                
30 Sophie Quinton, “In Manufacturing, Blue-Collar Jobs Need White-Collar Training,” National Journal, 
February 27, 2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/in-manufacturing-blue-collar-jobs-need-
white-collar-training-20120226.  Accessed May 29, 2013. 
31 Neil Irwin, “American manufacturing is coming back. Manufacturing jobs aren’t,” The Washington Post, 
November 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/11/19/american-
manufacturing-is-coming-back-manufacturing-jobs-arent/.  Accessed May 29, 2013. 
32 In the Company of Men, Neil LaBute, 1997; American Beauty, Sam Mendes, 1999; Office Space, Mike 
Judge, 1999; Fight Club, David Fincher, 1999. 
33 Susan Faludi, Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man (New York: William Morrow, 1999), 6.  Of 
course, wealthy white men had been complaining of the feminization of labor and the need for "authentic" 
physical experiences for over a century, since (at least) the shift from artisan to industrial 
manufacturing.  See T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of 
American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon, 1981), especially 59-96. 
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[They] have no Great War, no Great Depression.  [Their] great war is a spiritual war. 
[Their] great depression is [their] lives.” 
 Such claims should be taken with a grain of salt, since there was hardly a decade in 
the twentieth century that masculinity (meaning white masculinity) wasn’t declared to be 
in a state of crisis by one constituency or another.  In the Progressive Era, as Kevin P. 
Murphy has shown, Theodore Roosevelt and others promoted “strenuous manhood” by 
contrasting the “redblood” American with the all-too-common “mollycoddle,” the too-
common “weakling and the coward” who were “out of place in a strong and free 
community.”34  In the 1950s, as K.A. Cuordileone has documented, America’s Cold War 
masculinity was threatened by “corporatism and the decline of the self-made man; the 
affects of affluence and comfort; ‘civilizing,’ emasculating women; the power of a 
sentimental, feminine mass culture; and the excessive influence of women on boys and 
men.”35  In the 1970s and 1980s, responses to second-wave feminism included openly 
antifeminist “Men’s Rights” such as the Coalition of Free Men, which claimed that “it is 
actually women who have the power and men who are most oppressed.”36 
 However, as Faludi and others have noted, men’s roles in the twentieth century 
United States became closely tied to their labor, and there were major political economic 
developments since the 1970s, due primarily to neoliberal globalization and the decline 
of unions, that changed men’s work roles.  By 2010, when media commentators returned 
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to the subject of a crisis in masculinity, these trends had only accelerated.  Between 2000 
and 2010, the United States lost nearly one-third of its manufacturing jobs, as over 
40,000 factories closed.  The economic recession of 2008 had a disproportionate impact 
on men—according to one estimate, they had held nearly three out of four jobs that 
disappeared between 2007 to 2011.  Indeed, men’s unemployment rate during this period 
exceeded women’s by only 25% because so many men stopped actively searching for 
employment, and thus were not counted by the Labor Department’s official statistics.  
According to some commentators, the future was even more dire.  Some surmised that 
changes in the global economy, which had replaced American manufacturing with 
automation or low-wage work in the global South (often in nations with few labor laws or 
regulations), might very well signify “the end of [American] men,” since “the vast 
majority” of “the 15.3 million new jobs projected to sprout up over the next decade will 
come in fields that currently attract far more women than men.”37  Others observed that 
women now earned 60% of bachelor’s and master’s degrees, increasingly a pre-requisite 
for steady employment beyond low-wage, low-benefit service jobs. 
 Even so, the demise of American men was greatly exaggerated, which many 
journalists noted below the fold, if at all.  In 2011, only four percent of Fortune 500 
CEOs and 17% of U.S. Senators were female.  Women earned, on average, 17.8% less 
for performing the same work as men—in the 534 occupations listed by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, women with the same education and experience earned less than men in 
                                                
37 Andrew Romano and Tony Dokoupil, “Men’s Lib,” Newsweek 15, no. 13 (2010), 43. 
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527 of them.38  While baby steps were certainly being taken towards gender equity, talk 
of true equality, let alone the “end of men,” was premature.  Discourse about a crisis of 
masculinity, then, was as much about perception, as it has always been.  But as Faludi 
observed, the consequences of globalization and deindustrialization had real 
psychological consequences.  One peakist noted that in losing his job during the 
recession, his father had “lost the former relevancy that gave him the opportunity to make 
a living.  He is suffering.”39  In a post-industrial society, many men lost not only the 
“utilitarian world” of blue-collar labor that had provided employment, but were “thrust 
into an ornamental realm” where manhood was now defined by “appearance, by youth 
and attractiveness, by money and aggression, by posture and swagger and ‘props,’ by the 
curled lip and petulant sulk and flexed biceps.”40  Predicting the reversal of this 
ornamentalization, one peakist, “Bigdoug2053,” claimed that “things will be better for 
succeeding generations” in the post-peak world, “as localized economies eventually give 
men meaningful, though likely physically harder, work that will help support families and 
communities.”41 
 In the 2000s, this increasing ornamentalization led to the declaration of a new 
masculine identity: the metrosexual.  As Toby Miller put it, metrosexual men were 
“feminized males who blur the visual style of straight and gay in a restless search ‘to 
                                                
38 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2011,” 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2011.pdf.  Accessed May 13, 2013. 
39 “The Oil Drum: Campfire,” The Oil Drum, http://campfire.theoildrum.com/node/6171.  Accessed June 9, 
2013. 
40 Faludi, 38. 
41 “Why Are the Mean Girls Picking On World Made By Hand?” The Chatelaine’s Keys, May 4, 2008, 
http://sharonastyk.com/2008/05/04/kunstler-gets-defensive-meanderings-on-_world-made-by-hand_/.  
Accessed February 22, 2012. 
   236 
spend, shop and deep-condition.’”42  While the ideal male body, men’s fashion, and 
certain aspects of home décor were subjects that most men have probably always been at 
least implicitly aware of, metrosexuality required a new level of knowledge and curation 
of the self, primarily through mass consumption.  The growing acceptance of 
homosexuality, at least in blue states and large cities, led to a growing continuity between 
public and private standards of gay subcultures and expectations for straight men, with 
the TV show Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (2003-2007) as a prominent example.43  By 
the late 2000s, the expectations for even non-metrosexual American men seemed to be 
changing, with the explosion of new skin creams, false eyelashes, nail polish, grooming 
tools (for “manscaping”) and hair care products designed specifically for men.44 
  
Retrosexuality: Back to the Future 
 Even as these shifts in political economy, culture, and gender roles were creating 
the need for a new conception of white male heterosexuality—or perhaps, from a more 
utopian standpoint, the elimination altogether of categories of identity based on such 
essentialist notions as “sex” and “gender”—popular conceptions of masculinity were 
looking backwards.  This “retrosexuality,” as some observers called it, began in the wake 
of the September 11th attacks.45  Although George W. Bush’s “dead or alive” cowboy 
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machismo was mocked by liberals, it provided a model of masculinity that sought 
security not in an acknowledgement of a changing twenty-first century, but in a 
mythologized American history of Western individualism and mastery over nature.46  In 
the same vein, the counterterrorism expert, epitomized by Jack Bauer in the TV show 24, 
hearkened back to the cowboy as a model of heroic masculinity.  Bauer, a patriot and 
man’s man, was willing to use violence and step outside the laws of society in order to 
protect it.  No less an authority on sexuality than former President Bill Clinton praised 
Bauer, once telling NBC’s “Meet the Press” that “when Bauer goes out there on his own 
and is prepared to live with the consequences, it always seems to work better.”47 
In a cultural moment that seemed to celebrate obstinacy and rigidity, other 
noteworthy models of masculinity were similarly backward-looking.  Firemen in 
particular, lionized due to their fatal rush into the burning World Trade Center towers, 
“came to stand as exemplars of a way of life that was encoded as particularly and 
typically American: selfless, heroic, individually brave citizens rising in a moment of 
need to serve the common good,” as Hamilton Carroll observed.48  As a bastion of blue-
collar white ethnic masculinity (and even segregation49) during a moment rife with anti-
immigration sentiment, and a unionized public worker during a neoliberal era, the   
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fireman was a particularly anachronistic model of heroism in the early twenty-first 
century.  The glorification of disappearing blue-collar work in popular culture, primarily 
on TV shows such as American Chopper (2003-2010), Dirty Jobs (2005-2012), Deadliest 
Catch (2005-present) and Ice Road Truckers (2007-present) followed the heroic mold of 
the September 11th firefighters. 
  Of course, any analysis of early twenty-first century heterosexual masculinity 
must acknowledge that many of the dominant models of masculinity in popular culture in 
the 2000s did not fit into a “retrosexual” model, and often featured people of color.  Some 
of the most visible and admired male trendsetters during this period were black hip hop 
artists such as Jay-Z and Dr. Dre; movie stars such as Will Smith and Samuel L. Jackson; 
and athletes such as Dwayne Wade, Blake Griffin and LeBron James.  At the same time, 
the success and lifestyles of these celebrities are generally seen as beyond the reach of the 
average (white) male, because of their extreme wealth and because their success is seen 
as the result of their race—in the case of athletes, their athletic ability; in the case of 
musicians and movie stars, their natural “cool.”50  In contrast, the kinds of back-to-the-
future masculinities I focus on here are freely available to all.  To some extent, we might 
see the focus on “regular guys” such as the fireman and blue-collar worker as a response 
to the media’s lionization of wealthy athletes, musicians, and movie stars.  
 When the term “retrosexual” was coined, it referred to a very specific model: the 
strong, silent, charismatic Don Draper of the TV show Mad Men (2007-present).51  But 
the term quickly morphed into something broader: the “real men” of the Greatest 
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Generation.  As one cultural commentator put it, the “retrosexual” is the “anti-
metrosexual, the opposite of that guy who emerged in the 1990s in all his pedicured, 
moussed-up, skinny-jeans glory.  That man-boy was searching for his inner girl, it was 
argued. The retrosexual, however, wants to put the man back into manhood.”52  Blogs 
and Facebook pages devoted to the trend popped up, along with The Retrosexual Manual: 
How to Be a Real Man (2008), which advertised that “it's time to go back to basics—back 
to when men were men and women made breakfast the morning after.”53  One critical 
review of the term argued that it was “about returning to a time when men were men… A 
simpler time when it was clear what it meant to be a man and what his responsibilities 
were.54  Proponents of retrosexuality, like the authors of “The Art of Manliness” blog 
(and book), noted that re-learning “Manly Skills,” such as “How to Wire An Outlet,” 
“How to Raise Backyard Chickens” and “How to Bug-In: What You Need to Know to 
Survive a Grid-Down Disaster” were a necessary part of regaining one’s manhood.55 
 If we recall the kinds of activities described in chapter 1, it should be clear that 
peakists, survivalists, and so-called “retrosexuals” were engaged in some overlapping 
activities.  While each group might be doing them for seemingly different reasons, I want 
to suggest that they were responding to the same impulse: a resistance to the perceived 
feminization of labor and the specialization of knowledge that, without alternate models 
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of masculinity, looked backwards instead of forward.  As the white male peakist in this 
chapter’s epigraph put it, “I have roamed North America at will from Ixtapa to Halifax.  I 
eat like a king.  I want for nothing.  I know that my ancestors were more connected to 
nature, that they were survivors, but I am wealthy and soft.”56  Retrosexuality, in all of its 
forms, held the promise of making these men “hard” again. 
 
Anti-Feminism and the Latino Threat 
 That the bygone era when “men were men” just happens to coincide with a period 
of incredible white male privilege, before feminism and the civil rights movement, is no 
coincidence.  However unpopular anti-feminist and anti-immigration political positions 
were among liberals and leftists (such as most peakists) throughout the 2000s, they 
undergirded the popular models of white masculinity that emerged—the cowboy, the 
fireman, the counterterrorism agent, the Wild West lawman, and the retrosexual prepper.  
Given the changing economic situation of the United States, what’s required, as Andrew 
Romano and Tony Dokoupil argued, “is not a reconnection with the past but a liberation 
from it; not a revival of the old role but an expansion of it.”57  However, as Stephanie 
Coontz has pointed out, “one thing standing in the way of further progress for many men 
is the same obstacle that held women back for so long: overinvestment in their gender 
identity instead of their individual personhood.”58  This overinvestment is not mere 
insecurity but is reified by cultural norms.  As Coontz noted, statistics show that “men 
who take an active role in child care and housework at home are more likely than other 
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men to be harassed at work,” and “men who request family leave are often viewed as 
weak or uncompetitive and face a greater risk of being demoted or downsized.”59  
Similarly, journalist Hanna Rosin noted that when she “asked several businesswomen in 
Alexander City [Alabama] if they would hire a man to be a secretary or a receptionist or a 
nurse… many of them just laughed.”60  Since mainstream cultural models of alternate 
masculinity have not emerged, some white men—whether blue-collar workers who now 
found themselves out of work, or white-collar workers whose masculinity now seems 
merely ornamental—felt a sense of victimhood, caught between a changing economy and 
rigid gender roles.  
This sense of male victimization was articulated by conservatives to xenophobia 
and sexism.  Leo R. Chavez has described the wave of xenophobic discourse and action 
in the 1990s and 2000s as a “Latino Threat Narrative,” which sees Latinos (particularly 
Mexicans) as “an invading source from south of the border” bent on “destroying the 
American way of life.”61  A 2008 American National Election Studies survey found that 
44% of Americans found it “very” or “extremely” likely that “recent immigration levels 
[would] take jobs away from people already” here, with another 41% responding 
“somewhat likely.”62  Of course, there is little connection between job loss and increased 
immigration—most immigrants from Latin America, especially undocumented 
immigrants, are forced into working low-paying, no-benefit jobs that most whites have 
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been unwilling to accept, even when the alternative is unemployment.63 
Nonetheless, there are demographic and political changes on the horizon.  
Stephen Chait noted that as a result of immigration and, to a lesser extent, differentials in 
birth rates, “the nonwhite proportion of the electorate grows by about half a percentage 
point” ever year, so that “in every presidential election, the minority share of the vote 
increases by 2 percent.”  Projecting these changes into the future, this means that “in 30 
years, nonwhites will outnumber whites” as voters.64  Given that people of color, while 
hardly a monolithic voting bloc, have historically tended towards the Democratic Party—
partially as a result of indifference and hostility from the Republican Party, of course—
the Latino threat narrative has some connection to reality, if we squint hard enough.  
Indeed, immigration became a key issue during the 2012 election, as white hard-core 
conservatives pushed Republican candidates to make increasingly intolerant, even racist 
anti-immigration promises, which worked to their detriment in the general election. 
We might not expect peakists and Tea Partiers to mix, and indeed their politics 
are, for the most part, diametrically opposed.  But both groups are predominately white, 
male, educated, and middle-aged, and predict an impending decline on the horizon.65  
While many male peakists do not fit the model of the “retrosexual,” the comments of 
some male adherents on Internet forums make it clear that conservative articulations of 
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male victimhood, tied to anti-feminism and the Latino threat narrative, have crossed some 
political boundaries.  In the last few pages of this chapter, I want to argue that these kinds 
of political connotations are also implicit in many post-apocalyptic visions, among 
peakists and throughout American popular culture. 
 
Retrosexuality on the Small Screen: Revolution 
 A post-apocalyptic reimagination of the “crisis of masculinity” caused by the 
feminization of labor and the loss of blue-collar jobs during the recession is a central 
theme of a the TV show Revolution (2012-present), which received a great deal of hype 
in 2012, in part it because it was produced by J.J. Abrams (of Lost) and directed by John 
Favreau (of the Iron Man franchise).66  Although hardly exceptional in its premise or 
execution, the show is useful here because of the way that it reflects common themes in 
current and recent American popular culture. 
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 Set fifteen years after “the blackout,” when all electronics (including automobiles) 
suddenly ceased to function, the show presents a familiar Hobbesian post-apocalyptic 
terrain.   The former United States is controlled by a patchwork of regional militias, while 
the rest of the surviving population tries to eke out a living through subsistence farming.  
Although its nominal star is the teenage daughter Charlie (Tracy Spiridakos), her 
character is an anodyne blend of good-willed naiveté and kick-ass girl power.  As is often 
the case, Charlie is simultaneously a strong female who shows that women are just as 
capable of violence as men (the bow being the current weapon of choice), but also 
heavily sexualized—a number of TV critics objected to her skimpy outfits, heavy 
makeup, and perfectly-coiffed hair.67  The show’s real drama revolves around the battle 
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of a group of men for power in the post-apocalyptic world, with regular flashbacks to the 
contemporary United States that serve to naturalize existing conceptions of masculinity. 
 The shortest-lived of these male characters is Ben Matheson, Charlie’s father, who 
is killed by the Monroe Militia in the first episode.  A caring father who worked at the 
University of Chicago as a scientist developing cheap, renewable energy, Ben’s values 
are out of step with the world that the blackout creates—or returns us to.  In a flashback, 
he is shown leading his family out of Chicago until a scavenger steals their wagon of 
food.  Holding a shotgun to the man as he absconds with their provisions, Ben finds 
himself unable to fire—his wife must step forward to accomplish the task.  In the show’s 
present, the Monroe Militia arrives at the family’s commune to capture Ben.  Seeking to 
negotiate instead of defend himself—as, it is suggested, he had done many times before, 
when he surrendered weapons and foodstores—he is ultimately shot to death, and thus 
unable to prevent his son being taken prisoner. 
 Ben’s opposite is his brother, Miles.  Before his death, Ben asks his compatriots to 
seek out Miles in Chicago.  They find a man tough and hardened, drinking a single-malt 
scotch while awaiting what appears to be certain death at the hands of the approaching 
Militia.   Miles turns out to be the former commander of the Militia and a military-trained 
assassin.  With an eternal five-o’clock shadow and a flip remark for every situation, 
Miles is a classic rogue, but he’s also able to easily dispatch a dozen men with a sword or 
his bare hands.  Miles’ training in the pre-blackout U.S. military has equipped him for 
success in any situation.  In the post-apocalypse, as in our current world, the show 
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suggests, military might and the ability to inflict violence on others is the most important 
survival skill of all. 
 The show’s commentary on the feminization of labor is highlighted by the contrast 
between Aaron Pittman, a friend of Ben Matheson who sets out on the show’s adventures 
with Charlie, and Tom Neville, a major in the Monroe Militia.  Before the blackout, 
Aaron was the “wizard of Google,” with a beautiful wife, four homes, a limousine, a 
plane and 300 employees working under him.  When we first meet him after the blackout, 
however, he is clearly a burden on his community.  Chubby with thick-rimmed glasses, 
Aaron’s weight and physical incompetence is a regular source of humor.  He insists on 
joining the mission to recover the captured Danny, but admits that he is “afraid of bees” 
before complaining about “chafing” issues.  Later, he acknowledges that he is often 
“weak and afraid.”  Considered a genius before the blackout, Aaron is revealed to be less 
than a man in the post-apocalyptic world.  Months after the blackout, he and his wife 
deserted the city, but she contracts dysentery because he allowed her to drink from a 
sewage-filled lake.  Soon thereafter, he fails to protect her from two looters, and they are 
saved only by the aid of a stronger, leaner man who excels in physical combat.  Aaron 
abandons his wife the next day, believing that she will fare better under the protection of 
a group of strangers. 
 Tom Neville undergoes the opposite transformation.  He had been a white-collar 
worker, an insurance adjuster.  On the day of the blackout, he was berated and then fired 
by a younger colleague for granting a claim that he could have denied, his hands 
fidgeting as he sits in an office chair in a button-down shirt and tie.  When he returns 
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home, he politely asks his neighbors to turn their music down, but they simply ignore 
him.  He begins his transformation when the same neighbor breaks into his home six 
weeks after the blackout.  After Neville pummels him to death, he rises a new man.  
When we see him fifteen years later, he is a leader of the militia, strong, competent, 
physically capable, and smart. 
 When Neville holds Aaron and Charlie hostage, he delivers a monologue that 
encapsulates the show’s view of post-apocalyptic masculinity: 
I know you.  I recognized you the minute I laid eyes.  That’s Aaron Pittman, the 
Wizard of Google, you been on the cover of Wired magazine more times than I 
can count.  I bet you were high and mighty when the lights were on!  I bet you’d 
boss around those poor bastards in their tiny cubicles! I was one of those poor 
bastards myself.  But now look at you, and look at me.  Now you need Miles 
saving your fat, pockmarked ass!68  
Neville’s diatribe combines a number of ideas that were common in American popular 
culture.  He resents the power that elites like Pittman held over middle-level workers like 
himself, and learned from the blackout that stereotypically “liberal” qualities, such as 
empathy, compassion, and rational discourse are no longer rewarded—if they ever were.  
Concern for others, it is emphasized in almost every episode, is a potential weakness.  
Most importantly, in positing a Hobbesian scenario of all-against-all in a post-apocalyptic 
world which is often confused with a “state of nature,” Revolution naturalizes patriarchal, 
violent gender constructs. 
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Race, Gender and Individualism 
If, as discussed in chapter 3, the Internet of the 1990s and early 2000s is one ideal 
version of libertarian individualism, the post-apocalyptic scenario—in World Made By 
Hand, disaster films, and countless zombie attack scenarios and similar manifestations in 
the 2000s—is another.  Claire P. Curtis has remarked that since post-apocalyptic 
narratives speak to “our desire to start over again,” they establish and depict the “state of 
nature” that political scientists have theorized about for centuries.69   While Curtis gives 
equal attention to Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and Hobbes, it is really the latter’s violent 
vision of utter individualism and lawlessness that dominates the genre in all its recent 
incarnations.  Theoretically, when government and social structures such as race, class 
and gender break down, there will be complete equality of opportunity, which would 
allow the strong, prepared, meritorious individual to persevere and survive.  The 
individual can finally become what he should have been already, had he not been held 
back by the strictures of modern civilization. 
Although it flashes the promise of egalitarianism, we should recall that 
individualism is a distinctly raced and gendered philosophy.  As Elizabeth Fox-Genovese 
noted in her feminist critique of individualism, as a political philosophy it has “tended to 
depersonalize the individual, which it represented as simply a unit of society and the 
polity.”  Indeed, to many, individualism’s appeal is its apparent colorblindness: the 
individual “might be male or female, tall or short, rich or poor, nurturing or aggressive, 
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for such attributes did not effect the individual’s status as an individual.”70  
However, history has a long shadow.  Until relatively recently, women, people of color, 
gays and lesbians, the poor or unpropertied, and various others were oppressed, 
disenfranchised, and/or enslaved, and these histories have consequences that reverberate 
for decades, if not centuries.  In 2013, these groups are routinely denied opportunities and 
subject to institutional prejudice and individual acts of discrimination.  Individualism 
relies on a theoretical equality of opportunity, but this equality has never existed in fact.  
To the extent that it ever exists, true individual freedom has only been enjoyed in the 
United States by white, wealthy, heterosexual males. 
For those who don’t recognize or acknowledge this fact, individualism can easily 
lead to prejudice and resentment.  As Jack Turner identified, “at individualism’s heart is a 
will to see the world in a self-congratulatory way, to construe one’s achievements as 
entirely self-authored, to interpret accidental privileges as just deserts.”  In this way, “the 
individualist’s vainglory gives rise to distorted social perception” about the apparent 
inferiority of other groups.71  Absent an acknowledgement of historically persistent 
structural racism, sexism and classism and continuing discrimination, individualists find 
themselves justifying a given group’s poverty, powerlessness, low wages or rate 
incarceration by referring to the individual failures of that group’s members.  When it is 
applied to topics such as federal attempts to reverse centuries of discriminatory practices, 
this “distorted social perception” can breed racial resentment and claims of reverse 
                                                
70 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism (Chapel Hill: UNC 
Press, 1991), 122, 128. 
71 Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 23. 
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racism.  As Sally Robinson put it, “those who defend the existence of an unmarked, 
universally available individualism,” in the present or the post-apocalyptic future, are 
themselves practicing “identity politics in both subtle and overt ways.72 
The link that I’ve drawn between peakism and socially conservative individualism 
does not hold true for all adherents, of course—some male commenters objected to the 
sexist and xenophobic connotations of World Made By Hand, and some survey 
respondents were active in Transition Towns and other collective endeavors.  But the 
connections between post-apocalyptic imaginaries and the shifts in political economy, 
gender roles, and racial scapegoating in the United States in the mid-2000s provides a 
compelling explanation for the whiteness and maleness of this population.  This is to say 
that the kinds of apocalyptic scenarios that peak oil authors and believers often focus 
on—driven by scarcity and peopled by individualists—can lead them to adopt positions 
that seem counter to their stated beliefs.  The “retrosexual” opportunities that peakism 
and related ideologies offer are not reprehensible for the kinds of actions they can lead 
to—raising chickens and learning to farm, for example, are praiseworthy endeavors—but 
we should always remain mindful of the political, racial, and sexual connotations that 
they carry in their wake. 
 
                                                
72 Sally Robinson, Marked Men: White Masculinity in Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 
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Conclusion 
 Given the motivations of some white, male peakists, it might be easy to write off 
the peak oil movement as merely another chapter in America’s long history of misguided 
apocalypticism.  After the wave of concern over oil depletion died down in 2009—
because of the economic recession, which lowered energy usage and drew media 
attention to other issues, as well as the boom in “unconventional” petroleum, from tar 
sands to hydrofracking—this was the evaluation of most media commentators.  This is 
not the approach this I have taken.  In this conclusion, I highlight the lessons this 
dissertation has drawn about and from the peak oil movement, apply and extend them to 
the study of climate change, and suggest that the peak oil movement offers important 
lessons about contemporary environmental action, and politics in general. 
 
Taking Crisis Seriously 
The primary subject of this dissertation is a social movement not even five years 
in the rear-view mirror, but each chapter has argued that to truly understand peak oil 
believers, we need to historicize their concerns and actions.  I have done so by presenting 
a number of different, interrelated perspectives on twentieth-century American history—a 
history of beliefs about abundance and scarcity; a history of oil production and prices; a 
history of the libertarian shift; a history of the development of Internet technology; a 
history of American apocalyptic thought; and a very recent history of white masculinity.  
In the first part of this conclusion, I ask the reader to consider one final perspective: our 
place in environmental history.   
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Most readers will no doubt be familiar with many of the changes in the natural 
environment that have occurred over the last thirty years, so a lengthy recapitulation is 
not necessary.  Instead, I want to remind the reader of our current position.  Although our 
sense of an ongoing environmental crisis has become, as Frederick Buell put it, simply a 
“way of life,” we are living in a moment of almost unimaginable danger as a result of our 
reliance on fossil fuels.  The atmospheric carbon concentration recently passed 400 parts 
per million, the highest concentration in at least 800,000 years.1  Increases in average 
temperature and sea rise are only the most well-known consequences of this increase, 
however.  Weather patterns are shifting, leading to instability, violence, and mass 
migration, especially in the global South.  Scholars estimate that climate change already 
adversely affects 300 million people and is responsible for 300,000 deaths each year.2  
Under current trends, one-third of the planet’s land will become desert by 2100, and the 
proportion in “extreme drought” will jump from the current three to 30 percent.3  
Extreme weather events are on the rise—the three decades before 2008 “yielded four 
times as many weather-related disasters as the first three quarters of the 20th century 
combined.”4  Ocean ecosystems stand at the brink of collapse, with 90% of the large fish 
having disappeared from the oceans, primarily the result of ocean acidification and 
                                                
1 David Biello, “400 PPM: Can Artificial Trees Help Pull CO2 from the Air?”  Scientific American, May 9, 
2013, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=prospects-for-direct-air-capture-of-carbon-
dioxide.  Accessed June 1, 2013. 
2 John Vidal, “Global Warming Causes 300,000 Deaths a Year, Guardian, May 29, 2009.  This number is 
calculated as the result of floods, droughts, fires, new diseases, and small-scale warfare that can be 
attributed to anthropogenic climate change.  By 2030, this number is expected to be as high as 500,000 
people per year. 
3 Eleanor J. Burke, Simon J. Brown, and Nikolaos Christidis, “Modeling the recent evolution of global 
drought and projections for the twenty-first century with the Hadley Centre climate model,” Journal of 
Hydrometeorology 7, no. 5 (2006): 1113-1125. 
4 Charles M. Blow, “Farewell, Fair Weather,” New York Times, May 31, 2008. 
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wasteful industrial fishing.5  Up to 150 different species are going extinct every day, and 
if current trends continue, up to 30% of all known species—2,600,000 different 
species—will become extinct by 2050.6 
Most presentations of this and similar information tend to conclude with a 
reminder that it is not too late.  Indeed, it is not.  The problem is that current rates of 
consumption, pollution and despoliation are not holding steady or declining.  They are 
accelerating, as they have been doing since approximately 1950 (see figure 6.1).7  For 
example, in 2010 humans emitted roughly 37 billion tons of carbon, one quarter from the 
United States alone.  With the increases in consumption and energy use per capita 
expected to occur outside of the West, that number may jump as high as 60 billion tons 
by 2030.  But climate stabilization, a critical aspect of true sustainability, would require 
the entire world to reduce its overall consumption to the current poorest level.  In the 
United States, this would require a 95 percent reduction in total consumption.8 
  
 
 
                                                
5 Tom Levitt, “Overfished and Under-protected: Oceans on the Brink of Catastrophic Collapse,” CNN, 
March 27, 2013.  http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/22/world/oceans-overfishing-climate-change.  Accessed 
May 15, 2013. 
6 Sigmar Gabriel, “Biodiversity 'Fundamental' to Economics,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6432217.stm.  Accessed May 15, 2013. 
7 Garry Peterson, “Visualizing the Great Acceleration,” http://rs.resalliance.org/2008/12/04/visualizing-the-
great-acceleration-part-ii/. Data from William L. Steffen, Angelina Sanderson, Peter Tyson, Jill Jäger, 
Pamela A. Matson, Berrien Moore III, Frank Oldfield, Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet 
Under Pressure (Berlin: Springer, 2005). 
8 Carl Boggs, Ecology and Revolution: Global Crisis and the Political Challenge (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 32-33. 
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These basic facts are most often euphemized in the United States, by those who 
acknowledge them, as an imperative to move toward “sustainability.”  The term 
“sustainability,” like “crisis,” has been stretched thin by deliberate misuse, but we should 
recall from whence it came.  Although the term means different things to different 
people, “sustainability” (or “sustainable development”) is often defined as it first was, in 
1987, by a World Commission on Environment and Development as “a process of change 
Northern hemisphere average surface temperature 
Global population 
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Loss of tropical rainforest and woodland 
 
Global gross domestic product 
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Species extinctions 
1750                   1800                     1850                    1900                     1950                    2000  
 Motor vehicles 
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The “Great Acceleration” 
Fig. 6.2.  While humans have always placed stress on the biosphere, these stresses have greatly 
accelerated since approximately 1950.  Source: Garry Peterson, “Visualizing the Great 
Acceleration,” http://rs.resalliance.org/2008/12/04/visualizing-the-great-acceleration-part-ii/.  Data 
from William L. Steffen, Angelina Sanderson, Peter Tyson, Jill Jäger, Pamela A. Matson, Berrien 
Moore III, Frank Oldfield, Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under Pressure (Berlin: 
Springer, 2005). 
   255 
in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both 
current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.”9  The phrase 
“sustainable development” emerged in the 1990s as a useful environmental paradigm that 
incorporated environmental protection and a limits-to-growth attention to resources and 
intergenerational equity with a corporate-friendly acceptance of prolonged economic 
growth.10 
The very concept of “sustainability” is an implicit response to its opposite, 
unsustainability—a fair descriptor of the current state of human actions and lifestyles, 
especially in the global North.  One useful measure of judging sustainability is the 
ecological footprint, a tool that allows us to  “estimate the resource consumption and 
waste assimilation requirements of a defined human population or economy in terms of a 
corresponding productive land area,” based on the biosphere’s ability to regenerate.11  As 
of 2007, human beings used up the resources of one and a half Earths; but if everyone on 
the planet lived as the average American does—as most seek to do—we would exhaust 
the resources of five Earths each year.12  This figure does not even take into account or 
                                                
9 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 47.  This is often known as the Brundtland Commission after its Chairman, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, then the Prime Minister of Norway.  See Daniel J. Philippon, “Sustainability and the 
Humanities: An Extensive Pleasure,” American Literary History 24, no. 1 (2012): 163-179. 
10 Indeed, some claim that that the term, in its current meaning, was first used in Limits to Growth.  See 
Ulrich Grober, “Deep Roots: A Conceptual History of ‘Sustainable Development,’” unpublished Master’s 
thesis, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, 2007, 8-9.   
11 Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, “Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the 
Earth” (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers, 1996), 9. 
12 Global Footprint Network, “Data Sources,” 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/data_sources.  Accessed March 20, 2012.  An 
ecological footprint is a calculation that estimates the area of Earth's productive land and water required to 
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reliance on resource that are finite, such as topsoil, freshwater, phosphorus, key minerals, 
and of course fossil fuels. 
These constraints are only a small part of this equation, however.  Many 
Americans may understand a the phrase “environmental crisis” as referring specifically to 
climate change, which has attracted the lion’s share of recent environmental publicity in 
the last decade, but most scientists would join Buell in noting that  
Even a short list of current environmental crises is of necessity quite long.  At the 
least it must include an energy (and also other resources) crisis; a multifactorial waste 
crisis… a wetlands crisis; a food production crisis; a crop diversity crisis; a forest 
crisis; a soils crisis; an ocean crisis; a freshwater crisis; a biodiversity crisis; an acid 
rain crisis; an ozone hole crisis; a global warming crisis; an environmental 
toxification crisis; a global disease crisis; a population crisis; and a growth or 
development crisis.13 
Without splitting hairs over whether the term “crisis” applies equally to each of these 
areas, we might agree that the amount of resources our way of life demands is simply not 
sustainable.  Most readers will be aware of at least one or two of these crises.  They will 
also be aware that despite the “green” rhetoric that is now standard in most advertising, 
very little has been done to address them—in fact, almost every one of them has become 
more grave since they were first brought to public attention.14  Somehow, as Sarah S. 
                                                                                                                                            
supply the resources that an individual or group demands, as well as to absorb the wastes that the individual 
or group produces. 
13 Frederick Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 74.  For more information on each of these issues, see Buell, 69-142. 
14 The possible exception here is the hole in the ozone hole over the Earth’s polar regions, which was 
largely caused by the dissociation of chemicals such as CFCs.  The Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
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Amsler observed in 2010, “the spectre of crisis now casts an urgent but oddly bearable 
shadow on everyday life.  It appears through documentaries on the science of climate 
change and video footage of melting ice: we manage it with recycling bins and reusable 
bags.”15 
Amsler is referring here to Al Gore’s 2006 documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, 
which represented a high-water mark of climate change awareness in the mid-2000s but 
offered only minor, mostly individualistic suggestions for action.  As Michael Pollan 
noted in a review, “the really dark moment” of the film was not its visualization of the 
Atlantic Ocean washing over Manhattan, which most audience members were 
accustomed to seeing in blockbuster disaster movies such as The Day After Tomorrow, 
but it “came during the closing credits, when we are asked to… change our light bulbs. 
That’s when it got really depressing.  The immense disproportion between the magnitude 
of the problem Gore had described and the puniness of what he was asking us to do about 
it was enough to sink your heart.”16  The “puniness” of Gore’s suggestions, mirrored in 
the baby-step solutions that mainstream environmental organizations and liberal 
politicians proposed throughout the 2000s, reflected his acceptance of mainstream 
economic growthmanship.  But it also reflected a pragmatic awareness of America’s 
lukewarm support for environmental initiatives.  According to a 2009 poll on Americans’ 
                                                                                                                                            
Deplete the Ozone Layer, signed internationally in 1989, successfully restricted the production of these 
chemicals, and remains one of the great victories for environmentalism internationally.  However, it will be 
decades before the hole in the stratosphere is closed, and scientists are just beginning to understand the 
interaction between ozone depletion and climate change.  See Son SeokWoo, Neil F. Tandon, Lorenzo M. 
Polvani, and Darryn W. Waugh, “Ozone hole and Southern Hemisphere climate change,” Geophysical 
Research Letters 36, no. 15 (2009). 
15 Sarah S. Amsler, “Bringing Hope ‘To Crisis’: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action and Social Change,” in 
Stefan Skrimshire, ed., Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination (London: Continuum, 
2010), 129. 
16 Michael Pollan, “Why Bother?” New York Times, April 20, 2008, MM19. 
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policy priorities, “Global Warming” was the lowest priority of the twenty options 
presented, behind even “Trade Policy” and “Lobbyists.”  The general category 
“Environment” did only slightly better, at number sixteen.17 
In this context—with a public that still implicitly expects an indefinite 
continuation of “business as usual” enabled by a miraculous technological fix, with an 
unprecedented, almost existential environmental crisis on the horizon—studying the rare 
individuals and groups that have actually responded to environmental crisis in a 
proportionate way can provide one vision of what “taking crisis seriously” might look 
like.18  Peakists certainly overestimated the timing and immediate consequences of 
petroleum depletion and underestimated the potential of alternative energy sources, but 
their sense of an imminent ecological crisis was certainly justified.  They adopted and 
acted on an ecological identity that critiques and opposes the normative but increasingly 
problematic dominant social paradigm of unlimited abundance and technological 
solutionism described in chapter 1.  Furthermore, they were engaged in the kinds of 
actions that we might hope all Americans would undertake to cut our carbon emissions, 
necessary but not sufficient actions such as using public transit, making their homes more 
energy-efficient, driving and flying less, bicycling more, and altering their consumption 
patterns.  They argued, as one believer put it, that environmental issues such as peak oil 
and climate change are, at their core, “moral, ethical and spiritual” problems,” as opposed 
to “technical, scientific, engineering, economic” or “financial” problems, and advised that 
                                                
17 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Economy, Jobs Top Public's Policy Agenda,” 
January 20, 2011, http://www.people-press.org/2011/01/20/economy-dominates-publics-agenda-dims-
hopes-for-the-future.  Accessed August 27, 2012. 
18 Buell, 39. 
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“if we do not approach it from this direction our chances for surviving, much less 
creating a more just kind and humane society are very poor indeed.”19  This might have 
seemed a radical claim only a decade ago, but that time has passed. 
While the kinds of actions that peakists took had a negligible effect on actual 
carbon emissions, they still might have a tangible effect on the environmental crisis of the 
will that enables the continuing carbon catastrophe—the sense that Americans are not 
willing or even able to change their lifestyles and make sacrifices on behalf of the 
common good.  As sociologist Kari Marie Norgaard observed from her ethnographic 
research into climate change quiescence in the United States and Norway, “individuals 
see that smart people around them continue to carry on highly consumptive behaviors, 
even in the face of knowledge about their consequences, and assume that others are too 
self-interested to be motivated for change.”20  In this light, individualistic responses are 
important not for their potential to reduce actual emissions (let alone ensure survival in 
the post-apocalyptic future), but as an environmental communications strategy.  They 
signal to friends, family, co-workers and neighbors that despite the imperative to 
consume, Americans do possess a concern for the commonweal and a willingness to 
change. 
Studying peakists can also teach us a great deal about the causes of inaction, both 
personal and political.  The social dynamic of marginalization that my respondents 
described is not limited to apocalyptic predictions about oil depletion.  It extends to a 
number of potentially uncomfortable or unpleasant topics in the twenty-first United 
                                                
19 Respondent 9593771. 
20 Kari Marie Norgaard, Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions, and Everyday Life (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2011), 193. 
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States, such as the roots of the recent recession, growing economic inequality, structural 
racism, mass incarceration, drone strikes, indefinite detention centers and climate change, 
to name just a few.  Millions of conversations that never occur because one party is 
concerned about being perceived as a “Debby Downer” constitute the social production 
of an increasingly problematic normality.  They are, in sum, exactly the kind of missed 
collective conversation that most observers believe the United States desperately needs.  
Their absence exerts a silent influence on the nation’s ability to respond to the 
multitudinous challenges of our time. 
To illustrate the impact of ignoring societal problems, a peakist from Washington 
caricatured the “knee-jerk reaction” she often receives when discussing resource 
depletion: there’s “no evidence, you’re a pessimist anyway, yeah and my house is going 
to be under water next year as well.”21  As Hurricane Katrina, superstorm Sandy and so 
many other recent weather events have shown, there is a high price to be paid for 
avoiding difficult topics, and it compounds over time.  It would be comforting to 
maintain that peak oil and climate change are unrelated threats, but they are in fact two 
sides of the same oleaginous coin.  Both are global, carbon-based problems that threaten 
disastrous consequences if we do not transition away from fossil fuels.  If the “age of oil” 
ends soon, as peakists believed, it would indeed constitute a calamitous event; should we 
continue burning fossil fuels at the present rate for decades, the consequences of climate 
change will be far worse than current estimates predict. 
Denial of environmental science has rightly received a great deal of attention in 
the United States in the last decade, primarily focusing on the conservative crusade to 
                                                
21 Respondent 9575985.  Emphasis added. 
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obfuscate and politicize the science of anthropogenic climate change.22  But there are 
other forms of denial as well.  Social psychologists Susan Opotow and Leah Weiss have 
described the assignation of responsibility to “higher authorities or legitimate decision 
makers” as itself a form of denial of self-involvement.23  Of growing importance as the 
consequences of our reliance on fossil fuels become more widely accepted, sociologist 
Stanley Cohen has argued, is “implicatory denial.”  “Implicatory denial” admits the basic 
facts but minimizes “the psychological, political or moral implications that 
conventionally follow” from them, such as the ethical imperative to respond.24  
Sociologists such as Norgaard have demonstrated that these various forms of 
denial are socially and culturally constructed.  Different countries, cultures and 
subcultures have differing norms of action, inaction, and emotion, meaning that the kinds 
of information we pay attention to, ignore, and allow to influence us emotionally in our 
everyday lives.  First, we rely on the “cognitive traditions” of our culture or subculture, 
which tell us “whether to pay attention to a given idea or event in a given moment or 
not.”25  Then we rely on “emotion norms,” which “prescribe the socially appropriate 
range, intensity, duration, and targets of feelings in different situations,” and thereby “set 
the standard for what an individual ‘ought’ to feel in a given context.”26  She notes that in 
contrast to purely psychological theories of denial, “the notion of socially organized 
                                                
22 See, for example, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists 
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010); 
and James Hoggan, Climate Cover-up: The Crusade to Deny Global Warming (Greystone Books: 
Vancouver, 2009). 
23 Susan Opotow and Leah Weiss, “New Ways of Thinking About Environmentalism: Denial and the 
Process of Moral Exclusion in Environmental Conflict,” Journal of Social Issues 56, no. 3 (2000), 477. 
24 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering (Polity, 2001), 8. 
25 Norgaard 2011, 5. 
26 Ibid, 92. 
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denial emphasizes that ignoring occurs in response to social circumstances and is carried 
out through a process of social interaction.”27  In my surveys, peakists described in great 
detail the kinds of subtle and not-so-subtle social pressure exerted by their friends, 
family, and co-workers, and the cost of going against the grain.28  Studying the counter-
tradition of Malthusian environmentalism illuminates the contours of the social 
organization of denial. 
 
Peak Individualism? 
If peakists are to be respected for taking environmental crisis seriously, this 
dissertation has been critical of the way that many of them have responded.  Here we find 
the convergence of the two primary issues of Peak Politics: concerns about 
environmental crisis and the influence of the libertarian shift.  My respondents, like peak 
oil authors, were well aware that individualistic, survivalist responses to the problems of 
peak oil and climate change would not be sufficient, but many saw few alternatives.  This 
has less to do with a personal failure of imagination and more to do with their historical 
moment.  In a recent book on “catastrophism,” Eddie Yuen argued that “waking up” to 
the contemporary environmental situation “in the context of alienation is profoundly 
disempowering,” and appropriately distinguished this experience from political 
consciousness-raising during the 1960s, a decade of expanding democratic possibilities.  
“To understand” apathy about environmental challenges, Yuen asserted that we “must 
                                                
27 Ibid, 9.  
28 As Ehrenreich notes, the “culture of cheerfulness” is powerful exactly because it is in no way an official 
mandate but is seemingly reproduced and demanded by each individual citizen. One could very well 
describe the pressures to conform to the expectations of the “dominant social paradigm” through the lens of 
Michel Foucault’s concept of “governmentality.” 
   263 
look at the conditions of atomization, depoliticization, powerlessness, and alienation that 
afflict the U.S. body politic generally.”29 
As I argued in chapter 3, libertarian activists and their wealthy backers slotted 
their then-radical political philosophy into the long tradition of American individualism, 
and effected a monumental transformation of American political culture.  Capitalizing on 
the sense of inevitable growth and progress borne of the “age of oil,” “government” 
became primarily a matter of optimizing markets for maximum efficiency.  “The market” 
was not merely an answer to potentially divisive questions about distribution of wealth 
and environmental deterioration, but, as Daniel T. Rodgers observed, “stood for a way of 
thinking about society with a myriad of self-generated actions for its engine and 
optimization as its natural and spontaneous outcome.”30  The Internet, developed in the 
heyday of market fundamentalism, reflected the dominant ideology of its era.  Although 
we should hope that digital spaces will eventually deliver on their substantial democratic 
potential, we should recognize that they can also serve to atomize and depoliticize their 
inhabitants.  During the recession of 2007-2008, when the failure of market 
fundamentalism became too big to ignore, liberals finally began to push back against the 
spread of libertarian ideals.  But by this point they were bucking the tide of three decades 
of conservative warnings about the evils of “big government,” praise for market 
efficiency, and the targeted evisceration of the public sphere. 
                                                
29 Eddie Yuen, “The Politics of Failure Have Failed: The Environmental Movement and Catastrophism,” in 
James Davis, Sasha, Lilley, David McNally and Eddie Yuen, eds., Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics 
of Collapse and Rebirth (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 21. 
30 Rodgers, 41. 
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 With environmental issues ranking as a low priority, and in the absence of 
effective popular challenges to the status quo, the only politically acceptable means to 
respond to climate change and resource depletion is the favorite of neoliberals and 
libertarians alike: the market.  The mainstream response to concerns about oil depletion, 
which became widespread in the United States in 2008, was, as Peter North summarized 
it, “that market economies are creative enough to solve problems through solutions of 
which we cannot as yet even dream, and that technology will overcome contemporary 
carbon crises.”31  This response was even echoed by dedicated scholars of petroleum.32  
For American politicians concerned with climate change, the only imaginable solution is 
a cap-and-trade system, despite common knowledge about the abuse of emissions 
markets overseas and similar environmental markets in recent U.S. history.33  This is a 
libertarian solution that is enthusiastically advocated by liberals, Democrats, Republicans, 
and conservatives alike.  Although climate change has been described as “the greatest 
market failure the world has seen,” since carbon emissions have remained “external” to 
the emitter’s cost, the only solution is somehow to create even more markets.34  But, we 
should ask ourselves, is this faith in the free market and concomitant opposition to 
regulation not a reflection of conservative intellectual influence?  In this light, we might 
                                                
31 North 2010, 586. 
32 See, for example, Daniel Yergin, “There Will Be Oil,” The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2011. 
33 On the failure of emissions trading in the implementation of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, see 
David M. Driesen, “Neoliberal Instrument Choice,” in David M. Driesen, ed., Economic Thought and US 
Climate Change Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010). On the failure of contemporary Europeans 
emissions markets, see Nathaniel Gronewold, “Europe's Carbon Emissions Trading -- Growing Pains or 
Wholesale Theft?” New York Times, January 31, 2011; and Elisabeth Rosenthal and Andrew W. Lehren, 
“Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a Harmful Gas,” New York Times, August 8, 2012. 
34 Nicholas Stern, Review on the Economics of Climate Change (London: HM Treasury, 2006).  On the 
influence of libertarian-neoliberal thought on global environmental policy, see Driesen 2010; and Jane 
Andrew, Mary A. Kaidonis, and Brian Andrew, “Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate 
Change,” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21, no. 7 (2010): 611–618. 
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better understand the Nebraska peakist’s claim that “the problem of peak oil, like 
overpopulation and nuclear proliferation, is about collective action and long term 
planning. The problem is not a shortage of hydrocarbons”—nor, one might add, an excess 
of hydrocarbons—“but a shortage of wisdom.”35 
  Wisdom, however, is a resource that is renewable.  One meaning of “wisdom” is 
the “soundness of judgment in the choice of means and ends.”36  This dissertation is 
descriptive and analytical, and it is beyond its scope to offer prescriptions.  However, I 
can conclude with the simple observation that the adoption of libertarian solutions is not a 
sound means to maintain the status quo, let alone achieve a collective future that is more 
equitable, more just, and more sustainable.  Wisdom, then, would require that we 
recognize the gradual but indisputable trend towards libertarian and neoliberal ideals in 
political culture, not only in the United States but around the world.  Wisdom would also 
require understanding that the solutions to transnational, existential problems such as 
climate change and eventual resource depletion must be political and personal.  That our 
cultural fascination with apocalypse and recent developments in politics, law, digital 
technologies other areas have led to a sense of widespread alienation and depoliticization 
makes the actions of environmentally-aware Americans, such as peak oil believers, even 
more critical. 
                                                
35 Respondent 9686274. 
36 Oxford English Dictionary. 
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Appendix 
Survey Data 
 
        First  Second 
Survey Survey 
 
 
Date conducted      January 2011 July 2011 
 
Number of respondents     1128  628 
 
If you had to quantify your level of certainty in the fundamental theory of peak oil -- that 
global oil production will peak in the next decade (if it hasn't already), and that this event 
will have grave and potentially apocalyptic effects on the United States and around the 
world -- on a scale of 1 to 10, what would it be?  1 is disbelief, 10 is complete certainty.  
• 1       0.5  0.7 
• 2       0.3  0.7 
• 3       0.8  0 
• 4       0.3  0.4 
• 5       3.4  0 
• 6       3.9  1.5 
• 7       10.3  7.8 
• 8       18.3  19.0 
• 9       24.5  26.9 
• 10       37.8  42.9 
 
Which country/region are you in? 
• United States      77.3  70.2 
• Canada      8.0  9.7 
• Central America     0.3  0.5 
• South America     0.3  0 
• Western Europe     7.9  10.7 
• Eastern Europe     0.9  1.6 
• Africa       0.3  0 
• Asia       0.8  1.6 
• Other       4.3  5.8 
 
What is your age? 
• 0-20       0.1  -  
• 21-25       1.8  - 
• 26-30       5.4  - 
• 31-35       8.7  - 
• 36-40       9.0  - 
   288 
• 41-45       13.6  - 
• 46-50       14.1  - 
• 51-55       17.0  - 
• 56-60       14.1  - 
• 61-65       9.4  - 
• 66-70       3.5  - 
• 71-75       2.3  - 
• 76-80       0.4  - 
• 81+       0.4  - 
 
What is your gender? 
• Male       83.9  73.4 
• Female      15.5  22.8 
• Rather not answer     0.7  2.6 
 
If you are in the United States, do you identify as…  
• White       -  88.8 
• Black / African American    -  1.1 
• Asian       -  0 
• Hispanic / Latino     -  1.9 
• American Indian     -  0.7 
• Pacific Islander / Hawaiian    -  0.7 
• Other       -  3.7 
• Rather not answer     -  4.1 
 
If you are in the United States, what would you identify as your race or ethnicity? 
• Caucasian      90.7  - 
• African American     0.5  - 
• Latino       1.2  - 
• Asian American     0.6  - 
• Native American     0.8  - 
• Other       5.8  - 
 
What is your religious preference?   
• Protestant      -  5.5   
• Christian (non-specific)    -  9.0   
• Catholic      -  5.5   
• Jewish      -  2.9  
• Mormon      -  0.5   
• Other specific      -  11.6  
• None       -  50.9   
• Undesignated      -  14.0  
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
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• Did not graduate High School   0.4  1.1 
• High School      6.0  7.1 
• College      44.2  46.1 
• Trade or technical school    6.2  7.1 
• Master’s Degree     26.7  24.7 
• PhD       9.4  9.4 
• Other professional degrees    7.1  9.3 
 
How would you describe your political views?      
• Very conservative     -  4.3   
• Conservative      -  7.4  
• Moderate      -  29.9  
• Liberal       -  28.7  
• Very liberal      -  27.4 
 
How do you identify yourself politically? 
• Anarchist      6.5  9.0 
• Socialist      10.2  10.5 
• Progressive      20.1  20.1 
• Liberal       15.4  13.9 
• Independent       21.9  22.3 
• Moderate      10.2  8.4 
• Conservative      6.4  4.2 
• Libertarian      9.4  11.6 
 
At the height of your interest in the subject, how often did you visit peak oil websites 
(approximately)? 
• Many times a day     24.6  39.3 
• Once a day      42.3  42.3 
• Once a week      18.9  11.6 
• Once a month      6.4  2.2 
• Once a year      3.1  0.7 
• Never       4.8  3.0 
 
What initially sparked your interest in this topic?  16.3  - 
• 1970s Oil Crisis     5.4  - 
• The Gulf War      5.3  - 
• 9/11       5.2  - 
• Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan    9.3  - 
• Hurricane Katrina     2.3  - 
• Gas Prices      11.2  - 
• BP Oil Spill      1.4  - 
• A book      29.0  - 
• Friend/family/coworker    8.4  - 
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Have you found it difficult to speak to others about peak oil? 
• Yes       -  29.3 
• Sometimes      -  36.7 
• Rarely       -  11.2 
• Not at all      -  21.4 
• Never tried      -  0.29 
 
Have you found it difficult to speak to others about peak oil or “come out” as a peak 
oiler? 
• Yes       29.3  -   
• Sometimes      36.7  - 
• Rarely       11.2  - 
• Not at all      21.4  - 
• Never tried      0.3  - 
 
Have you attended any in-person meetings with others interested in the same topic?  If so, 
where? 
• MeetUp Groups     10.6  18.7 
• Conventions (regional or national)   9.9  11.2 
• Transition Initiative     12.3  22.1 
• Lectures      27.9  31.2 
• No       61.4  53.0 
 
What do you think the benefits of visiting sites like Peak Oil News & Message Boards 
(www.peakoil.com) have been for you? (Select all that apply.) 
• Centralized location for information   72.7  - 
• Place to have questions answered   45.1  - 
• Good to be of service to newcomers   23.1  - 
• Comfort of knowing that other people have   
The same thoughts     54.9  - 
• Grow more of my own food    28.9  - 
• Invest differently     26.0  - 
• No benefits      0.9  - 
• I don’t visit peak oil websites    7.0  - 
 
 
How has you knowledge of peak oil affected your life?  Please select all that apply. 
• Changed occupation     12.8  -   
• Changed partner/spouse    2.5  - 
• Living in a Transition Town    3.3  - 
• Building a Transition Town    5.8  - 
• Living in other form of sustainable community 7.2  - 
• Building other form of sustainable community 15.6  - 
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• Drive less      53.2  - 
• Purchased car with better MPG   32.3  - 
• Not affected my life     11.3  - 
 
As a result of your knowledge of peak oil, have you done any of the following? 
• Reduced energy usage at your current home  -  81.6 
• Moved to a smaller or more energy-efficient home -  24.0 
• Prepared food or other supplies for yourself and 
your family      -  72.3   
• Changed your occupation    -  19.9 
• Moved to a Transition Town    -  2.6 
• Moved to some other form of sustainable 
community      -  12.4 
• Engaged in political activity related to peak oil -  27.3 
 
Please agree or disagree with the following statement: "Fictional portrayals of post-
apocalyptic scenarios have influenced the vision that some 'peak oilers' have of what the 
post-peak period will be like." 
• Strongly disagree     2.4  - 
• Disagree      14.7  - 
• Agree       68.5  - 
• Strongly agree      20.5  - 
 
Please agree or disagree with the following statement: "Fictional portrayals of post-
apocalyptic scenarios have influenced my image of what the post-peak period will be 
(and will not) be like." 
• Strongly disagree     11.1  - 
• Disagree      27.1  - 
• Undecided      25.5  - 
• Agree       33.1  - 
• Strongly agree      3.1  - 
 
Would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “We don’t give everyone an 
equal chance in this country.” 
• Agree       -  82.2 
• Disagree      -  15.2 
 
In recent years, has too much been made of the problems facing black people? 
• Too much      -  10.1  
• Too little      -  34.5 
• Just right      -  12.7  
• Don’t know      -  40.7  
 
Do you think it should be legal or illegal for gay and lesbian couples to get married?  
How strongly do you feel about this question? 
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• Legal (strongly)     -  56.1 
• Legal (somewhat)     -  24.1 
• Illegal (somewhat)     -  3.3 
• Illegal (strongly)     -  3.3 
• No opinion      -  11.4 
 
Which of the following websites have you checked regularly? 
• Life After the Oil Crash    -  31.8 
• Peak Oil News     -  30.7 
• The Oil Drum      -  54.6 
• Energy Bulletin     -  39.4 
• Peak Oil Blues     -  15.5 
• Clusterfuck Nation     -  39.5 
 
Which of the following books have you read? 
• Richard Heinberg’s The Party’s Over  -  78.3 
• James Howard Kunstler’s The Long Emergency -  87.2 
• Matthew Simmons’ Twilight in the Desert  -  77.1 
• James Howard Kunstler’s World Made By Hand -  78.1 
• Rob Hopkins’ Transition Handbook   -  72.7 
• Dmitry Orlov’s Reinventing Collapse  -  77.6 
 
Which of the following do you see as most likely for the country you currently reside in?  
Please rate each on a scale of 0 to 10. 
• Business as usual with no major consequences -  1.9 
• Better technology and new energy sources 
allow for little change     -  2.7 
• Resource wars for remaining energy   -  7.8 
• A gradual shift into a lower-energy world 
(“powerdown”)     -  5.7 
• A smaller population     -  7.1  
• A significant drop in quality of life   -  7.9 
• Apocalyptic scenario (i.e. violence, 
epidemics, die-off)     -  6.1 
 
Which of the following do you see as most likely in the less developed parts of the 
world?  Please rank each on a scale of 1 to 10. 
• Business as usual with no major consequences -  2.8 
• Better technology and new energy sources  
allow for little change     -  2.4 
• Resource wars for remaining energy     7.3 
• A gradual shift into a lower-energy world 
(“powerdown”)     -  4.9 
• A smaller population     -  7.3 
• A significant drop in quality of life   -  6.3 
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• Apocalyptic scenario (i.e. violence, 
epidemics, die-off)     -  6.8 
 
Have you been more or less engaged in the following activities since learning about peak 
oil?  Please put on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 for much less engaged, 3 for no change, and 
5 for much less engaged.  
• Following political or national news   -  3.8 
• Voting       -  2.9 
• Attending rallies, marches or protests  -  2.8 
• Involved in community activities   -  3.5 
• Planning own future     -  4.5 
 
Do most members of Congress deserve re-election? 
• Yes       -  2.6 
• No       -  85.7 
• No opinion      -  11.2 
 
 
 
 
